Chitwood v. Chitwood ( 2016 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Kimberly A. Chitwood, Respondent,
v.
Charles C. Chitwood, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2014-001899
Appeal From Greenwood County
Joseph W. McGowan, III, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-312
Submitted April 1, 2016 – Filed June 22, 2016
AFFIRMED
Thomas E. Hite, Jr., of Hite and Stone, of Abbeville, and
Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this family court action between Kimberly A. Chitwood
(Wife) and Charles C. Chitwood (Husband), Husband appeals the family court's
order amending a divorce decree and increasing his monthly child support
obligation. Husband argues the family court erred in (1) recalculating child
support based on the visitation schedule agreed to by the parties, rather than the
actual number of nights the children stayed with him in the year preceding the
divorce because the parenting plan allowed the parties to deviate from the
schedule, and (2) amending the divorce decree pursuant to a Rule 59(e), SCRCP,
motion because the divorce decree was entered pursuant to a consent agreement
without the presentation of evidence and a trial on the merits. We affirm.1
1. We find the family court did not err in recalculating child support based on the
number of nights the children are scheduled to stay with Husband under the agreed
upon visitation schedule, rather than the number of nights the children stayed with
Husband in the year preceding the divorce. See Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C.
412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, [the
appellate] [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Eason v. Eason, 384
S.C. 473, 479, 682 S.E.2d 804, 807 (2009) ("[T]he appellate court has jurisdiction
to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence.");
Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011) ("[A]n appellant is
not relieved of his burden to demonstrate error in the family court's findings of
fact."); Gaffney v. Gaffney, 401 S.C. 216, 221, 736 S.E.2d 683, 686 (Ct. App.
2012) ("The burden is upon the appellant to convince the appellate court that the
preponderance of the evidence is against the family court's findings."); Heins v.
Heins, 344 S.C. 146, 158, 543 S.E.2d 224, 230 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Unambiguous
marital agreements will be enforced according to their terms."); id. ("Where an
agreement is clear and capable of legal interpretation, the court's only function is to
interpret its lawful meaning, discover the intention of the parties as found within
the agreement, and give effect to it.").
2. We find the second issue is unpreserved. See Gartside v. Gartside, 383 S.C. 35,
43, 677 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Ct. App. 2009) ("But for a very few exceptional
circumstances, an appellate court cannot address an issue unless it was raised to
and ruled upon by the family court."); Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 466,
719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (2011) ("[T]he issue must be sufficiently clear to bring into
focus the precise nature of the alleged error so that it can be reasonably understood
by the judge."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003)
("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.").
AFFIRMED.
HUFF, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.