Lend Lease v. Allsouth Electrical ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Lend Lease (US) Public Partnership LLC f/k/a Actus
Lend Lease LLC, Respondent,
v.
Allsouth Electrical Contractors, Inc., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002679
Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-164
Submitted February 1, 2015 – Filed March 25, 2015
DISMISSED
Walter Henry Bundy, Jr., and Michael Brent McDonald,
both of Smith Bundy Bybee & Barnett, PC, of Mount
Pleasant, for Appellant.
Edward James Coyne, III, of Williams Mullen, of
Wilmington, NC, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Allsouth Electrical Contractors, Inc. (Allsouth) appeals the
circuit court's order granting Lend Lease (US) Public Partnership LLC f/k/a Actus
Lend Lease LLC's (Lend Lease's) motion to stay and compel arbitration. On
appeal, Allsouth argues the circuit court erred in (1) compelling arbitration when
the parties did not contractually agree to arbitrate all of Lend Lease's claims, (2)
ignoring the plain language of the contracts and finding all of Lend Lease's causes
of action were for indemnification, and (3) ruling on the merits of the claim.
We dismiss this appeal because this court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from an
order granting a motion to stay and compel arbitration. See Steinmetz v. Am.
Media Servs., LLC, 393 S.C. 72, 75, 709 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]n
arbitration cases, this court only has jurisdiction over appeals from orders of the
circuit court enumerated in section 15-48-200[(a) of the South Carolina Code
(2005)]."). An order compelling arbitration is not appealable under section 15-48-
200(a). See Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United HealthCare Servs., Inc., 361 S.C.
544, 558, 606 S.E.2d 752, 759 (2004) ("Section 15-48-200[(a)] does not expressly
permit an appeal from an order granting an application to compel arbitration or
from an order to stay claims pending arbitration."). Thus, when the circuit court
issued its order compelling arbitration, it was divested of jurisdiction over the case.
See Steinmetz, 393 S.C. at 74, 709 S.E.2d at 709 ("When a case is sent to
arbitration, the circuit court is divested of jurisdiction over the case."). Although
the parties completed arbitration and the circuit court lifted the stay, the circuit
court did not resume jurisdiction over the case because it did not issue an order to
confirm, vacate, modify, or correct the arbitrator's award. See id. ("[U]pon motion
of either party to confirm, vacate, modify, or correct the arbitrator's award, the
circuit court resumes jurisdiction over the case."). Accordingly, because Allsouth
did not appeal from an order enumerated in section 15-48-200(a), this court's
jurisdiction has not been triggered and Allsouth's appeal has not been properly
perfected. See Main Corp. v. Black, 357 S.C. 179, 182, 592 S.E.2d 300, 302
(2004) ("If the circuit court has not resumed jurisdiction and issued one of the
orders enumerated in [s]ection 15-48-200[(a)], there is no court order that can be
the subject of an appeal."); Steinmetz, 393 S.C. at 75, 709 S.E.2d at 710 ("[T]he
type of order appealed from triggers this court's jurisdiction, not the fact that the
circuit court has resumed jurisdiction and issued an order enumerated in section
15-48-200[(a)]."); id. at 76, 709 S.E.2d at 710 ("The post-arbitration motions
allowed by statute in circuit court are more than a mere formality; they provide the
basis for a properly perfected appeal of an arbitration award to this court.").
Therefore, this appeal is dismissed.
DISMISSED.1
FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.