SCDSS v. Leeanne Cattles ( 2021 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    South Carolina Department of Social Services,
    Respondent,
    v.
    Leeanne Cattles, Domingo Perez, Ignatio Anaya, and
    Guillermo Castellanos, Defendants,
    Of whom Leeanne Cattles is the Appellant.
    In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.
    Appellate Case No. 2020-001428
    Appeal From Orangeburg County
    Anne Gue Jones, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-435
    Submitted November 10, 2021 – Filed December 3, 2021
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
    Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of
    Union, for Appellant.
    Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Respondent.
    Jerrod Austin Anderson, of Anderson Law Office, P.A.,
    of Orangeburg, for the Guardian ad Litem.
    PER CURIAM: Leeanne Cattles (Mother) appeals an order of the family court
    concerning eight of her nine children. On appeal, Mother argues the family court
    erred by (1) finding educational neglect; (2) approving a permanency plan of
    "another planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA)" for C.A., termination of
    parental rights (TPR) and adoption for W and C.P., non-relative placement for S.A.
    and A, and relative placement for S.P., K, and D; and (3) allowing the Department
    of Social Services (DSS) to forgo reasonable efforts to reunite the children with
    Mother. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
    1. We find a preponderance of the evidence supports the family court's finding of
    educational neglect. See Lewis v. Lewis, 
    392 S.C. 381
    , 384, 
    709 S.E.2d 650
    , 651
    (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to
    find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence."
    (quoting Eason v. Eason, 
    384 S.C. 473
    , 479, 
    682 S.E.2d 804
    , 807 (2009))). At the
    merits hearing, the family court took judicial notice of the May 9, 2019 contempt
    order in which the family court found Mother willfully violated the previously
    issued compulsory school attendance orders for her children. Additionally, Mother
    conceded her focus on ensuring her older children attended school caused her to
    neglect her responsibility to ensure her younger children—who were eleven, eight,
    and six years old at the time of the contempt hearing—also attended school.
    Because this evidence shows that Mother "voluntarily and intentionally" failed to
    comply with the compulsory school attendance orders, we find a preponderance of
    the evidence indicates Mother "refus[ed] to cooperate" with the school's efforts to
    bring about the children's attendance. See State v. Passmore, 
    363 S.C. 568
    , 571,
    
    611 S.E.2d 273
    , 275 (Ct. App. 2005). (stating that a finding of contempt results
    from an act done "voluntarily and intentionally"); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20
    (6)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2020) ("[A] child's absences from school may not be
    considered abuse or neglect unless the school has made efforts to bring about the
    child's attendance, and those efforts were unsuccessful because of the parents'
    refusal to cooperate."). Accordingly, we affirm the family court's finding that
    Mother engaged in educational neglect.
    2. We find the family court erred by approving a permanency plan of APPLA for
    C.A. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384, 709 S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family
    court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view
    of the preponderance of the evidence." (quoting Eason, 
    384 S.C. at 479
    , 
    682 S.E.2d at 807
    )). The family court's final order indicates it failed to identify a
    compelling reason for approval of the plan or why reunification, relative
    placement, and TPR and adoption were not in C.A.'s best interest. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1700
    (C)(2) (Supp. 2020) ("If the court approves a plan of another
    planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA), the court must find compelling
    reasons for approval of the plan, including compelling reasons why reunification
    with the parents, custody, or guardianship with a fit and willing relative, or
    termination of parental rights and adoption is not in the best interest . . . .").
    Additionally, the transcript of the merits hearing shows the family court failed to
    ask C.A. about her wishes as to her placement plan. See 
    id.
     ("At each hearing in
    which the court approves or renews APPLA for a child over the age of sixteen, the
    court must ask the child about the child's wishes as to the placement plan."). Thus,
    we reverse the family court's approval of a permanent plan of APPLA for C.A.
    Additionally, we find Mother failed to show the family court erred by approving
    permanency plans of non-relative placement for S.A. and A, TPR and adoption for
    W and C.P., and relative placement for S.P., K, and D. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384,
    709 S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has
    jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the
    evidence." (quoting Eason, 
    384 S.C. at 479
    , 
    682 S.E.2d at 807
    )); Ex parte Morris,
    
    367 S.C. 56
    , 62, 
    624 S.E.2d 649
    , 652 (2006) ("[T]he appellate court's broad scope
    of review does not relieve the appellant of the burden of showing that the family
    court committed error.").
    3. Because the family court erred by approving a permanency plan of APPLA for
    C.A., we find that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the family
    court's grant of DSS's request to forgo reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and
    C.A. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384, 709 S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family
    court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view
    of the preponderance of the evidence." (quoting Eason, 
    384 S.C. at 479
    , 
    682 S.E.2d at 807
    )); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1640
    (C)(8) (Supp. 2020) ("The family
    court may authorize [DSS] to . . . [forgo] reasonable efforts . . . when . . .
    implementation of reasonable efforts . . . is inconsistent with the permanent plan
    for the child."). Thus, we reverse the family court's authorization of DSS's request
    to forgo reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and C.A.
    As to Mother's seven other children, we find that the family court did not err by
    granting DSS's request to forgo reasonable efforts. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 384, 709
    S.E.2d at 651 ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has
    jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the
    evidence." (quoting Eason, 
    384 S.C. at 479
    , 
    682 S.E.2d at 807
    )). Rather, we find a
    preponderance of the evidence showed that implementation of reasonable efforts
    would be inconsistent with the properly approved permanency plans of
    non-relative placement, relative placement, and TPR and adoption because each of
    the plans involve a grant of permanent custody to a third party.
    See § 63-7-1640(C)(8) ("The family court may authorize [DSS] to . . . [forgo]
    reasonable efforts . . . when . . . implementation of reasonable efforts . . . is
    inconsistent with the permanent plan for the child."). Moreover, we hold that a
    preponderance of the evidence—including the prior finding of willful contempt
    against Mother, Mother's testimony conceding she was unable to ensure the
    children attended school, and the fact that five of the seven children will reside in
    Texas pursuant to their permanency plans—showed that forgoing reasonable
    efforts for reunification was in the best interests of the children. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1640
    (F) (Supp. 2020) ("If the court authorizes [DSS] to . . . [forgo]
    reasonable efforts to . . . reunify a family, the court must make specific written
    findings in support of its conclusion that . . . [implementation] of reasonable efforts
    is not in the best interest of the child.").
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. 1
    LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2020-001428

Filed Date: 12/3/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024