State v. Cameron ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Justin Bradley Cameron, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2018-001493
Appeal From Clarendon County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-021
Submitted November 1, 2021 – Filed January 12, 2022
AFFIRMED
Tara Dawn Shurling, of Law Office of Tara Dawn
Shurling, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest A. Finney, III, of Sumter,
all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Justin Bradley Cameron appeals his conviction for criminal sexual
conduct with a minor (CSCM) in the first degree. On appeal, Cameron argues the
trial court erred in overruling his objection to a question from the State that identified
him as the perpetrator of the crime because the question (1) went beyond the "time
and place" hearsay exception for a victim's prior consistent statement in sexual
misconduct cases as permitted by Rule 801(d)(1)(D), SCRE; (2) improperly
bolstered the victim's testimony; and (3) violated Cameron's due process rights. We
affirm.
I.
Cameron was indicted for one count of CSCM in the first degree in relation to the
alleged sexual battery of his nephew (Victim) between June and August of 2015. At
trial, the State presented evidence that sometime during the summer of 2015, Victim,
who was six years old at the time, and his mother lived with David Flowers and one
of Flowers' two sons at Flowers' home in Turbeville, South Carolina. The State
presented further evidence that in July 2015, Flowers, Victim, and Victim's mother
drove and picked up Cameron from Rock Hill, and Cameron stayed with them at
Flowers' home for about a week. Cameron slept on the living room couch during
his stay while Victim and his mother slept in Flowers' son's room. Victim testified
one night while the others were asleep and his mother was at work, Cameron entered
Victim's room and anally and orally penetrated him. Victim testified he told
Flowers' son about the incident shortly after it occurred. Flowers' son confirmed that
Victim told him about the incident, and he stated he told Victim's mother about
Victim's disclosure. Meanwhile, Victim was placed in foster care. Victim testified
that shortly after he turned seven, he told his foster mother about the incident with
Cameron because his foster mother had to take him to the hospital for stomach and
bowel problems. Victim stated he did not think he told his foster father about the
incident, but he believed his foster mother did.
Victim's foster father testified when he and his wife began fostering Victim, Victim
had bowel issues. Victim's foster father testified they took Victim to the emergency
room for the issues, Victim was admitted to the hospital for the weekend, and his
wife stayed with Victim. The State then asked foster father, "Did . . . Victim, I guess,
this is a yes or no question. Did . . . Victim t[ell] you about the incident?" Cameron
objected to this question on hearsay grounds, and the trial court asked the State to
restate its question. The State asked Father, "Did Victim t[ell] you about the incident
that happened between him and his uncle?" Cameron objected again on hearsay
grounds, and the trial court ruled it would allow Victim's foster father to answer the
question as to whether or not Victim told him anything but not what Victim said,
stating, "It's a yes or no answer." Victim's foster father testified, "Yes." The State
then asked, "And did he t[ell] you about where it happened?" He stated, "Yes," and
Cameron objected, arguing Victim's foster father was testifying about what Victim
said. The trial court stated, "No, he's not. He's testifying as to the time and place
which I believe [is] allowed . . . under the rules. You're not allowed to testify as to
what he told you, other than time and place . . . as provided under our rules." Victim's
foster father then testified Victim told him the incident happened at Flowers' home
when he stayed there one summer.
Cameron presented an alibi defense, contending he could not have sexually assaulted
Victim because he was in Rock Hill from June to August 2015. Specifically, he
presented evidence he was in prison there from July 17, 2015, to September 28,
2015. He also presented the testimony of Shirley Milsaps, a member of a church he
burglarized in Rock Hill, who testified Cameron performed community service at
her church, her church paid for him to stay in a motel in Rock Hill, and she picked
him up from the motel every day from March or April 2015 until he was incarcerated
on July 17, 2015. Tony Lawson, an associate pastor at the church, stated from June
to mid-July 2015, he saw Cameron at the church sporadically, but he could not say
he saw Cameron every day. Michael Polson, the pastor of the church, testified he
was at the church from July 5 to 9, 2015, and Cameron was also there. However,
Polson admitted he took the week of the Fourth of July off from work and he also
left on a mission trip for six days shortly thereafter. Cameron testified he never went
to Turbeville that summer.
The jury found Cameron guilty. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years'
imprisonment. This appeal follows.
II.
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v.
Johnson, 413 S.C. 458, 466, 776 S.E.2d 367, 371 (2015). "The admission or
exclusion of evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Id. "An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in
factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." Id. (quoting State v. Jennings,
394 S.C. 473, 477–78, 716 S.E.2d 91, 93 (2011)).
III.
Cameron argues the trial court violated his due process rights and committed
prejudicial error when it allowed the State to ask Victim's foster father if Victim told
him "about the incident that happened between [Victim] and his uncle" because it
"was no different than allowing the State to ask [Vicitm's foster father] whether the
Victim had identified [Cameron] as the person who sexually assaulted him,"
overstepping the law in South Carolina regarding such testimony. We disagree.
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Cameron's objection
to the State's question. See Johnson, 413 S.C. at 466, 776 S.E.2d at 371 (defining
abuse of discretion standard). Initially, we find Cameron failed to preserve the issue
of whether this question bolstered Victim's testimony as Cameron only objected to
the question on hearsay grounds. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d
691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground
on appeal."). Nonetheless, we find the question of whether Victim told his foster
father about the alleged incident with Cameron and the "Yes" answer do not
constitute bolstering as Victim's foster father gave no opinion as to Victim's
credibility and he did not state whether he believed Victim's disclosure. See Briggs
v. State, 421 S.C. 316, 324, 806 S.E.2d 713, 717 (2017) ("[T]he central point of the
prohibition against improper bolstering [is that] a witness may not give an opinion
for the purpose of conveying to the jury—directly or indirectly—that she believes
the victim.").
Next, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Cameron's
hearsay objection to the question because the trial court properly limited Victim's
foster father's answer to whether Victim disclosed the alleged incident's time and
place and such testimony is not hearsay. See Rule 801(d)(1), SCRE ("A statement
is not hearsay if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with
the declarant's testimony in a criminal sexual conduct case or attempted criminal
sexual conduct case where the declarant is the alleged victim and the statement is
limited to the time and place of the incident[.]"). We acknowledge that following
Cameron's initial hearsay objection, the State should not have added the phrase "that
happened between him and his uncle." See Thompson v. State, 423 S.C. 235, 241,
814 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) (providing Rule 801(d)(1), SCRE, "obviously limits
corroborating testimony in [a CSC] case to the time and place of the assault(s); any
other details or particulars, including the perpetrator's identity, must be excluded"
(emphasis added)). However, the trial court adequately handled the situation by
instructing Victim's foster father to only give a yes or no answer as to whether Victim
told him anything and to not discuss anything Victim said.1 Moreover, the trial court
1
We note the trial court appears to have in effect sustained Cameron's objection to
the State's rephrased question as it limited the answer Victim's foster father could
provide. We also note Cameron did not make a motion to strike the State's question
or request that the court give the jury a limiting instruction. Thus, we find Cameron
continued to properly limit Father's testimony regarding Victim's disclosure to the
time and place of the incident under Rule 801(d)(1), SCRE. Thus, we find the trial
court did not err in overruling Cameron's objection.
Nonetheless, even if the trial court erred in overruling Cameron's objection to the
State's question, the error was harmless. See Thompson, 423 S.C. at 245–46, 814
S.E.2d at 492 ("[T]he bright-line rule [of presuming prejudice when trial counsel did
not object to inadmissible hearsay testimony identifying the defendant as the
perpetrator] should no longer control and . . . in a direct appeal, a harmless error
analysis should be employed when reviewing the admission of hearsay testimony
that improperly corroborates the victim's testimony in a sexual assault case."). The
State's question to Victim's foster father regarding whether Victim disclosed the
incident "between him and his uncle," did not prejudice Cameron or affect the
outcome of his trial. Victim's foster father's testimony regarding the disclosure did
not contain any details about the incident beyond where and when Victim told him
it occurred; he did not say what Cameron allegedly did to Victim or opine that
Victim's disclosure was genuine or credible. Cf. Id. at 240, 246–50, 814 S.E.2d at
489, 493–95 (finding petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object
to (1) a DSS case worker's testimony that the victim revealed the petitioner sexually
abused her; (2) the expert forensic interviewer's testimony that the victim disclosed
chronic abuse by the petitioner and the specific types of sexual abuse committed,
and that the victim's disclosure was "the most compelling she had encountered in
almost one thousand child interviews"; and (3) a detective's, who was also a trained
forensic interviewer's, testimony that the victim's disclosures were consistent with
her training and experience). Additionally, the other evidence in this case—
specifically Victim's testimony that Cameron sexually abused him; evidence of
Victim's consistent disclosures to both Flowers' son and his foster mother about the
sexual abuse; and testimony from Flowers, Victim, and Flowers' son that Cameron
was present at the Flowers' home at the time of the alleged sexual abuse, despite
Cameron's assertion that he was in Rock Hill—make the State's question identifying
has waived and failed to preserve any argument the question should have been struck
or that the jury should have been given a limiting instruction. See State v. Martucci,
380 S.C. 232, 259, 669 S.E.2d 598, 612–13 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Where a defendant
objects and the objection is sustained but he does not move to strike the evidence,
the issue is not preserved for appellate review."); see also State v. Evans, 316 S.C.
303, 307 n.1, 450 S.E.2d 47, 50 n.1 (1994) (finding that when the defendant "did not
request [a limiting instruction] nor make the argument . . . that the failure to give a
limiting instruction was error," the issue of whether a limiting instruction should
have been given is waived).
Cameron as the alleged perpetrator in this case harmless. Thus, we find any error
by the trial court in not overruling the question was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.2
KONDUROS, HILL, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.