State v. Ransom-Williams ( 2016 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Darius Ransom-Williams, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2012-212566
    Appeal From Orangeburg County
    Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-021
    Heard November 2, 2015 – Filed January 20, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    Sheila Marlouvon Bias, of Richardson Plowden &
    Robinson, PA, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert
    Michael Dudek, both of Columbia, for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
    Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
    Columbia; and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of
    Orangeburg, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Darius Ransom-Williams (Ransom-Williams) appeals his
    convictions for first-degree burglary and assault and battery of a high and
    aggravated nature, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) finding the inclusion of the
    reconstructed proceedings presented a record sufficient for appellate review, and
    (2) admitting Ransom-Williams's confession because it was obtained in violation
    of his constitutional rights. We affirm.
    1. We find the circuit court properly held the inclusion of the reconstructed
    proceedings presented a record sufficient for appellate review. See Adams v. H.R.
    Allen, Inc., 
    397 S.C. 652
    , 656, 
    726 S.E.2d 9
    , 12 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]he
    reconstructed record must allow for meaningful appellate review."); State v.
    Ladson, 
    373 S.C. 320
    , 324, 
    644 S.E.2d 271
    , 273 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining our
    state aligned with the majority of jurisdictions that hold the inability to prepare a
    complete transcript, in and of itself, does not necessarily present a ground for
    reversal); id. at 325, 644 S.E.2d at 273 ("Before a defendant can establish that he is
    entitled to a new trial on the basis of an inadequate reconstructed record, he must
    identify a specific appellate claim that this court would be unable to review
    effectively using the reconstructed record." (brackets omitted) (emphasis added)
    (quoting Harris v. Comm'r of Corr., 
    671 A.2d 359
    , 363 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)));
    Sweat v. Crawford, 
    292 S.C. 324
    , 327, 
    356 S.E.2d 147
    , 149 (Ct. App. 1987)
    (finding omissions from the record did not prejudice appellant because the
    evidence included in the record sufficiently supported the findings of fact made by
    the referee).
    2. We find the circuit court properly held that Edwards v. Arizona, 
    451 U.S. 477
    ,
    484–85 (1981), did not mandate the suppression of Appellant's statements. See In
    re Tracy B., 
    391 S.C. 51
    , 61, 
    704 S.E.2d 71
    , 75–76 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Once an
    accused has invoked his right to have an attorney present during custodial
    interrogation, he may not be subjected to further police interrogation 'unless the
    accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
    the police.'" (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85 (1981))); id. at 65, 704 S.E.2d
    at 78 ("The United States Supreme Court has stressed 'the Edwards rule is not a
    constitutional mandate, but judicially prescribed prophylaxis.'" (quoting Maryland
    v. Shatzer, 
    559 U.S. 98
    , 105 (2010))). Additionally, we find the circuit court
    correctly determined that Appellant's inculpatory statements were made
    voluntarily. See State v. Miller, 
    375 S.C. 370
    , 378, 
    652 S.E.2d 444
    , 448 (Ct. App.
    2007) ("The [circuit court] determines the admissibility of a statement upon proof
    of its voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence."); 
    id.
     ("On appeal, the
    conclusion of the [circuit court] as to the voluntariness of a statement will not be
    reversed unless so erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion."); 
    id.
     at 378–79,
    652 S.E.2d at 448 ("When reviewing a [circuit court]'s ruling concerning
    voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own
    view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the
    [circuit court]'s ruling is supported by any evidence.").
    AFFIRMED.
    SHORT, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-UP-021

Filed Date: 1/20/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024