Gadson v. Deloatch ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jerry Gadson and Sheila Gadson, Appellants,
v.
Caroline Deloatch and Bank of America, Individually
and Jointly, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2012-211466
Appeal From Richland County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-221
Submitted April 1, 2014 – Filed June 11, 2014
AFFIRMED
Mary P. Miles, of Law Office of Mary P. Miles, of
Cayce, for Appellants.
Thad H. Westbrook and Michael J. Anzelmo, both of
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia,
for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Jerry and Sheila Gadson (the Gadsons) appeal the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Bank of America and denial of their motion
to extend time to respond to requests for admission or, alternatively, to withdraw
the admissions. The Gadsons argue the trial court erred in (1) granting summary
judgment based on deemed admissions because the Rule 40(j), SCRCP, consent
motion justified their late responses and they effectively withdrew their admissions
by filing late responses; (2) failing to grant their motion to withdraw admissions
because withdrawal would promote the merits of the case and would not prejudice
Bank of America; and (3) failing to state reasons for denying their motion to
withdraw admissions. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment: Wogan v.
Kunze, 379 S.C. 581, 585, 666 S.E.2d 901, 903 (2008) ("When reviewing the grant
of summary judgment, [an appellate court] applies the same standard which
governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary judgment is proper
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Scott v. Greenville Hous. Auth., 353 S.C.
639, 645, 579 S.E.2d 151, 154 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[F]ailure to respond to requests
for admissions renders any matter listed in the request conclusively admitted for
trial."); Rule 36(a), SCRCP ("The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after
service of the request, . . . the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the
party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the
matter.").
2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying the Gadsons' motion: Rule 36(b),
SCRCP (stating a trial court "may permit withdrawal or amendment [of
admissions] when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the party who obtained the admissions fails to satisfy the court that
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
on the merits"); Scott, 353 S.C. at 652, 579 S.E.2d at 158 (holding the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing the withdrawal of admissions because the party
who obtained the admission demonstrated prejudice).
3. As to whether the trial court erred in failing to state reasons for denying the
Gadsons' motion: I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526
S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) ("If the losing party has raised an issue in the [trial] court,
but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to alter or amend the
judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.").
AFFIRMED.1
WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.