State v. Brown ( 2016 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Midrevius Amone Brown, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002764
Appeal From Greenwood County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-236
Submitted January 1, 2016 – Filed June 1, 2016
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Midrevius Amone Brown appeals his convictions of assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature and possession of a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime, arguing (1) the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to grant an appropriate
continuance so Brown could have ballistics testing performed on evidence in his
case. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. We find the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion to dismiss. See
State v. Bryant, 372 S.C. 305, 312, 642 S.E.2d 582, 586 (2007) ("The conduct of a
criminal trial is left largely to the sound discretion of the trial [court], who will not
be reversed in the absence of a prejudicial abuse of discretion."); State v. Black,
400 S.C. 10, 16-17, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012) ("To warrant reversal, an error
must result in prejudice to the appealing party."). First, the trial court did not err in
finding the State did not violate Brown's due process rights by returning the gun to
the accuser's family before ballistics testing was performed. See State v.
Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 538-39, 552 S.E.2d 300, 307 (2001) ("To establish a
due process violation, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that the State destroyed
the evidence in bad faith, or (2) that the evidence possessed an exculpatory value
apparent before the evidence was destroyed and the defendant cannot obtain other
evidence of comparable value by other means."). Second, the trial court did not err
in finding there were no Brady v. Maryland, 371 U.S. 812 (1962), or Rule 5,
SCCrimP, violations. See State v. Anderson, 407 S.C. 278, 287, 754 S.E.2d 905,
909 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[A]n individual asserting a Brady violation must
demonstrate the evidence was (1) favorable to the accused; (2) in the possession of
or known by the prosecution; (3) suppressed by the State; and (4) material to the
accused's guilt or innocence, or was impeaching." (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 419 (1995))); Hyman v. State, 397 S.C. 35, 45, 723 S.E.2d 375, 380
(2012) ("Materiality of evidence is determined based on the reasonable probability
that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense." (quoting Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 384, 629 S.E.2d
353, 356 (2006))); Anderson, 407 S.C. at 287, 754 S.E.2d at 909 ("A reasonable
probability is shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial." (citing Hyman, 397 S.C. at 45-46, 723
S.E.2d at 380)); Bryant, 372 S.C. at 315, 642 S.E.2d at 588 ("Similarly, under Rule
5, SCRCrimP, criminal defendants are entitled to their statements, criminal
records, and any documents or tangible objects material to the preparation of their
defense or intended for use by the prosecution."); State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442,
453, 503 S.E.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The definition of 'material' for
purposes of Rule 5 is the same as the definition used in the Brady context."); id. at
453-54, 503 S.E.2d at 220 ("[R]eversal [for Rule 5, SCRCrimP violations] is
required only where the defendant suffered prejudice from the violation.").
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
2. We find the trial court did not err in failing to grant an appropriate continuance.
See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may
not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal."); State v. Curtis,
356 S.C. 622, 632, 591 S.E.2d 600, 605 (2004) ("A party cannot complain of an
error which his own conduct created.").
AFFIRMED.
HUFF, A.C.J., and WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.