State v. Mahaffey ( 2014 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Christopher Paul Mahaffey, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2012-213062
    Appeal From Spartanburg County
    J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-449
    Heard September 9, 2014 – Filed December 10, 2014
    AFFIRMED
    Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
    Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
    Attorney General Mary Shannon Williams, both of
    Columbia, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Appellant Christopher Paul Mahaffey seeks review of his
    convictions for first-degree burglary, petit larceny, possession of cocaine base, and
    possession of oxycodone. Mahaffey argues joinder of all four charges resulted in
    the admission of character evidence that otherwise would have been inadmissible
    in a trial on only the burglary and larceny charges. Mahaffey also challenges the
    circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second-
    degree burglary. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
    authorities:
    1. As to the denial of Mahaffey's motion to sever the charges: State v. Simmons,
    
    352 S.C. 342
    , 350, 
    573 S.E.2d 856
    , 860 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A motion for severance
    is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court." (citations omitted)); 
    id.
    ("The court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
    discretion."); State v. Spears, 
    393 S.C. 466
    , 475, 
    713 S.E.2d 324
    , 328 (Ct. App.
    2011) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is unsupported
    by the evidence or controlled by an error of law." (quoting State v. Rice, 
    368 S.C. 610
    , 613, 
    629 S.E.2d 393
    , 395 (Ct. App. 2006)); State v. Beekman, 
    405 S.C. 225
    ,
    230, 
    746 S.E.2d 483
    , 486 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding charges may be "tried together
    where they (1) arise out of a single chain of circumstances; (2) are proved by the
    same evidence; (3) are of the same general nature; and (4) no real right of the
    defendant has been prejudiced").
    2. As to the denial of Mahaffey's request to charge the jury on second-degree
    burglary: 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311
    (A)(1)(a) (2003) (stating, in pertinent part,
    that a person is guilty of first-degree burglary if (1) the person enters a dwelling
    without consent and with the intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and (2) in
    entering, or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight, he or another participant
    in the crime is armed with a deadly weapon); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-312
    (A)
    (2003) ("A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if the person enters a
    dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein."); State v.
    Coleman, 
    342 S.C. 172
    , 175, 
    536 S.E.2d 387
    , 389 (Ct. App. 2000) ("It is not error
    to refuse to charge the lesser included offense unless there is evidence tending to
    show the defendant was guilty only of the lesser offense."); State v. McCaskill, 
    321 S.C. 283
    , 285, 
    468 S.E.2d 81
    , 82 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The general rule is that one is
    'armed' for purposes of first-degree burglary if a firearm is easily accessible and
    readily available for use by that individual for offensive or defensive purposes."
    (citations omitted)); 
    id.
     ("[T]o be 'armed' with a deadly weapon within the meaning
    of 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311
    (A)(1)(a), a person or 'another participant in the
    crime' need only have physical control over a deadly weapon 'in effecting entry or
    while in the dwelling or in the immediate flight therefrom' such that the weapon is
    readily available for the person to use."); id. at 286, 468 S.E.2d at 83 (concluding
    that when a burglar took possession and control over a loaded rifle located within
    the dwelling, the rifle "was just as available to the burglar for offensive or
    defensive use as if the burglar had himself brought the weapon to the burglary for
    the purpose of committing the crime"); State v. Funchess, 
    267 S.C. 427
    , 430, 
    229 S.E.2d 331
    , 332 (1976) ("[T]he [p]resence of evidence to sustain the crime of a
    lesser degree determines whether it should be submitted to the jury[,] and the mere
    contention that the jury might accept the State's evidence in part and might reject it
    in part will not suffice." (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
    AFFIRMED.
    WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2014-UP-449

Filed Date: 12/10/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024