Catoe v. City of Columbia ( 2015 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Evalena Catoe, individually and as Personal
    Representative of the Estate of Richard L. Catoe, Jr.,
    deceased, Appellant,
    v.
    The City of Columbia and Leon Lott, in his official
    capacity as Sheriff of Richland County, Defendants,
    Of whom Leon Lott, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
    Richland County, is the Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2014-000194
    Appeal from Richland County
    Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-547
    Heard October 15, 2015 – Filed December 2, 2015
    AFFIRMED
    Pamela R. Mullis, of Mullis Law Firm, PA, of Columbia,
    for Appellant.
    Robert David Garfield and Andrew F. Lindemann, both
    of Davidson & Lindemann, PA, of Columbia, for
    Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Evalena Catoe, individually and as personal representative of her
    husband's estate, appeals the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in
    favor of Sheriff Leon Lott, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Richland County, in
    this negligence action. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
    following authorities:
    1.      With respect to whether law enforcement owed a duty of care to Catoe's
    husband, Richard L. Catoe, Jr.: Edwards v. Lexington Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 
    386 S.C. 285
    , 290, 
    688 S.E.2d 125
    , 128 (2010) ("An essential element in a cause of
    action based upon negligence is the existence of a legal duty of care owed by the
    defendant to the plaintiff. Without a duty, there is no actionable negligence."
    citation omitted)); 
    id.
     ("A plaintiff alleging negligence on the part of a
    governmental actor or entity may rely either upon a duty created by statute or one
    founded on the common law."); Wyatt v. Fowler, 
    326 S.C. 97
    , 101, 
    484 S.E.2d 590
    , 592 (1997) ("[T]he state does not owe its citizens a duty of care to proceed
    without error when it brings legal action against them."); Madison ex rel Bryant v.
    Babcock Ctr., Inc., 
    371 S.C. 123
    , 145, 
    638 S.E.2d 650
    , 661 (2006) ("The public
    duty rule insulates public officials, employees, and governmental entities from
    liability for the negligent performance of their official duties by negating the
    existence of a duty towards the plaintiff."); 
    id.
     (indicating the public duty rule is
    applied when the alleged duty is founded upon a statute); Edwards, 
    386 S.C. at 290
    , 
    688 S.E.2d at 128
     ("[W]hen the duty is founded on the common law, we refer
    to this as a legal duty arising from 'special circumstances.'"); Faile v. S.C. Dep't of
    Juvenile Justice, 
    350 S.C. 315
    , 334, 
    566 S.E.2d 536
    , 546 (2002) (recognizing five
    instances in which a duty of care may arise: (1) when the defendant has a special
    relationship to the victim; (2) when the defendant has a special relationship to the
    injurer; (3) when the defendant voluntarily undertakes a duty; (4) when the
    defendant negligently or intentionally creates the risk; and (5) when a statute
    imposes a duty on the defendant).
    2.      With respect to whether the alleged negligent conduct was immune from
    liability under section 15-78-60(6) of the South Carolina Code (2005): 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60
    (6) (providing a governmental entity is not liable for a loss
    resulting from "civil disobedience, riot, insurrection, or rebellion or the failure to
    provide [or] the method of providing police or fire protection"); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20
    (f) (2005) ("The provisions of this chapter establishing limitations on and
    exemptions to the liability of the State, its political subdivisions, and employees,
    while acting within the scope of official duty, must be liberally construed in favor
    of limiting the liability of the State."); Huggins v. Metts, 
    371 S.C. 621
    , 624-25, 
    640 S.E.2d 465
    , 466-67 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding police conduct in negotiating with and
    attempting to take custody of a man brandishing knives and threatening to harm
    himself and others fell within the "method" of providing police protection as
    contemplated by section 15-78-60(6)), cert. denied Oct. 18, 2007.
    AFFIRMED.
    FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-UP-547

Filed Date: 12/2/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024