State v. Haltiwanger ( 2016 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Gerald Bernard Haltiwanger, Jr., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002460
Appeal From Richland County
Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-175
Heard February 1, 2016 – Filed April 13, 2016
AFFIRMED
Heather Vry Scalzo, of Byford & Scalzo, LLC, of
Greenville, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert
Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant
Attorney General Alphonso Simon, Jr., and Solicitor
Daniel Edward Johnson, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Gerald Bernard Haltiwanger appeals his conviction for murder,
arguing the trial court erred in admitting his statement to police because the
statement was typewritten by law enforcement and was not a complete record of
his interview. Haltiwanger contends the trial court's failure to properly weigh the
prejudicial effect of the statement against its probative value, under Rule 403 of the
South Carolina Rules of Evidence, resulted in undue prejudice and misled the jury.
We affirm.
We find the trial court did not err in admitting Haltiwanger's statement to police
because the probative value of the statement was not substantially outweighed by
its prejudicial effect. See Rule 402, SCRE ("All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution of the State of South Carolina, statutes, these rules, or by other rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina."); Rule 401, SCRE
("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 403, SCRE
("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ."); Jamison v. Ford
Motor Co., 373 S.C. 248, 269, 644 S.E.2d 755, 766 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he
dictates of Rule 401 are subject to the balancing requirement of Rule 403, SCRE,
which requires a court to exclude relevant evidence upon a showing that its
admission would be more prejudicial than probative." (quoting Watson ex rel.
Watson v. Chapman, 343 S.C. 471, 478, 540 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Ct. App. 2000)));
State v. Gray, 408 S.C. 601, 616, 759 S.E.2d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2014) ("All
evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be
[scrutinized under Rule 403]." (alteration by court) (quoting State v. Gilchrist, 329
S.C. 621, 630, 469 S.E.2d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 1998))); id. ("Prejudice that is 'unfair'
is distinguished from the legitimate impact all evidence has on the outcome of a
case."); State v. McGee, 408 S.C. 278, 288-89, 758 S.E.2d 730, 736 (Ct. App.
2014) ("Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that
results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather[,] it refers to
evidence which tends to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis." (quoting State
v. Dennis, 402 S.C. 627, 636, 742 S.E.2d 21, 26 (Ct. App. 2013))), cert. denied,
Dec. 4, 2014; State v. Stokes, 381 S.C. 390, 404, 673 S.E.2d 434, 441 (2009)
("[T]he determination of prejudice must be based on the entire record, and the
result will generally turn on the facts of each case.").
Haltiwanger argues the trial court erred in failing to weigh the probative value of
the typed statement against the prejudicial effect of misleading the jury into
believing the typed statement was a complete version of Haltiwanger's interview
with police. We disagree. Haltiwanger's statement to police contained an
admission as to his involvement in the shooting and subsequent death of Victim;
his statement was knowingly and voluntarily given;1 and he was given the
opportunity to read, review, and make changes to the statement—though he elected
not to make any changes—prior to signing it. Additionally, the jury was properly
given the opportunity to consider the typewritten statement and Haltiwanger's trial
testimony that the statement did not include additional information he provided to
police—specifically, his testimony he shot Victim because he was afraid Victim
was going to shoot him as Victim charged towards Haltiwanger's car with his gun
raised. See State v. Von Dohlen, 322 S.C. 234, 243, 471 S.E.2d 689, 695 (1996)
(finding once the trial court determines a defendant's confession is valid because it
was knowingly and voluntarily given, it must then submit the defendant's statement
to the jury); State v. Atchison, 268 S.C. 588, 599, 235 S.E.2d 294, 299 (1977)
("Whenever there is conflicting evidence relative to the validity of a statement or a
confession, . . . it becomes the initial duty of the trial court to make a factual
finding as to the validity of the statement. If found valid, the court should allow
the statement to go to the jury for its ultimate determination of validity."); McGee,
408 S.C. at 288-289, 758 S.E.2d at 736 ("'Unfair prejudice does not mean the
damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the
evidence; rather[,] it refers to evidence which tends to suggest [a] decision on an
improper basis.' 'Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has an undue tendency to
suggest a decision on an improper basis, such as an emotional one.'" (quoting
Dennis, 402 S.C. at 636, 742 S.E.2d at 26, and State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526,
547, 552 S.E.2d 300, 311 (2001))).
AFFIRMED.
HUFF, A.C.J., and KONDUROS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
1
During a pretrial hearing, conducted pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 386(1964), the trial court determined Haltiwanger's statement was knowingly and
voluntarily given.