State v. Gahagan ( 2015 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Kenneth Thomas Gahagan, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2012-208388
    Appeal From Charleston County
    Stephanie P. McDonald, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-064
    Heard November 4, 2014 – Filed February 4, 2015
    AFFIRMED
    Patrick Coleman Wooten, of Nelson Mullins Riley &
    Scarborough, LLP, of Charleston, and Chief Appellate
    Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for
    Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant
    Attorney William M. Blitch and Assistant Attorney
    General Mary Shannon Williams, all of Columbia, for
    Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Kenneth T. Gahagan appeals his conviction of lewd act on a
    minor, arguing the trial court erred in (1) not allowing him to recross-examine a
    witness regarding a matter introduced during redirect examination and (2) denying
    his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and
    the following authorities:
    1.     As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing Gahagan to recross-
    examine a witness regarding a matter introduced during redirect examination:
    Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gould, 
    266 S.C. 521
    , 533, 
    224 S.E.2d 715
    , 720 (1976)
    ("The right to, and scope of, recross-examination is within the sound discretion of
    the trial court."); State v. Johnson, 
    338 S.C. 114
    , 124, 
    525 S.E.2d 519
    , 524 (2000)
    ("[A] trial judge may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based upon
    concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
    witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.");
    United States v. Fleschner, 
    98 F.3d 155
    , 157 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Absent the
    introduction of any new matter on re-direct examination, the rule is that recross-
    examination is not required. Without something new, a party has the last word
    with his own witness.").
    2.     As to whether the trial court erred in denying Gahagan's motion for a
    directed verdict: Curtis v. State, 
    345 S.C. 557
    , 567, 
    549 S.E.2d 591
    , 596 (2001)
    ("An appellate court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an
    adjudication where there remains no actual controversy."); 
    id.
     ("'A case becomes
    moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon [the]
    existing controversy. This is true when some event occurs making it impossible
    for [the] reviewing Court to grant effectual relief.'" (quoting Mathis v. S.C. State
    Highway Dep't, 
    260 S.C. 344
    , 346, 
    195 S.E.2d 713
    , 715 (1973))).
    AFFIRMED.
    HUFF, SHORT, and KONDUROS, JJ. concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-UP-064

Filed Date: 2/4/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024