Jennifer McFarland v. Thomas Morris ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Jennifer McFarland and Carlton Holcombe, Appellants,
    v.
    Thomas Morris and David Hannemann, Respondents.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-000644
    Appeal From Dorchester County
    Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-113
    Heard February 9, 2022 – Filed March 16, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    Russell Grainger Hines, of Clement Rivers, LLP, of
    Charleston, for Appellants.
    Morgan S. Templeton and William Wharton Watkins, Jr.,
    both of Wall Templeton & Haldrup, PA, and John Joseph
    Dodds, IV, of Yarborough Applegate, LLC, all of
    Charleston, and Graham Pollock Powell, of The Powell
    Firm, of Mount Pleasant, for Respondents.
    PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
    authorities: 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-830
    (a) (2006) ("A director shall discharge his
    duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee: (1) in good
    faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
    under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to
    be in the best interests of the corporation." (emphases added)); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-830
    (d) (2006) ("A director is not liable to the corporation, a member, or any
    other person for any action taken or not taken as a director, if the director acted in
    compliance with this section."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-831
    (a) (2006) ("A conflict
    of interest transaction is not voidable or the basis for imposing liability on [a]
    director if the transaction was fair to the corporation at the time it was entered
    into . . . ."); Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Broad general statements may be
    disregarded by the appellate court."); Rule 208(b)(1)(E), SCACR ("At the head of
    each part, the particular issue to be addressed shall be set forth in distinctive type,
    followed by discussion and citations of authority."); Buffington v. T.O.E. Enters.,
    
    383 S.C. 388
    , 393, 
    680 S.E.2d 289
    , 291 (2009) ("[W]hile there is no formulaic
    balancing test, . . . courts should consider equitable doctrines when determining
    whether to enforce a restrictive covenant . . . . Indeed, an action to enforce a
    restrictive covenant is an action in equity, and to hold that a court must issue an
    injunction as a matter of law upon a finding that a restrictive covenant has been
    violated is erroneous."); Duckett by Duckett v. Payne, 
    279 S.C. 94
    , 96, 
    302 S.E.2d 342
    , 343 (1983) ("[T]he appellant carries the burden of convincing this [c]ourt that
    the trial court erred."); Lollis v. Dutton, 
    421 S.C. 467
    , 477, 
    807 S.E.2d 723
    , 728 (Ct.
    App. 2017) ("On appeal from an action in equity, [the appellate court] may find facts
    in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence." (alteration in
    original) (quoting Walker v. Brooks, 
    414 S.C. 343
    , 347, 
    778 S.E.2d 477
    , 479
    (2015))); 
    id. at 478
    , 807 S.E.2d at 728 ("However, this broad scope of review does
    not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore the fact that the
    [circuit court] was in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses."
    (alteration in original) (quoting Laughon v. O'Braitis, 
    360 S.C. 520
    , 524–25, 
    602 S.E.2d 108
    , 110 (Ct. App. 2004))); 
    id.
     ("Further, 'this broad scope does not relieve
    the appellant of [the] burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.'"
    (alteration in original) (quoting Ballard v. Roberson, 
    399 S.C. 588
    , 593, 
    733 S.E.2d 107
    , 109 (2012))); Rawlinson Rd. Homeowners Ass'n v. Jackson, 
    395 S.C. 25
    , 35,
    
    716 S.E.2d 337
    , 343 (Ct. App. 2011) ("A party seeking injunctive relief 'must
    demonstrate irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, and the absence
    of an adequate remedy at law. An injunction is a drastic remedy issued by the court
    in its discretion to prevent irreparable harm suffered by the plaintiff.'" (emphases
    added) (quoting Denman v. City of Columbia, 
    387 S.C. 131
    , 140–41, 
    691 S.E.2d 465
    , 470 (2010))); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Mother ex rel. Minor Child, 
    375 S.C. 276
    , 283, 
    651 S.E.2d 622
    , 626 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[W]e note this issue is abandoned
    because Mother makes a conclusory argument without citation of any authority to
    support her claim."); Ellie, Inc. v. Miccichi, 
    358 S.C. 78
    , 99, 
    594 S.E.2d 485
    , 496
    (Ct. App. 2004) ("Numerous cases have held that where an issue is not argued within
    the body of the brief but is only a short conclusory statement, it is abandoned on
    appeal.").
    AFFIRMED.
    GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-113

Filed Date: 3/16/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024