Hickman v. City of Myrtle Beach ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Oscar Hickman, Appellant,
v.
City of Myrtle Beach, Employer, and Companion
Property & Casualty Group, Carrier, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2013-000564
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-211
Heard April 15, 2014 – Filed June 4, 2014
AFFIRMED
Gene McCain Connell, Jr., of Kelaher, Connell &
Connor, PC, of Surfside Beach, for Appellant.
Stanford Ernest Lacy, of Collins & Lacy, PC, of
Columbia, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Oscar Hickman filed this workers' compensation action against
City of Myrtle Beach and Companion Property & Casualty Group, seeking benefits
for a change of condition. The Workers' Compensation Commission (the
Commission) affirmed the Single Commissioner, finding Hickman did not suffer a
compensable change of condition. Hickman appeals, arguing the Commission
erred in failing to: (1) liberally construe the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act);
(2) find he suffered a compensable change of condition; and (3) find back surgery
would lessen his period of disability. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
and the following authorities:
1. As to Hickman's argument the Commission erred in failing to liberally
construe the Act, we find the Commission properly construed the applicable
provisions of the Act in this case. See Hutson v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 399 S.C.
381, 387, 732 S.E.2d 500, 503 (2012) (stating "the guiding principle undergirding
our workers' compensation system that the Act is to be liberally construed in favor
of the claimant"); Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 469, 617 S.E.2d 369, 377 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that
legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language
used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of
the statute."); see also Wigfall v. Tideland Utils., Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 117, 580
S.E.2d 100, 109 (2003) (explaining the appellate courts may not extend the Act by
providing a more liberal rule of compensation than that which the legislature has
intended).
2. As to Hickman's argument the Commission erred in failing to find he
suffered a compensable change of condition, we find no reversible error by the
Commission. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-90(A) (Supp. 2013) (permitting the
review of a previous compensation award "on proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that there has been a change of condition caused by the original injury,
after the last payment of compensation"); Causby v. Rock Hill Printing &
Finishing Co., 249 S.C. 225, 227, 153 S.E.2d 697, 698 (1967) (explaining the Act
defines a change of condition in a compensation claim as "a change in the
claimant's physical condition as a result of the original injury, occurring after the
first award"); Krell v. S.C. State Highway Dep't, 237 S.C. 584, 588, 118 S.E.2d
322, 323–24 (1961) (acknowledging the determination of whether a claimant
experiences a change of condition is a question for the Commission (citations and
quotation marks omitted)); Robbins v. Walgreens & Broadspire Servs., Inc., 375
S.C. 259, 265–66, 652 S.E.2d 90, 94 (Ct. App. 2007) (affirming the Commission's
denial of a claim for change of condition where medical tests performed both
before and after the settlement of the claim showed the same condition despite
claimant's continuing pain).
3. As to Hickman's argument the Commission erred in failing to find back
surgery would lessen his period of disability, we find the Commission properly
denied benefits. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-60(A) (Supp. 2013) (requiring
employer to provide medical treatment "as in the judgment of the [C]ommission
will tend to lessen the period of disability as evidenced by expert medical evidence
stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty"); Dodge v. Bruccoli, Clark,
Layman, Inc., 334 S.C. 574, 581, 514 S.E.2d 593, 597 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the
Commission may require additional medical care and treatment even if the
claimaint has reached maximum medical improved if such treatment would tend to
lessen the period of disability); see generally Lee v. Harborside Cafe, 350 S.C. 74,
81–82, 564 S.E.2d 354, 358 (Ct. App. 2002) (applying substantial evidence
standard of review to the Commission's finding regarding whether additional
medical care or treatment would tend to lessen the period of disability under
Dodge).
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.