Cox v. Pinckney ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Catherine Virginia Cox, Appellant,
v.
Kenneth L. Pinckney, Sr., and Stacy Marie St. Pierre,
Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002474
Appeal From Beaufort County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge,
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-375
Submitted June 1, 2015 – Filed July 29, 2015
AFFIRMED
Kimberly L. Smith, of Moss Kuhn & Fleming, PA, of
Beaufort, for Appellant.
Adam J. Neil and Wesley Brian Sawyer, both of Murphy
& Grantland, PA, of Columbia, for Respondents.
KONDUROS, J.: Catherine Cox appeals the trial court's order granting Stacy St.
Pierre's summary judgment motion, arguing South Carolina (1) has not limited
negligent entrustment actions to cases involving intoxicated drivers and (2) should
adopt the negligent entrustment standard set forth in sections 308 and 390 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). We find Cox failed to preserve these issues
for our review and affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
St. Pierre moved for summary judgment, arguing Cox's negligent entrustment
claim should be dismissed because South Carolina has limited negligent
entrustment claims to circumstances involving intoxicants. The trial court granted
the motion, and Cox appealed. Cox failed to include the transcript of the motion
hearing in the record on appeal, and her arguments in opposition to summary
judgment were first presented in the record in her motion to reconsider. This
failure to provide an adequate record prevents this court from determining what
arguments she made before the trial court entered its judgment on the motion. See
Harkins v. Greenville Cnty., 340 S.C. 606, 616, 533 S.E.2d 886, 891 (2000)
(providing the appellant has the burden of presenting an appellate court with an
adequate record). Therefore, the issues presented on appeal are unpreserved. See
Patterson v. Reid, 318 S.C. 183, 185, 456 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A
party cannot for the first time raise an issue by way of a Rule 59(e) motion which
could have been raised at trial."); see also Commercial Credit Loans, Inc. v.
Riddle, 334 S.C. 176, 186, 512 S.E.2d 123, 129 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[B]ecause the
transcript of the proceedings below is omitted from the record, it appears the first
time [the appellant] made this argument was in its Rule 59(e) motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, this issue is not properly preserved for our
review."); Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329,
730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) ("If our review of the record establishes that an issue is
not preserved, then we should not reach it.").
AFFIRMED.1
GEATHERS, J., concurs. THOMAS, J., concurring in a separate opinion in
which GEATHERS, J., concurs.
THOMAS, J.: I agree with the majority that the issues on appeal are unpreserved.
However, I write separately to note my belief that the tort of negligent entrustment
is not restricted to situations involving the presence of alcohol. "The theory of
negligent entrustment provides . . . the owner or one in control of the vehicle and
responsible for its use who is negligent in entrusting it to another can be held liable
for such negligent entrustment." Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
618, 621, 274 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
McAllister v. Graham stated the elements of negligent entrustment as they applied
to that case, which featured the entrustment of a vehicle to an intoxicated driver.
287 S.C. 455, 458, 339 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating the elements for
"the test of liability here under the theory of negligent entrustment" (emphasis
added)); see also Gadson ex rel. Gadson v. ECO Servs. of S.C., Inc., 374 S.C. 171,
176, 648 S.E.2d 585, 588 (2007) (noting the elements of negligent entrustment as
they were stated in Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 342 S.E.2d 628 (Ct. App.
1986), which relied on McAllister for those elements); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Enter.
Leasing Co.-Se., 383 S.C. 259, 264-66, 678 S.E.2d 819, 822-23 (Ct. App. 2009)
(explaining that "the elements needed to prove [negligent entrustment] have
varied" and remarking that a negligent entrustment claim not involving alcohol
could not be established under the elements set forth in McAllister). For example,
in my view, an injured third party could pursue a negligent entrustment claim
where an individual lent their vehicle to a driver with a known physical or mental
condition, or where a person allowed someone to borrow their car for the known
purpose of illegally drag racing. Cf. James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 377 S.C. 628,
634, 661 S.E.2d 329, 332 (2008) (concluding South Carolina law does not prohibit
a plaintiff from pursuing claims including negligent entrustment once respondeat
superior liability has been admitted, in a case in which no allegation was made that
the entrusted driver was intoxicated); Howell v. Hairston, 261 S.C. 292, 296-99,
199 S.E.2d 766, 768-69 (1973) (reversing the trial court's grant of a motion for
nonsuit and remanding for a new trial in an action for damages resulting from
entrustment of an air rifle to a minor when it could be inferred the parents "knew
that under the circumstances their son should not have been allowed unsupervised
possession" of the rifle because he had a reputation as a bully and displayed
"aggressive and malicious tendencies").
While our supreme court declined to adopt sections 308 and 390 of the
2
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) based on the facts of Lydia v. Horton and
Gadson, those cases involved the presence of alcohol. Moreover, unlike the third-
party negligent entrustment cause of action here, Lydia involved a first-party
negligent entrustment claim, which the court rejected because the negligence of the
plaintiff outweighed that of the defendant and because of public policy
considerations. See Lydia, 355 S.C. at 39, 583 S.E.2d at 752. Consequently, I do
not believe those cases or McAllister suggest negligent entrustment claims must
involve intoxicated drivers.
2
355 S.C. 36, 583 S.E.2d 750 (2003).
GEATHERS, J., concurs.