Corey v. Corey ( 2016 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Heather Corey, Appellant/Respondent,
v.
Kevin Corey, Respondent/Appellant.
In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2014-001461
Appeal From Greenville County
Robert N. Jenkins, Sr., Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-050
Submitted December 21, 2015 – Filed January 25, 2016
AFFIRMED
N. Douglas Brannon, of Kennedy & Brannon, P.A., of
Spartanburg, for Appellant/Respondent.
Joseph M. Ramseur, Jr. and Danielle Metoyer Mitchell,
of Mitchell Ramseur, LLC, of Greenville, for
Respondent/Appellant.
Bobby H. Mann, Jr., of Temple & Mann, of Greenville,
Guardian ad Litem, pro se.
PER CURIAM: This cross appeal arises from an action by Heather Corey
(Mother) seeking the termination of parental rights (TPR) against Kevin Corey
(Father). Father counterclaimed for a change of custody. On appeal, Mother
argues the family court erred in (1) disregarding the South Carolina Supreme
Court's order limiting expert testimony about Father's psychosexual testing, (2)
awarding grandparent visitation, (3) ordering expanded reunification with Father
absent a change of circumstances, and (4) denying TPR and applying res judicata
to a TPR action. Mother additionally argues the administrative judge for the
family court erred by sua sponte amending a prior order and assigning a resident
judge to preside over the TPR trial. Father argues the family court erred in (1)
refusing to order a change of custody and (2) denying his request for attorney's
fees. We affirm.
1. Mother argues the family court erred by disregarding the South Carolina
Supreme Court's mid-trial order limiting expert testimony about Father's
psychosexual testing. We disagree.
Father provided Mother with the results of his psychosexual testing by March 7,
2014. Before the March 24, 2014 portion of the trial, Mother requested a
continuance, contending Father failed to timely provide the results of his
psychosexual testing and Mother could not effectively cross-examine Father and
two of his expert witnesses. The family court denied the continuance. Mother
filed a notice of appeal with the supreme court and petitioned for supersedeas. In
denying Mother's petition for supersedeas, the supreme court stated it was
"confident the family court [would] take appropriate measures to safeguard
[Mother's] due process rights and allocate additional hearing time to give the
parties the ability to address the results of the testing once the results [were]
provided to [Mother]." Heather C. v. Kevin C., S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated March
24, 2014.
We find the family court did not err because the supreme court's order did not limit
the presentation of testimony regarding Father's psychosexual testing, and Mother
had adequate time to review the records and prepare for examination of the expert
witnesses. In particular, Mother had adequate time to prepare for Doctor Richard
Dwyer, the expert who conducted the psychosexual testing at issue. Moreover,
Mother extensively examined two of her own experts in rebuttal, including Doctor
Selman Watson, the expert with whom Mother consulted regarding the
psychosexual testing results. Furthermore, although the family court denied the
continuance, Mother was effectively provided an additional month to prepare for
these witnesses, who were examined during the April 21-22, 2014 portion of the
trial. Although the supreme court's order was not a directive, we find the family
court complied with the spirit of the order and took "appropriate measures to
safeguard [Mother's] due process rights and allocate additional hearing time to give
the parties the ability to address the results of the testing once the results [were]
provided to [Mother]." Accordingly, we affirm.
2. Mother argues the family court erred in awarding visitation to the paternal
grandparents. She further asserts the visitation award violated her due process
rights because Father did not request that relief in his pleadings, the grandparents
were not parties, and Mother lacked notice of the issue during trial. Mother
additionally argues the family court erred in awarding grandparent visitation over
her objection when the court made no findings of unfitness or compelling
circumstances. We disagree.
On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); see
also Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). Nonetheless,
this court is not required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and
heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign
comparative weight to their testimony. Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385, 709 S.E.2d at 652.
The burden is upon the appellant to convince this court that the preponderance of
the evidence is against the findings of the family court. Id. "In appeals from the
family court, the appellate court has the authority to find the facts in accordance
with its view of the preponderance of the evidence." Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56,
61, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006). "This broad scope of review does not, however,
require the appellate court to disregard the findings of the family court." Id. "This
degree of deference is especially true in cases involving the welfare and best
interests of a minor child." Id. at 62, 624 S.E.2d at 652.
First, we find the family court did not violate Mother's due process rights in
awarding visitation to the paternal grandparents when they were not made parties
until after the trial. In Father's counterclaim, he requested as an alternative to
granting him custody that the children be placed in the custody of the paternal
grandparents. See Bass v. Bass, 272 S.C. 177, 180, 249 S.E.2d 905, 906 (1978)
("Due process requires that a litigant be placed on notice of the issues which the
court is to consider."); see also Middleton v. Johnson, 369 S.C. 585, 594, 633
S.E.2d 162, 167 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Under the penumbra of custody is the lesser
included right to visitation."). Further, both grandparents testified concerning their
ability to care for the children and their desire to have relationships with the
children, and Mother had the opportunity to cross-examine them on those issues.
Thus, Mother had adequate notice that grandparent visitation was an issue before
the court and her due process rights were not violated.
Second, we find the family court did not err in awarding the paternal grandparents
visitation. See Camburn v. Smith, 355 S.C. 574, 579-80, 586 S.E.2d 565, 568
(2003) ("Before visitation may be awarded [to the grandparents] over a parent's
objection, one of two evidentiary hurdles must be met: the parent must be shown to
be unfit by clear and convincing evidence, or there must be evidence of compelling
circumstances to overcome the presumption that the parental decision is in the
child's best interest[s]."). We initially note Mother was not shown by clear and
convincing evidence to be unfit, and the family court made no such finding. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(33) (Supp. 2015) (stating the family court must find
the child's parents are unfit by clear and convincing evidence or compelling
circumstances exist to "overcome the presumption that the parental decision is in
the child's best interest[s]").
However, the circumstances here are sufficiently compelling to overcome Mother's
decision on visitation. See Camburn, 355 S.C. at 579, 586 S.E.2d at 568 ("The fact
that a child may benefit from contact with the grandparent, or that the parent's
refusal is simply not reasonable in the court's view, does not justify government
interference in the parental decision."); id. at 580, 586 S.E.2d at 568 (reversing
award of grandparent visitation when no compelling circumstances were present to
overcome the presumption that the decision by the fit parents was in the children's
best interests); see also § 63-3-530 (33) (requiring the presence of compelling
circumstances before the family court may award grandparent visitation over a fit
parent's objection). In its order, the family court found it in the children's best
interests to be reunited with the paternal grandparents because it would assist in the
reunification process between Father and the children, the grandparents "have
demonstrated love" for the children, and the grandparents "previously had a good
relationship with their grandchildren" before the divorce. We agree.
The fact the grandparents demonstrated love and previously maintained a good
relationship with the children—standing alone—does not create compelling
circumstances to overcome Mother's decision regarding visitation with the
grandparents. See Camburn, 355 S.C. at 579, 586 S.E.2d at 568 (noting
"significant harm to the child" as an example of a compelling circumstance that
may overcome the presumption that a fit parent's decision regarding visitation is in
the child's best interests). However, when combined with the impact visitation
with the paternal grandparents would have on advancing the reunification process
with Father following nearly four years of separation and sexual abuse allegations,
the circumstances are sufficiently compelling to overcome the presumption that
Mother's decision on visitation was in the children's best interests. We find
fostering a relationship between the children and the paternal grandparents as a
way to assist the children's relationship with Father is sufficiently compelling to
justify ordering visitation. Cf. Marquez v. Caudill, 376 S.C. 229, 249, 656 S.E.2d
737, 747 (2008) (holding a biological parent's death and an attempt to maintain ties
with that parent's family may be compelling circumstances justifying ordering
grandparent visitation over a fit parent's objection). However, we emphasize the
family court's order grants only therapeutic visitation coordinated by the counselor
to serve as a remedial component in facilitating Father's relationship with the
children. It does not grant a separate visitation to the grandparents in addition to
that of Father. Accordingly, we find the circumstances here sufficiently
compelling to justify the award of visitation to the paternal grandparents.
3. Mother next argues the family court erred in ordering reunification visitation
between Father and the children and expanding the visitation beyond the prior final
order absent a change of circumstances, and she requests the prior merits order be
reinstated. We disagree.
"As with child custody, the welfare and best interests of the child are the primary
considerations in determining visitation." Paparella v. Paparella, 340 S.C. 186,
191, 531 S.E.2d 297, 300 (Ct. App. 2000). When the court has previously
established visitation, the moving party must show a change of circumstances to
warrant a change of visitation. Ingold v. Ingold, 304 S.C. 316, 320, 404 S.E.2d 35,
37 (Ct. App. 1991).
We initially find the family court did not expand Father's prior visitation beyond
what the order on merits intervention awarded Father. The agreement reflected in
the original final order provided,
Father shall be allowed visitation with the minor children
as directed by the children's counselor, Linda Hutton.
Linda Hutton shall determine the course of reunification
to include when and how Father resumes contact with the
minor children (to include both indirect and direct
contact and visitation). The parties agree this process
will begin with therapeutic visitation . . . when [Linda
Hutton] deems it appropriate.
The order additionally appointed Hutton to "facilitate a re-introduction of Father to
the children as she deem[ed] appropriate."
In the final order following the TPR trial, the family court ordered Father to have
visitation that would "eventually be as close as possible to the original agreement."
The order provided the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) would select a
counselor/therapist based on Father's and Mother's recommendations within fifteen
days, and the selected counselor would "facilitate reunification of the children with
Father" and "facilitate visitation between Father and the minor children
and . . . determine the course of reunification to include when and how Father
resumes contact with the minor children . . . ." Although the court required no
further testing before therapeutic counseling could begin, it ordered the parties to
cooperate with the counselor's recommendations regarding "mental health
treatment of any nature related to the restoration of the family," including co-
parenting counseling, family counseling, and individual psychological evaluation
and treatment.
We find the family court's order still places the authority to order visitation with
the children's therapist when he or she deems it appropriate. The order issued
following the TPR trial substantially reflects the same visitation plan Mother now
requests be reinstated. Although a substantial change of circumstances is
necessary for the court to modify visitation, we find the family court did not
modify the visitation order in place. See Ingold, 304 S.C. at 320, 404 S.E.2d at 37
(stating the moving party must show a change of circumstances to warrant
modifying visitation).
Further, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the family court's
decision to grant Father visitation. See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385, 709 S.E.2d at 652(stating the burden is upon the appellant to convince this court the preponderance
of the evidence is against the findings of the family court). Although the children's
counselors testified the children would likely regress if required to engage in
visitation with Father, the GAL and Mother's own expert, Dr. Watson, testified a
relationship with Father may be beneficial if the children's safety could be assured.
Additionally, the family court ordered therapeutic counseling that would include
education for the parents "on appropriate boundaries" with the children, each other,
and other family members and required the parties to cooperate with any
recommendations regarding mental health treatment. As the GAL noted, while the
immediate impact on the children from contact with Father is a significant
consideration, the issue is whether the children's best interests are served by a long-
term relationship with Father. See Paparella, 340 S.C. at 191, 531 S.E.2d at 300
(stating the children's best interests are the paramount considerations in
determining visitation); Watson v. Poole, 329 S.C. 232, 240, 495 S.E.2d 236, 240
(Ct. App. 1997) ("The family court is given wide latitude to take whatever actions
it deems necessary in the best interest[s] of the child.").
Furthermore, the results of Father's ABLE assessment1 indicated Father "did not
show interest in elementary or pre-school age children," and responded normally in
the adult and adolescent groups. Father scored a four percent on the ABLE
assessment. Dr. Dwyer explained a low score on the ABLE assessment showed
the subject is less similar to people who have tried to justify sexual activity with
children. Although Mother has asserted Father received inadequate treatment, she
also believes treatment will be ineffective until he admits to the abuse, which may
never happen. This case presents complicated questions and a perfect solution
does not exist. Nonetheless, the family court did not err in ordering this visitation
plan given the complexities in the case. We find the children's best interests are
served and their safety assured with the visitation order in place because it allows a
therapist to determine when contact would begin with Father. Consequently, we
affirm the family court's granting of therapeutic visitation.
4. Mother argues the family court erred in denying the termination of Father's
parental rights. Specifically, Mother argues the court erroneously found the abuse
was not repetitive or continual. Mother additionally contends the family court
erred in applying res judicata to a TPR action.2 We disagree. We find the family
court did not err in denying TPR because Mother did not present clear and
convincing evidence establishing a TPR ground or that it was in the children's best
interests.
"Because terminating the legal relationship between natural parents and a child is
one of the most difficult issues an appellate court has to decide, great caution must
be exercised in reviewing termination proceedings[,] and termination is proper
only when the evidence clearly and convincingly mandates such a result." S.C.
1
The ABLE Assessment is designed to measure sexual interest and collect
information about abusive and sexual problem behaviors.
2
The family court's findings that the abuse was not repetitive or severe and TPR
was not the in children's best interests are dispositive. Accordingly, we need not
address the argument concerning res judicata and estoppel. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (noting an appellate court need not address remaining issues when
disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Roe, 371 S.C. 450, 455, 639 S.E.2d 165, 168 (Ct. App.
2006).
Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof
which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm
belief as to the allegations sought to be established. Such
measure of proof is intermediate, more than a mere
preponderance but less than is required for proof beyond
a reasonable doubt . . . .
Loe v. Mother, Father, & Berkeley Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 382 S.C. 457, 465,
675 S.E.2d 807, 811 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Anonymous (M-156-90) v. State Bd.
of Med. Exam'rs, 329 S.C. 371, 374 n.2, 496 S.E.2d 17, 18 n.2 (1998)).
The family court may order TPR upon finding at least one statutory ground for
TPR is satisfied and also finding TPR is in the best interests of the child. S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2015). The family court may order TPR upon
finding "[t]he child or another child while residing in the parent's domicile has
been harmed . . . and because of the severity or repetition of the abuse or neglect, it
is not reasonably likely that the home can be made safe within twelve months."
S.C. Code. Ann. § 63-7-2570(1). Harm occurs when the parent "inflicts or allows
to be inflicted upon the child physical or mental injury or engages in acts or
omissions which present a substantial risk of physical or mental injury to the
child." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(4) (2010).
We find Mother did not establish either a statutory ground for TPR by clear and
convincing evidence or that TPR is in the children's best interests. The parties
have engaged in nearly five years of litigation, in which Mother has attempted to
prove Father is a sexual offender, Father has contended Mother committed parental
alienation, and both parties have presented extensive expert testimony. The
children have seen multiple therapists over the last several years, and each therapist
testified at trial that the children disclosed abuse that was specific as to perpetrator,
time, and location. However, the transcripts of the children's forensic interviews
indicate some inconsistencies in the disclosures, which Father's experts noted in
their testimony. Although Mother contends the 19-1-1803 order "contains specific
3
See S.C. Code Ann. § 19-1-180(B)(2)(a)-(b) (2014) (stating a child's out-of-court
statement concerning an act of alleged abuse is admissible if the child is
unavailable to testify and the child's statement is "shown to possess particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness").
findings of the children's credibility," the family court's order involved the
admissibility of the children's out-of-court statements but was not a finding that
abuse occurred.
Certainly, if Father sexually abused the children, it would amount to harm as
defined in the TPR statute. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(4) (stating harm occurs
when the parent "inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical or mental
injury or engages in acts or omissions which present a substantial risk of physical
or mental injury to the child"). However, Mother did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Father harmed the children and his home cannot be made
safe within twelve months because of the repetition or severity of the harm given
the inconsistencies presented in the children's forensic interviews and the
conflicting expert testimony. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248,
254, 519 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating the grounds for TPR must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence); Loe, 382 S.C. at 465, 675 S.E.2d at 811
("Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be
established." (quoting Anonymous (M-156-90), 329 S.C. at 374 n.2, 496 S.E.2d at18 n.2)); cf. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v Michelle G., 407 S.C. 499, 503, 509-10, 757
S.E.2d 388, 390-91, 393-94 (2014) (affirming TPR and finding the appellant's
conduct satisfied the "repetition" portion of the TPR statute when it was undisputed
the appellant sexually abused the minor children multiple times); Richland Cty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Earles, 330 S.C. 24, 33-34, 496 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1998)
(affirming TPR and finding the evidence established the mother "repetitively and
severely, physically and sexually abused [the] children" when one child disclosed a
"graphic and detailed" description of the sexual abuse that occurred "all their
lives").
Finally, we find terminating Father's parental rights would not be in the children's
best interests. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d
285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating in a TPR case, the best interests of the children
are the paramount consideration). Although multiple therapists testified the
children would require additional therapy if required to engage in visitation with
Father, several other experts testified the children would suffer a detriment from
eliminating a relationship with their Father entirely. Specifically, the GAL
opposed TPR, stating, "I'm not hopeful that [Father] and the children will be able
to reconcile . . . . However, I believe there is an inherent benefit to having a
father." He indicated concern about TPR if Father did not commit the abuse;
however, he continued, "But let's say that it did happen[.] Isn't there some value?
Couldn't there be some training, some teaching, some behavior to allow them to
have a father in their lives again?" Dr. Watson additionally testified a potential
solution would be for the children to continue therapy, and learn proper touching
rules and how to protect themselves, while Father engaged in therapy to learn to
assure the children's comfort and safety. Dr. Watson also opined the father-child
relationship was worth repairing if Father was not a threat. We find the children's
best interests would not be served by terminating Father's parental rights when
alternatives remain. Thus, the family court did not err in finding TPR was not in
the children's best interests, and we affirm the denial of TPR.
5. Mother argues the chief administrative judge erred in sua sponte amending a
prior order and assigning a resident judge instead of a visiting judge to preside at
the TPR trial. We disagree. The South Carolina Supreme Court's order
specifically authorizes the chief administrative judge for the family court to set the
trial rosters, designate which presiding judge shall hear the trial rosters, and resolve
scheduling problems that arise. See Order RE: Duties of Family Court Chief
Judges for Administrative Purposes, 2012-11-21-06 (S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated
Nov. 21, 2012) (authorizing the chief administrative judge for family court to
designate which presiding judge shall hear the trial rosters and to resolve
scheduling problems). Thus, we find the chief administrative judge did not err in
amending the prior order and assigning a resident judge.
6. Father argues the family court erred in failing to find a substantial change in
circumstances warranting a change of custody. We disagree. "[T]o grant a change
in custody, there must be a showing of changed circumstances occurring
subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree." Latimer v. Farmer, 360 S.C. 375,
381, 602 S.E.2d 32, 35 (2004). "[W]hen a non-custodial parent seeks a change in
custody, the non-custodial parent must establish the following: (1) there has been a
substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child and (2) a
change in custody is in the overall best interests of the child." Id. "The change of
circumstances relied on for a change of custody must be such as would
substantially affect the interest[s] and welfare of the child." Id.We find the family court did not err in denying Father's request for a change in
custody. Father contended at trial that the family court should order a change of
custody because Mother was committing parental alienation. The family court
concluded Mother was not committing parental alienation given the conflicting
expert testimony, Mother's psychological evaluation, and Mother's testimony that
she sought only to protect the children and not to harm Father. Although Father
presented extensive expert testimony on parental alienation and Mother
continuously refused to comply with the agreement originally reached, the expert
testimony on parental alienation was conflicting, and nearly every expert noted it
was not a well-defined condition. Further, neither any of the therapists nor the
GAL believed Mother was committing parental alienation but was only seeking to
protect her children. See Brown v. Brown, 412 S.C. 225, 239, 771 S.E.2d 649, 656
(Ct. App. 2015) (stating it is appropriate for the family court to consider who has
been the primary caretaker as well as the opinions of third parties, such as the GAL
and expert witnesses, making custody determinations).
Further, the family court considered the testimony of Mother, the children's
therapists, and the children's teachers that both children were doing well in school
and thriving. See Shirley v. Shirley, 342 S.C. 324, 330, 536 S.E.2d 427, 430 (Ct.
App. 2000) (stating in determining custody, "the family court should consider how
the custody decision will impact all areas of the child's life, including physical,
psychological, spiritual, educational, familial, emotional, and recreational
aspects"); id. (stating the controlling considerations in all child custody
controversies are the children's welfare and best interests). We find the family
court's findings regarding custody and whether Mother committed parental
alienation are supported by the record, and we affirm the denial of the change of
custody. See Brown, 412 S.C. at 239, 771 S.E.2d at 657 (stating "child custody
decisions are matters left largely to the discretion of the family court" even though
"this court has jurisdiction to correct errors of law and find facts in accordance
with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence").
Finally, we find Watson v. Poole is distinguishable from the present case. 329 S.C.
at 234, 238-39, 495 S.E.2d at 237, 239-40 (finding the "conditions [were]
inherently injurious to the child's best interest[s] and constitute[d] a change of
circumstances warranting a change of custody" when the mother continued to
pursue unfounded sexual abuse allegations and sought to terminate the father's
visitation rights). Unlike in Watson, multiple counselors in this case testified to the
children disclosing sexual abuse, and the children in this case were much older and
capable of indicating whether abuse occurred. Though the children's forensic
interviews contained inconsistencies, four therapists who each provided counseling
to the children testified to disclosures. See id. at 236 & n.4, 495 S.E.2d at 238 &
n.4 (noting the counselor who initially reported the father had sexually abused the
daughter later concluded the father had not abused the daughter). Although in both
cases the mother continued to pursue sexual abuse allegations and remove the
father from the children's lives, here, Mother is relying on the opinions of multiple
professionals that the children's best interests are served if they do not have contact
with Father. See id. at 234-35, 495 S.E.2d at 237-38 (stating the mother sought to
terminate the father's visitation rights even though no physical evidence of sexual
abuse was ever found, and she admitted "at least ten findings had been made that
[the father] never harmed the child"). Finally, in this case, the GAL opined the
children may be able to develop a relationship with Father through a therapeutic
visitation plan and opposed removing the children from Mother's custody. Cf. id.
at 239, 495 S.E.2d at 240 (noting the GAL's testimony that the child would only be
able to develop a relationship with the father outside of the mother's home). Thus,
the family court properly denied Father's request for a modification of custody.
7. Father argues the family court erred in denying his request for attorney's fees.
We disagree. The family court considered the factors outlined in Glasscock v.
Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 161 n.1, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 n.1 (1991), finding both
parties received beneficial results and neither party was in a position to pay the
fees incurred. In particular, Mother did not succeed in her claim for TPR, but
Father also did not gain custody of the children. Similarly, Father succeeded in
being granted visitation with the children, but the appointed counselor will
determine when and how Father is to resume contact. See id. (stating the court
should consider the beneficial results obtained by the attorney).
Furthermore, Father and Mother have engaged in protracted litigation since 2010,
including the nine day TPR trial, and both have likely incurred significant expenses
as a result. Mother's net monthly income was substantially lower than Father's net
monthly income, and both parties' financial declarations indicate more monthly
expenses than net income earned. See id. (stating the family court should consider
the parties' financial conditions, ability to pay, and the effect an award of fees
would have on their standards of living). Mother and Father each obtained
beneficial results but not all of the relief requested, and an award of attorney's fees
would significantly impact each party. Accordingly, we affirm the family court's
denial of Father's request for attorney's fees.
AFFIRMED.4
FEW, C.J., and LOCKEMY, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.