State v. Chisolm ( 2015 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Don-Survi Chisolm, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2011-200186
    Appeal From Dorchester County
    Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-501
    Heard September 15, 2015 – Filed October 28, 2015
    AFFIRMED
    Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek and
    Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, both of Columbia,
    for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
    Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
    Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior
    Assistant Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of
    Columbia, and David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of
    Orangeburg, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Don-Survi Chisolm appeals his murder conviction, arguing the
    trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence of prior drug dealing; (2) admitting a
    weapon; (3) failing to suppress evidence from a search warrant; (4) refusing to
    permit cross-examination about an allegedly unrelated weapon; and (5) allowing
    him to represent himself. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
    following authorities:
    1.     As to whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior drug
    dealing: State v. Pagan, 
    369 S.C. 201
    , 208, 
    631 S.E.2d 262
    , 265 (2006) ("The
    admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be
    reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Dennis, 
    402 S.C. 627
    , 635-36,
    
    742 S.E.2d 21
    , 26 (Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that "[o]ne of the accepted bases for
    the admissibility of evidence of other crimes arises when such evidence furnishes
    part of the context of the crime or is necessary to a full presentation of the case"
    (quoting United States v. Masters, 
    622 F.2d 83
    , 86 (4th Cir. 1980))); State v.
    Adams, 
    354 S.C. 361
    , 378, 
    580 S.E.2d 785
    , 794 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating a trial
    court's decision regarding the comparative probative value and prejudicial effect of
    relevant evidence should be reversed only in exceptional circumstances).
    2.     As to whether the trial court erred in admitting a weapon into evidence:
    State v. Dunbar, 
    356 S.C. 138
    , 142, 
    587 S.E.2d 691
    , 693-94 (2003) ("Issues not
    raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."); 
    id.
     ("A
    party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.").
    3.     As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained
    based on a search warrant: State v. Wright, 
    391 S.C. 436
    , 442, 
    706 S.E.2d 324
    ,
    326 (2011) (stating when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
    based on the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court will affirm if there is any
    evidence to support the ruling and reverse only when there is clear error); State v.
    Jones, 
    342 S.C. 121
    , 126-27, 
    536 S.E.2d 675
    , 678 (2000) (holding a defendant is
    entitled to challenge misstatements in a warrant affidavit if the following criteria
    are met: "(1) the defendant's attack is more than conclusory and is supported by
    more than a mere desire to cross-examine; (2) the defendant makes allegations of
    deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth which are accompanied
    by an offer of proof; and (3) the affiant has made the allegedly false or reckless
    statement"); State v. Robinson, 
    408 S.C. 268
    , 274, 
    758 S.E.2d 725
    , 728 (Ct. App.
    2014), cert. granted (Dec. 3, 2014) (explaining a court may not suppress evidence
    "simply because the officer made a false statement in, or omitted key facts from, an
    affidavit supporting a search warrant"); 
    id.
     (stating the proponent of suppression
    must demonstrate the false statements or omissions rendered the affidavit unable to
    support a finding of probable cause).
    4.      As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit cross-examination
    about an allegedly unrelated weapon: Rule 608(c), SCRE ("Bias, prejudice or any
    motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by
    examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced."); State v.
    Pradubsri, 
    403 S.C. 270
    , 276-77, 
    743 S.E.2d 98
    , 102 (Ct. App. 2013) (noting a
    criminal defendant may show a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing
    that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination);
    State v. Boiter, 
    302 S.C. 381
    , 383, 
    396 S.E.2d 364
    , 365 (1990) ("Although the
    Confrontation Clause 'tips the scales' in favor of permitting cross-examination if it
    could reasonably be expected to have an effect on the jury, a court may prohibit
    cross-examination for impeachment purposes when the probative value of the
    evidence that the defendant seeks to elicit is substantially outweighed by the risk of
    prejudice."); State v. Mizzell, 
    349 S.C. 326
    , 331, 
    563 S.E.2d 315
    , 317 (2002) ("The
    trial judge retains discretion to impose reasonable limits on the scope of cross-
    examination."); State v. Lyles, 
    379 S.C. 328
    , 336-37, 
    665 S.E.2d 201
    , 205-06 (Ct.
    App. 2008) (explaining only relevant evidence is admissible).
    5.     As to whether the trial court erred in allowing Chisolm to represent himself:
    State v. McLauren, 
    349 S.C. 488
    , 493, 
    563 S.E.2d 346
    , 348 (Ct. App. 2002)
    (explaining a defendant may waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se); id. at
    493, 
    563 S.E.2d at 348-49
     (requiring the waiver of counsel to be knowingly and
    intelligently made); State v. Bryant, 
    383 S.C. 410
    , 414, 
    680 S.E.2d 11
    , 13 (Ct. App.
    2009) ("It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there was a
    knowing and intelligent waiver by the accused."); State v. Cash, 
    309 S.C. 40
    , 42-
    43, 
    419 S.E.2d 811
    , 813 (Ct. App. 1992) (listing the factors used in determining if
    a defendant had sufficient background to understand the disadvantages of self-
    representation); McLauren, 
    349 S.C. at 494
    , 
    563 S.E.2d at 349
     ("In the absence of
    a specific inquiry by the [circuit court] addressing the disadvantages of a pro se
    defense . . . , the appellate court will look to the record to determine whether [a
    defendant] had sufficient background or was apprised of his rights by some other
    source.").
    AFFIRMED.
    SHORT, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-UP-501

Filed Date: 10/28/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024