Marks v. Old South Mortgage ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Melissa Jean Marks, Appellant,
v.
Old South Mortgage Corporation, John Does 1-100,
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, Defendants,
Of whom Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, is the Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002555
Appeal From Colleton County
Maité Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-245
Submitted February 1, 2015 – Filed June 3, 2015
AFFIRMED
Melissa Jean Marks, of Round O, pro se.
Robert A. Muckenfuss, of McGuireWoods LLP, of
Charlotte, North Carolina; and Elizabeth Marion
Zwickert Timmermans, of McGuireWoods LLP, of
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Melissa Jean Marks appeals the circuit court's orders, which
granted summary judgment to Nationstar Mortgage (Nationstar), denied her
motion to dismiss Nationstar as a party, and denied her motion for reconsideration.
Marks argues the circuit court erred in (1) failing to follow the law of the case; (2)
failing to determine whether Nationstar engaged in fraud, which barred it from
obtaining rights as a holder in due course; (3) finding Nationstar had standing; (4)
finding Marks lacked standing; (5) finding the case was barred by judicial
estoppel; (6) finding the case was barred by res judicata; (7) failing to determine
whether Nationstar produced sufficient evidence to support the grant of summary
judgment and the denial of Mark's motion to dismiss; and (8) failing to determine
whether her issues should have been bifurcated so some could have proceeded to
judgment on the merits. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:
1. As to whether the circuit court erred in denying her motion to dismiss
Nationstar as a party: Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 255, 478 S.E.2d 841, 844
(1996) ("A motion to dismiss a party is addressed to the court's discretion."); Rule
19(a), SCRCP ("A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall
be joined as a party in the action if . . . he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest . . . .");
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Draper, 405 S.C. 214, 223, 746 S.E.2d 478, 482 (Ct. App.
2013) ("A holder is a person in possession of [an] instrument drawn, issued,
transferred, or indorsed to him."); S.C. Code Ann. 36-3-301 (Supp. 2014) ("'Person
entitled to enforce' an instrument means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a
nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a
person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument
pursuant to [s]ection 36-3-309 or 36-3-418(d). A person may be a person entitled
to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument
or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.").
2. As to whether the circuit court erred in granting Nationstar's motion for
summary judgment: McNaughton-McKay Elec. Co. of N.C. v. Andrich, 324 S.C.
275, 279, 482 S.E.2d 564, 566 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Summary judgment is proper
when it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); id. ("Summary judgment should be
granted when plain, palpable, and undisputable facts exist on which reasonable
minds cannot differ."); id. ("In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist,
the evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."); Venture
Eng'g, Inc. v. Tishman Const. Corp. of S.C., 360 S.C. 156, 162, 600 S.E.2d 547,
550 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The doctrine of res judicata provides that final judgment on
the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating claims
that were or could have been raised in that action." (quotation marks omitted));
Catawba Indian Nation v. State, 407 S.C. 526, 538, 756 S.E.2d 900, 907 (2014)
("Res judicata may be applied if (1) the identities of the parties are the same as in
the prior litigation, (2) the subject matter is the same as in the prior litigation, and
(3) there was a prior adjudication of the issue by a court of competent
jurisdiction."); McNaughton-McKay, 324 S.C. at 280, 482 S.E.2d at 567 ("The
general rule is that a confirmed plan of reorganization is binding on the debtor and
other proponents of the plan." (quotation marks omitted)); id. ("[J]udgments of the
bankruptcy courts are normally immune to collateral attack. They can be relied
upon by state courts. And when the judgment is final and valid, it is given
appropriate effect as res judicata or as a collateral estoppel in subsequent
proceedings in the state courts, where it is there entitled to full faith and credit."
(quotation marks omitted)); id. ("A very broad preclusive effect has been given to
orders confirming reorganization plans.").
3. As to Marks's remaining issues: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court
need not review remaining issues when the disposition of prior issues is
dispositive).
AFFIRMED.1
SHORT, LOCKEMY, and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.