Anders v. The Settings of Mackay Point ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jeffrey H. Anders and Maureen Anders, Michael K.
Callahan and Amy Callahan, Melinda A. Caviccia,
Michael B. Ciulis, Stephen Kipa, Chad Kurtz, Spencer L.
Morgan, Richard O'Reilly and Alicia F. O'Reilly, Daniel
Ryan and Susan Ryan, Gennady Shmukler, Michael
Schmuff and Joanne Schmuff, and Matthew Terry,
Kathryn M. Tillman, Valerie A. Lowe, Tacg Properties,
LLC, Mackay Marsh, LLC, Plaintiffs,
Of whom Spencer L. Morgan is the Appellant,
v.
The Settings of Mackay Point, LLC, The Setting
Development Companies, LLC, Branch Banking & Trust
Co., Wachovia Bank, N.A., Bond Safeguard Insurance
Company, and Jasper County, Defendants,
Of which Wachovia Bank, N.A. is the Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2013-001629
Appeal From Jasper County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-434
Heard December 10, 2014 – Filed August 19, 2015
AFFIRMED
Robert Wade Maring, of Maring Law Firm, P.A., of
Georgetown, for Appellant.
Shelton Sterling Laney III, of Womble Carlyle Sandridge
& Rice, LLP, of Greenville, and Matthew Todd Carroll,
of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, of
Columbia, both for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Spencer L. Morgan (Morgan) seeks review of the circuit court's
dismissal of his case pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. Morgan argues the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) denying his
motion for a continuance and (2) dismissing his claims for failure to prosecute.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Morgan's motion for a
continuance: Rule 40(i)(1), SCRCP (providing that the court may grant a
continuance for "good and sufficient cause"); Crestwood Golf Club, Inc. v. Potter,
328 S.C. 201, 212, 493 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997) (explaining "power is deemed to be
necessarily vested in [circuit] courts [in order for them] to manage their own affairs
so as to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases" (citation omitted));
State v. Colden, 372 S.C. 428, 435, 641 S.E.2d 912, 916 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The
granting of a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the
[circuit] court and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion. Reversals for the denial of a continuance' are about as rare as the
proverbial hens' teeth.'" (citations omitted)).
2. As to whether the circuit court erred in dismissing Morgan's claims for
failure to prosecute: Rule 41(b), SCRCP ("For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him."); McComas v. Ross, 368 S.C.
59, 62, 626 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Whether an action should be
dismissed for failure to prosecute is left to the discretion of the [circuit] court
judge, and his decision will not be disturbed, except upon a clear showing of an
abuse of discretion." (citing Small v. Mungo, 254 S.C. 438, 442, 175 S.E.2d 802,
804 (1970))).
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.