Mickle v. Boyd Brothers Transportation ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Joseph Mickle, Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Boyd Brothers' Transportation, Inc., Employer, and
Lumbermans' Underwriting Alliance, Carrier,
Respondents-Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2013-001212
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-068
Heard December 11, 2014 – Filed February 11, 2015
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED
Frank A. Barton, Mullis Law Firm, of Columbia, for
Appellant-Respondent.
Duke K. McCall, Jr., Smith Moore Leatherwood, LLC,
of Greenville, for Respondents-Appellants.
PER CURIAM: Joseph Mickle was a truck driver and employee of WTI—a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Boyd Brothers' Transportation, Inc.—and was based
in South Carolina. Mickle suffered injury to his back after pulling the tarp off of a
truck load in Alabama. Boyd Brothers paid Mickle benefits in Alabama initially,
but Mickle decided to pursue benefits in South Carolina where he lived. After a
hearing, the single commissioner issued an order finding: (1) the commission had
jurisdiction over Mickle's claim; (2) Mickle was permanently and totally disabled;
and (3) Boyd Brothers, as Mickle's statutory employer, was responsible for paying
him benefits. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Panel, which affirmed the
single commissioner's order in full. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I. Jurisdiction
Boyd Brothers challenges the commission's determination that it had jurisdiction
over Mickle's claim. We believe the jurisdiction issue raises two sub-issues: (1)
whether WTI was covered by the Workers' Compensation Act and (2) if WTI was
not covered by the Act, whether the commission had jurisdiction over Mickle's
claim because of an employer-employee relationship between Boyd Brothers and
Mickle. "Because both issues are jurisdictional . . . this Court has the power and
duty to review the record and decide the issue in accordance with the
preponderance of the evidence." Voss v. Ramco, Inc., 325 S.C. 560, 565, 482
S.E.2d 582, 584-85 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The parties stipulated WTI did not regularly employ four or more
employees in South Carolina at the time of Mickle's injury. Thus, we find WTI
was exempt from the Act's coverage. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-360(2) (2015).
However, this stipulation is not dispositive of the jurisdiction issue.
The parties also stipulated WTI was Boyd Brothers' wholly-owned subsidiary. The
parties framed—and the commission addressed—the jurisdiction issue as whether
Boyd Brothers was Mickle's statutory employer. In doing so, the commission
relied on this court's decision in Poch v. Bayshore Concrete Products/S.C., Inc.,
386 S.C. 13, 686 S.E.2d 689 (Ct. App. 2009) (Poch I). In Poch v. Bayshore
Concrete Products/S.C., Inc., 405 S.C. 359, 747 S.E.2d 757 (2013) (Poch II),
however, our supreme court held "the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect legal
standard." 405 S.C. at 370, 747 S.E.2d at 763. The supreme court provided "eight
factors that courts should consider in determining whether" a parent company and
its wholly-owned subsidiary "are separate and distinct corporations" or a single
economic entity "for workers' compensation purposes." 405 S.C. at 372-73, 747
S.E.2d at 764 (stating "no one factor is controlling"). At oral argument the parties
agreed Poch II, which was not decided until after the parties' initial briefs had
already been filed with this court, changes the jurisdictional analysis. However,
neither party advised the court of Poch II while this appeal was pending. See Rule
208(b)(7), SCACR ("When pertinent and significant authorities come to the
attention of a party after his initial brief(s) has been served and filed, the party shall
promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter, with a copy to all
counsel, setting forth the citations."). Therefore, we question whether the
applicability of Poch II is before us. See Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily,
no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on
appeal."); Walde v. Ass'n Ins. Co., 401 S.C. 431, 435 n.1, 737 S.E.2d 631, 633 n.1
(Ct. App. 2012) (refusing to address an issue when the appellant's brief did not
"include an issue on appeal addressing this contention").
Reviewing the commission's analysis under the law of statutory employment, we
find by the preponderance of the evidence the commission had jurisdiction over
Mickle's claim. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-400 (2015); Poch II, 405 S.C. at 368,
747 S.E.2d at 762 ("In determining whether an employee is engaged in activity that
is part of [the owner's] trade, business, or occupation as required under section 42-
1-400, this Court has applied three tests." (alteration in original) (quoting Olmstead
v. Shakespeare, 354 S.C. 421, 424, 581 S.E.2d 483, 485 (2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. ("If the activity at issue meets even one of these three criteria,
the injured employee qualifies as the statutory employee of 'the owner.'" (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Additionally, if we apply the Poch II test, as Boyd Brothers asks this court to do
rather than remand to the commission, we find the following facts relevant under
the Poch II analysis. Boyd Brothers' human resources director, Lynn Colley,
testified, "I'm here as a representative . . . of Boyd Brothers and WTI." In addition,
she stated the companies maintained "a self-insured group health
plan . . . administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield," and "the paperwork does route
from WTI to Boyd. It's compiled together and sent to Blue Cross." Furthermore,
Boyd Brothers' website includes "Boyd Brothers and WTI and a logistics
department, a Boyd logistics department and the company, as well," and Colley
confirmed Boyd Brothers advertised to its customers the "WTI Division currently
has [trucks available]." Moreover, "both [WTI and Boyd Brothers] are flatbed
carriers," and advertise "the total trucks that both companies have"—consisting of
"1,050 conventional tractors" and "1,670 48-foot flatbed trailers." In addition,
Colley stated, "I can't say that [Boyd Brothers and WTI] may not have the same
customers, but they have their own customer base." While Colley briefly stated
"[e]ach company has its own president," she thereafter addressed only the
"owners" of Boyd Brothers and WTI, and explained Boyd Brothers and WTI have
the exact same owners. Colley acknowledged the owners of Boyd Brothers: "could
close down WTI"; "could change what [WTI was] doing"; "could direct where
[WTI's] trucks go and deliver"; and "they could do the same thing for Boyd
Brothers." Finally, when asked whether the owners of Boyd Brothers "have total
control over WTI," Colley answered affirmatively.
We also note Mickle testified the trucks he drove had "WTI, Subsidiary of Boyd
Brothers" on them and he considered himself as working for "WTI/Boyd
Brothers." Mickle acknowledged he was "dispatched by WTI to different
locations," but stated he was switched from "one dispatcher to another" and he did
not "know who [he] was talking to." In addition, Mickle's "medical cards,"
medical paperwork, and dental coverage papers were labeled "Boyd Care." He
also stated that after WTI accepted his workers' compensation claim in Alabama,
"[WTI] switched me to Boyd Brothers. They told me I had to call Boyd Brothers."
Thus, under Poch II, we find by the preponderance of the evidence the commission
had jurisdiction over Mickle's claim.
II. Boyd Brothers' Liability
Boyd Brothers argues the commission erred in determining Mickle was
permanently and totally disabled. We disagree. In reaching its determination, the
commission relied on the following facts: (1) treating physicians' conclusions that
Mickle was limited "to sedentary work capacity"; (2) a functional capacity
evaluation finding the same; (3) treating physicians' restriction on Mickle driving
trucks; (4) Mickle's age—sixty-six—and high school education; (5) Mickle's
working "almost exclusively in truck driving"; (6) Mickle's prescribed medication
that prohibited him from driving trucks and substantially limited "his ability to
perform any other form of work"; and (7) Dr. Robert Brabham's vocational
assessment. Thus, we find substantial evidence exists to support the commission's
decision. See White v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 355 S.C. 560, 564, 586 S.E.2d 157, 159
(Ct. App. 2003) ("The appellate court's review is limited to deciding whether the
Commission's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled by
some error of law." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Additionally,
we disagree with Boyd Brothers' assertion that the commission erred in awarding
Mickle a lump sum payment of benefits because the burden of proving facts to
justify such an award rests on the employee. Pursuant to section 42-9-301 of the
South Carolina Code (2015), when the commission makes a finding to award a
lump sum payment, the employer bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the
commission's finding was an abuse of discretion. We find Boyd Brothers did not
meet this burden.
III. Award Calculation
In a cross appeal, Mickle argues the commission erred by not correcting a
miscalculation in the single commissioner's order giving Boyd Brothers credit for
136 weeks of benefits payments when it had only paid 32 weeks. At oral argument
Boyd Brothers conceded the commission's miscalculation should be corrected if
we found the commission had jurisdiction over Mickle's claim. Therefore, we
reverse because there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the
commission's determination. We remand for the commission to correct the
miscalculation.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.