State v. Garnett ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Adriel Nicholas Garnett, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-000722
    Appeal From Spartanburg County
    J. Mark Hayes, II, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-009
    Submitted November 1, 2021 – Filed January 12, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    Tommy Arthur Thomas, of Irmo, for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
    Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney
    General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy
    Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia;
    and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, all for
    Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Adriel Garnett appeals his convictions and sentences for murder
    and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the
    trial court erred by (1) denying his pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution
    under the Protection of Persons and Property Act1 (the Act) and (2) denying his
    mid-trial motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
    1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Garnett was not
    entitled to immunity from prosecution under the Act. See State v. Marshall, 
    428 S.C. 11
    , 17-18, 
    832 S.E.2d 618
    , 621 (Ct. App. 2019) ("Appellate courts review an
    immunity determination for abuse of discretion."); 
    id. at 18
    , 832 S.E.2d at 621-22
    ("A circuit court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an error of law or,
    when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support."). At the
    immunity hearing, Dr. David Wren testified that the victim's autopsy revealed he
    was shot five times in the back and three times in the side. Additionally, the State
    presented evidence that after the shooting, Garnett fled the scene and evaded law
    enforcement for several months. This evidence undermines Garnett's claim that he
    shot the victim in self-defense because it calls into question whether Garnett
    actually was or reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or
    sustaining serious bodily injury when he shot the victim. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440
    (C) (2015) ("A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and
    who is attacked in [a] place where he has a right to be . . . has the right to . . . meet
    force with force . . . if he reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death or
    great bodily injury . . . ."); Marshall, 428 S.C. at 18, 832 S.E.2d at 622 ("To
    warrant immunity under the Act, . . . the accused must demonstrate the elements of
    self-defense, save the duty to retreat, to the satisfaction of the circuit court by a
    preponderance of the evidence."); State v. Curry, 
    406 S.C. 364
    , 371 n.4, 
    752 S.E.2d 263
    , 266 n.4 (2013) (providing the second and third elements of
    self-defense require a defendant to show he actually was or reasonably believed he
    was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury).
    Thus, we find this evidence supports the trial court's finding that Garnett failed to
    show by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-defense. See State v.
    Mitchell, 
    382 S.C. 1
    , 4, 
    675 S.E.2d 435
    , 437 (2009) (stating that under the abuse of
    discretion standard of review, an appellate court "does not re-evaluate the facts
    based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence but simply determines
    whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence").
    2. We hold Garnett waived his right to appellate review of the denial of his
    mid-trial motion for a directed verdict because his trial testimony supplemented the
    1
    
    S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410
     to -450 (2015).
    State's case as the only direct evidence identifying Garnett as the shooter. See
    State v. Phillips, 
    416 S.C. 184
    , 192 n.7, 
    785 S.E.2d 448
    , 452 n.7 (2016) ("Under
    the waiver rule, a defendant who presents evidence in his own defense waives the
    right to have the court review the denial of directed verdict based solely on the
    evidence presented in the State's case-in-chief." (quoting State v. Hepburn, 
    406 S.C. 416
    , 431, 
    753 S.E.2d 402
    , 410 (2013))); State v. Harry, 
    321 S.C. 273
    , 277,
    
    468 S.E.2d 76
    , 79 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[W]hen the defendant presents testimony, he
    loses the right to have the court review the sufficiency of the evidence based on the
    [S]tate's evidence alone."); Hepburn, 
    406 S.C. at 436-37
    , 
    753 S.E.2d at 413
    (providing that the waiver rule applies only if the defendant's evidence "serve[s] to
    fill gaps in the [S]tate's evidence").
    AFFIRMED.2
    WILLIAMS, A.C.J., and MCDONALD, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
    2
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-009

Filed Date: 1/12/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024