State v. Kranendonk ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Steven Kranendonk, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2012-210207
Appeal From Richland County
G. Thomas Cooper Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-210
Heard April 8, 2014 – Filed June 4, 2014
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, both of Columbia,
for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Steven Kranendonk appeals his convictions for two counts of
reckless homicide by operation of a boat. Kranendonk argues the trial court erred
in (1) qualifying Investigator Robin Camlin as an expert in navigational rules and
allowing her to offer opinions that exceeded her qualifications; and (2) admitting
evidence of Kranendonk's blood alcohol content that was allegedly obtained
without probable cause. We affirm.
1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it qualified Camlin
as an expert in navigational boating rules. State v. Price, 368 S.C. 494, 498, 629
S.E.2d 363, 365 (2006) ("The decision to admit or exclude testimony from an
expert witness rests within the trial court's sound discretion."); State v. White, 382
S.C. 265, 269, 676 S.E.2d 684, 686 (2009) (stating the admission or exclusion of
expert testimony will not be reversed absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion). She
derived her opinions from facts within her knowledge and her professional
experience with boating rules. See State v. Goode, 305 S.C. 176, 178, 406 S.E.2d
391, 393 (Ct. App. 1991) ("There is no abuse of discretion as long as the witness
has acquired by study or practical experience such knowledge of the subject matter
of [her] testimony as would enable [her] to give guidance and assistance to the jury
in resolving a factual issue which is beyond the scope of the jury's good judgment
and common knowledge."). Accordingly, we find no error in Camlin's
qualification and the admission of her expert testimony.
2. We find the facts and circumstances known to the officer requesting the
blood sample would warrant a prudent man to believe Kranendonk violated section
50-21-113. See S.C. Code Ann. § 50-21-116 (2008) (requiring an individual to
submit to a breath, blood, or urine test if an officer has probable cause to believe
the individual has violated section 50-21-113—the statute that provides penalties
for operating a boat while under the influence of alcohol resulting in death); Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) ("Probable cause exists if the facts and
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the
offense has been committed."). The officer articulated specific reasons for drawing
Kranendonk's blood, including: (1) his knowledge that Kranendonk operated a boat
involved in an accident with multiple fatalities; (2) his knowledge that Kranendonk
had been drinking prior to the accident; and (3) his observation that Kranendonk
smelled of alcohol. Therefore, we find probable cause existed and hold the trial
court did not err in admitting evidence of Kranendonk's blood alcohol content.
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.