Charleston County Assessor v. LMP Properties ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Charleston County Assessor, Appellant,
v.
LMP Properties, Inc., Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002264
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-303
Heard April 16, 2015 – Filed June 24, 2015
AFFIRMED
Bernard E. Ferrara, Jr., Joseph Dawson, III, Bradley
Allen Mitchell, and Austin Adams Bruner, all of the
Charleston County Attorney's Office, of North
Charleston, for Appellant.
Stanley Clarence Rodgers, of the Law Office of Stanley
C. Rodgers, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The Charleston County Assessor (Assessor) appeals the
administrative law court's (ALC) order valuing 121 units (the Units) on a piece of
property owned by LMP Properties, Inc. (LMP) at $8,565,000 for the 2008 tax
year. Assessor argues the ALC erred in (1) finding condominiums were not the
highest and best use of the Units, (2) calculating the market value of the Units
when used as condominiums, and (3) construing our supreme court's holding in
Lindsey v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 302 S.C. 504, 508, 397 S.E.2d 95, 97
(1990), to stand for the proposition that use is the determining factor in property
valuation. We affirm.
As to whether the ALC erred in finding condominiums were not the highest and
best use of the Units, we find substantial evidence supports the ALC's finding that
condominiums were not a financially feasible use of the Units. Specifically,
LMP's expert's testimony supports the conclusion that—based on the depressed
market for condominiums in Charleston in 2007—condominiums were not a
financially feasible use of the Units. Because condominiums were not a financially
feasible use of the Units, condominiums could not be the highest and best use of
the Units. Moreover, we find substantial evidence supports the ALC's finding that
apartments were the highest and best use of the Units. See Taylor v. Aiken Cnty.
Assessor, 402 S.C. 559, 561, 741 S.E.2d 31, 32 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The decision of
the [ALC] should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial
evidence or controlled by some error of law." (alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Hull v. Spartanburg Cnty. Assessor, 372 S.C.
420, 424, 641 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Ct. App. 2007) ("'Substantial evidence' is not a
mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the
case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or
must have reached in order to justify its action." (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276
S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981))); Charleston Cnty. Assessor v. LMP
Props., Inc., 403 S.C. 194, 198, 743 S.E.2d 88, 90 (Ct. App. 2013) (stating under
the Appraisal Institute's methodology, "a property's highest and best use must be
physically possible, legally permissible, financially feasible, and maximally
profitable" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because we find substantial evidence supports the ALC's holding that
condominiums were not a financially feasible use of the Units, we do not reach the
issue of whether the ALC improperly valued the Units when used as
condominiums or whether the ALC erred in its application of the holding in
Lindsey. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613,
518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding appellate courts need not address remaining
issues when determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.