Hilton v. Farmer ( 2016 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Leslie Nicole Hilton, Respondent,
    v.
    Brandon Roland Farmer, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2015-000318
    Appeal From York County
    Wayne M. Creech, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-282
    Submitted March 1, 2016 – Filed June 8, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    Stephen D. Schusterman, of Schusterman Law Firm, of
    Rock Hill, for Appellant.
    Daniel Dominic D'Agostino, of D'Agostino Law Firm, of
    York, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
    authorities: Miller v. Miller, 
    299 S.C. 307
    , 310, 
    384 S.E.2d 715
    , 716 (1989) ("A
    family court has authority to modify the amount of a child support award upon a
    showing of a substantial or material change of circumstances."); 
    id.
     ("The burden is
    upon the party seeking the change to prove the changes in circumstances
    warranting a modification."); id. at 310, 
    384 S.E.2d at 717
     ("A substantial or
    material change in circumstances might result from changes in the needs of the
    children or the financial abilities of the supporting parent to pay among other
    reasons."); 
    id.
     ("Generally, however, changes in circumstances within the
    contemplation of the parties at the time the initial decree was entered do not
    provide a basis for modifying a child support award."); Hailey v. Hailey, 
    357 S.C. 18
    , 25, 
    590 S.E.2d 495
    , 498 (Ct. App. 2003) ("However, in applying this general
    rule, the family court should look not only at whether the parties contemplated the
    change, but also 'most importantly whether the amount of [support] in the original
    decree reflects the expectation of that future occurrence.'" (quoting Sharps v.
    Sharps, 
    342 S.C. 71
    , 78, 
    535 S.E.2d 913
    , 917 (2000))); Sharps, 
    342 S.C. at 77
    , 
    535 S.E.2d at 916
     ("[T]here are some future changes which may be in contemplation of
    the parties at the time of the decree but, due to other considerations, cannot be
    addressed at that time in the divorce decree."); id. at 78, 
    535 S.E.2d at 917
     (finding
    the termination of child support based on the emancipation of the children was a
    substantial change that warranted modifying the wife's alimony); 
    id.
     ("Although
    the emancipation of the children was an expected event, the original divorce decree
    would not have been able to make a future adjustment in alimony in favor of [the
    w]ife because doing so would have required substantial speculation as to future
    conditions.").
    AFFIRMED.1
    HUFF, A.C.J., and SHORT and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-UP-282

Filed Date: 6/8/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024