Anderson v. SCDMV ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Kenneth Ray Anderson, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles and
Clemson University Police Department, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002547
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-481
Submitted October 1, 2014 – Filed December 23, 2014
AFFIRMED
Ryan Lewis Beasley, of Ryan L. Beasley, P.A., of
Greenville, for Appellant.
Frank L. Valenta, Jr., Linda Annette Grice, and Philip S.
Porter, of the South Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles, all of Blythewood, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Kenneth Ray Anderson appeals an order of the Administrative
Law Court (ALC) sustaining the suspension of his license for refusing to submit to
a breath test as required under section 56-5-2951 of the South Carolina Code
(Supp. 2013). On appeal, Anderson argues the ALC erred in affirming the
suspension because the Department of Motor Vehicles (the Department) failed to
establish Anderson (1) was given a written copy and was verbally informed of his
rights under section 56-5-2950 and (2) was lawfully arrested for driving under the
influence (DUI). We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
1. As to whether the Department showed Anderson was properly advised of his
implied consent rights: S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Holtzclaw, 382 S.C. 344,
347, 675 S.E.2d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The court of appeals may reverse or
modify the decision [of the ALC] only if substantive rights of the appellant have
been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in light of the reliable
and substantial evidence on the whole record, arbitrary or otherwise characterized
by an abuse of discretion, or affected by other error of law."); Taylor v. S.C. Dep't
of Motor Vehicles, 382 S.C. 567, 571, 677 S.E.2d 588, 590 (2009) ("Given that
nothing in [section 56-5-2951(F) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2013)]
provides for mandatory re-issuance of a driver's license upon review of these
factors, we find an examination of the four factors with an eye toward prejudice is
the proper inquiry."); Carroll v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 388 S.C. 39, 44-45, 693
S.E.2d 430, 433 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding substantial evidence supported the
ALC's finding the motorist was not prejudiced by the lack of written notice
because the Department showed he was verbally advised of his implied consent
rights).
2. As to whether the Department proved Anderson was lawfully arrested for DUI:
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2013) (stating an appellate court "may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of evidence
on questions of fact"); S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. McCarson, 391 S.C. 136,
145, 705 S.E.2d 425, 430 (2011) ("The dispositive question in determining the
lawfulness of an arrest is whether there was 'probable cause' to make the arrest.");
State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 49, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("Probable cause for
a warrantless arrest exists when the circumstances within the arresting officer's
knowledge are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has
been committed by the person being arrested."); id. ("Whether probable cause
exists depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the information
at the officer's disposal.").
AFFIRMED.1
HUFF, SHORT, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.