Ruff v. Nunez ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Mary Margaret Ruff, Respondent,
v.
Samuel Nunez, Jr., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2014-001245
Appeal From Greenville County
W. Marsh Robertson, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-279
Submitted March 1, 2015 – Filed June 10, 2015
AFFIRMED
Samuel Nunez, Jr., of Downingtown, PA, pro se.
Dianne S. Riley, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Samuel Nunez, Jr. appeals an order of the family court granting
Mary Ruff restitution for transportation costs associated with visitation of their
minor child. Nunez argues the family court erred in (1) ordering him to reimburse
Ruff for one-half of the visitation transportation costs, plus post-judgment interest,
that she paid between March 18, 2011, and February 19, 2014; and (2) not ordering
Ruff to reimburse him for visitation transportation costs that he incurred between
July 25, 2006, and March 18, 2011. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the family court erred in granting Ruff's motion for restitution:
Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014) (stating
appellate courts review appeals from the family court de novo); Cudd v. Arline,
277 S.C. 236, 239, 285 S.E.2d 881, 883 (1981) (holding an appellate court will not
reverse a family court order concerning visitation transportation expenses absent a
clear abuse of discretion1); Brown v. Brown, 286 S.C. 56, 57, 331 S.E.2d 793, 793-
94 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Generally, reversal of a judgment on appeal has the effect of
vacating the judgment and leaving the case standing as if no such judgment had
been rendered. Consequently, a party who receives payment under a judgment
subsequently reversed must restore whatever advantage he obtained thereby to his
adversary." (internal citation omitted)); Christy v. Christy, 317 S.C. 145, 151, 452
S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Once the remittitur is sent down from the appellate
court, the [family] court acquires jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and take any
action consistent with the appellate court ruling."); Martin v. Paradise Cove
Marina, Inc., 348 S.C. 379, 385, 559 S.E.2d 348, 351-52 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating
that when an appellate court remits a case without expressly remanding it, the
lower court acquires jurisdiction to enforce the appellate court's judgment and take
any action consistent with the appellate court's ruling, including hearing the
appellant's motion for restitution); Dema v. Tenet Physician Servs.-Hilton Head,
Inc., 383 S.C. 115, 123, 678 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2009) ("A party may be unjustly
enriched when it has and retains benefits or money which in justice and equity
belong to another. Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine which permits the
recovery of that amount the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of
the plaintiff."); Inglese v. Beal, 403 S.C. 290, 297, 742 S.E.2d 687, 691 (Ct. App.
2013) (stating that to recover restitution for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must
show (1) she gave the defendant a non-gratuitous benefit; (2) the defendant
1
See generally Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 391, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011)
(stating "the inartful use of an abuse of discretion deferential standard of review
merely represents the appellate courts' effort to incorporate the two sound
principles underlying the proper review of an equity case," those two principles
being "the superior position of the [family court] to determine credibility and the
imposition of a burden on an appellant to satisfy the appellate court that the
preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the [family] court").
realized value from the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the defendant to
retain the benefit without paying the plaintiff for its value).
2. As to whether the family court erred in not ordering Ruff to reimburse Nunez:
Buist v. Buist, 410 S.C. 569, 574, 766 S.E.2d 381, 383 (2014) (specifying an issue
must be raised to and ruled upon by the family court to be preserved for appellate
review); Hickman v. Hickman, 301 S.C. 455, 457, 392 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ct. App.
1990) (stating "an issue raised in but not ruled upon by the [family] court and not
presented to the [family] court in a motion to amend the judgment is not preserved
for appellate review").
AFFIRMED.2
FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.
2
Nunez also filed a motion to waive oral argument, and Ruff filed a return
opposing Nunez's motion and requesting oral argument. We decide this case
without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.