Militano-Catanzaro v. Catanzaro ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Stephanie Allyson Militano-Catanzaro, Appellant,
    v.
    Leonard Vincent Catanzaro, Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2011-197967
    Appeal From Horry County
    Ronald R. Norton, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-018
    Heard November 10, 2015 – Filed January 20, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    Randall K. Mullins, of Mullins Law Firm, P.A., of North
    Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.
    Leonard Catanzaro, of Loris, pro se.
    PER CURIAM: Stephanie Allyson Militano-Cantanzaro (Wife) appeals an order
    by the family court that held she was not entitled to alimony, attorney's fees,
    guardian ad litem (GAL) fees, or a change in the method of the child support
    award. We affirm.
    1. We disagree with Wife's argument the family court erred in not awarding her
    alimony. See Bodkin v. Bodkin, 
    388 S.C. 203
    , 215, 
    694 S.E.2d 230
    , 237 (Ct. App.
    2010) ("The amount to be awarded for alimony, as well as a determination of
    whether a spouse is entitled to alimony, is within the sound discretion of the family
    court."); Patel v. Patel, 
    359 S.C. 515
    , 529, 
    599 S.E.2d 114
    , 121 (2004) ("Three
    important factors in awarding periodic alimony are (1) the duration of the
    marriage; (2) the overall financial situation of the parties, especially the ability of
    the supporting spouse to pay; and (3) whether either spouse was more at fault than
    the other."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130
    (C) (2014) (providing factors that must be
    considered in the making of an alimony award). We find the family court did not
    abuse its discretion in finding alimony was not sustainable in Leonard Vincent
    Catanzaro's (Husband's) financial situation as he had less disposable income than
    Wife even though she had higher expenses.
    2. We disagree with Wife's argument that the family court erred in not changing the
    method of the child support award nor its calculation. See Bennett v. Rector, 
    389 S.C. 274
    , 281, 
    697 S.E.2d 715
    , 719 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A child support award rests
    in the discretion of the trial judge [] and will not be altered on appeal absent abuse
    of discretion."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 114
    -4720(A)(1) (Supp. 2015) ("The
    guidelines define income as the actual gross income of the parent, if employed to
    full capacity, or potential income if unemployed or underemployed."). We find the
    family court's chosen method of child support calculation was appropriate and
    intended to benefit Wife if Husband received additional bonuses or income despite
    its inconvenience to Wife.
    3. We agree with the family court that Wife was not entitled to attorney's fees and
    GAL fees. See Gartside v. Gartside, 
    383 S.C. 35
    , 47, 
    677 S.E.2d 621
    , 627 (Ct.
    App. 2009) ("An award of attorneys' fees rests within the sound discretion of the
    family court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.");
    E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 
    307 S.C. 471
    , 476-77, 
    415 S.E.2d 812
    , 816 (1992) (providing in
    determining whether to award attorney's fees and costs, a family court should
    consider the following factors: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's
    fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective
    financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard
    of living"); Shirley v. Shirley, 
    342 S.C. 324
    , 341, 
    536 S.E.2d 427
    , 436 (Ct. App.
    2000) ("An award of [GAL] fees lies within the sound discretion of the [family
    court] and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."); Payne
    v. Payne, 
    382 S.C. 62
    , 71, 
    674 S.E.2d 515
    , 519 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding the family
    court did not abuse its discretion by equally splitting the GAL fees between the
    parties). We find the family court properly determined each party should pay their
    own attorney's fees and half of the GAL fees based on the financial situation of
    each party and the contested nature of the proceedings.
    AFFIRMED.
    HUFF, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-UP-018

Filed Date: 1/20/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024