Boose v. Boose ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Tonia Monique Boose, Appellant,
v.
Fernando Darnell Boose, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2019-000366
Appeal From York County
Tony M. Jones, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-026
Submitted December 1, 2021 – Filed January 12, 2022
AFFIRMED
Melinda Inman Butler, of Butler Law Firm, of Union, for
Appellant.
James Wilson Tucker, Jr., and George Edgar Anderson,
V, both of McKinney Tucker & Lemel, of Rock Hill, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this family court case, Tonia Boose (Mother) appeals, arguing
the family court erred in: (1) ordering a joint custody schedule that is contrary to
the children's best interests; (2) finding Fernando Boose's (Father's) vehicle debt
was marital debt subject to a 50/50 division; (3) ordering Father to claim the
parties' daughter as a dependent on his tax returns; and (4) ordering Mother to pay
Father's attorney's fees and costs. After our de novo review, we affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. We find the court did not err in awarding joint custody of the children
because exceptional circumstances existed. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-
530(A)(20), (42) (2010) (providing the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to
award the custody of the children to either spouse, or to order joint or divided
custody where the court finds it is in the best interests of the child); S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-15-230 (Supp. 2020) ("(A) The court shall make the final custody
determination in the best interest of the child based upon the evidence presented.
(B) The court may award joint custody to both parents or sole custody to either
parent. (C) If custody is contested or if either parent seeks an award of joint
custody, the court shall consider all custody options, including, but not limited to,
joint custody, and, in its final order, the court shall state its determination as to
custody and shall state its reasoning for that decision. (D) Notwithstanding the
custody determination, the court may allocate parenting time in the best interest of
the child."); Brown v. Brown, 362 S.C. 85, 90, 606 S.E.2d 785, 788 (Ct. App.
2004) ("The paramount and controlling factor in every custody dispute is the best
interests of the children."); Patel v. Patel, 347 S.C. 281, 285, 555 S.E.2d 386, 388
(2001) (Patel I) ("The family court considers several factors in determining the
best interest of the child, including: [1] who has been the primary caretaker; [2] the
conduct, attributes, and fitness of the parents; [3] the opinions of third parties
(including [the Guardian ad Litem], expert witnesses, and the children); and [4]
and the age, health, and sex of the children."); id. ("When determining to whom
custody shall be awarded, all the conflicting rules and presumptions should be
weighed together with all the circumstances of the particular case, and all relevant
factors must be taken into consideration."); Lewis v. Lewis, 400 S.C. 354, 365, 734
S.E.2d 322, 327 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Although the legislature gives family court
judges the authority 'to order joint or divided custody whe[n] the court finds it is in
the best interests of the child,' . . . joint or divided custody should only be awarded
whe[n] there are exceptional circumstances." (omission by court) (quoting Patel v.
Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 528, 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004) (Patel II))).
2. We find Mother failed to meet her burden of proving Father's vehicle debt is
nonmarital; thus, the family court did not err in finding Father's vehicle debt was
incurred for the joint benefit of the parties during the marriage and was marital
debt subject to a 50/50 division. See Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 546, 615
S.E.2d 98, 105 (2005) ("[A] 'marital debt' is a debt incurred for the joint benefit of
the parties regardless of whether the parties are legally liable or whether one party
is individually liable."); id. ("Marital debt, like marital property, must be
specifically identified and apportioned in equitable distribution."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-3-620(B)(13) (2014) (providing in making an apportionment of marital
property pursuant to a divorce, the court must give weight in such proportion as it
finds appropriate to "liens and any other encumbrances upon the marital property,
which themselves must be equitably divided, or upon the separate property of
either of the parties, and any other existing debts incurred by the parties or either of
them during the course of the marriage."); Wooten, 364 S.C. at 546, 615 S.E.2d at
105 ("This statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a debt of either spouse
incurred prior to the beginning of marital litigation is a marital debt and must be
factored in the totality of equitable apportionment."); id. at 547, 615 S.E.2d at 105("When the debt is incurred before marital litigation begins, the burden of proving
a debt is nonmarital rests upon the party who makes such an assertion."). We find
Mother's summary statements concerning Father's IRS debt and loans she states
were premarital and her credit card debt are abandoned and decline to address
them. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514
(1994) (noting when a party fails to cite authority or when the argument is simply a
conclusory statement, the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue on appeal).
3. We find no error in the family court's decision to award Mother a tax
deduction for their son and Father a tax deduction for their daughter because the
parties had joint custody of the children. See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(F) (2014)
("The Family Court may allocate the right to claim dependency exemptions
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code and under corresponding state tax
provisions and to require the execution and delivery of all necessary documents
and tax filings in connection with the exemption."); Hudson v. Hudson, 340 S.C.
198, 205, 530 S.E.2d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating the allocation of a
dependent tax exemption is within the family court's discretion); id. at 203, 530
S.E.2d at 402-03 (noting the custodial parent is entitled to claim the dependent tax
deduction under the governing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code).
4. We find the family court did not err in ordering Mother to pay Father's
attorney's fees and costs because the court properly considered all the factors in
determining who should pay the parties' attorneys' fees and the amount of the fees.
See Thornton v. Thornton, 428 S.C. 460, 477, 836 S.E.2d 351, 360 (Ct. App. 2019)
("Section 20-3-130(H) of the South Carolina Code (2014) authorizes the family
court to order payment of litigation expenses such as attorney's fees, expert fees,
and investigation fees to either party in a divorce action."); Reiss v. Reiss, 392 S.C.
198, 210, 708 S.E.2d 799, 805 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The award of attorney's fees in a
domestic action rests within the sound discretion of the family court."); E.D.M. v.
T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992) (providing there are
four factors a family court should consider in determining whether attorney's fees
should be awarded to a party: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's
fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective
financial conditions; [and] (4) [the] effect of the attorney's fee on each party's
standard of living."); Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313,
315 (1991) (stating in determining a reasonable attorney's fee, there are six factors
a family court should consider: "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case;
(2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel;
(4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; [and] (6)
customary legal fees for similar services."); Thornton, 428 S.C. at 477, 836 S.E.2d
at 360 ("In awarding attorney's fees, the family court must make specific findings
of fact on the record for each of the required factors.").
AFFIRMED.1
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., and HUFF, A.J., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.