State v. Jackson ( 2012 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Harold Lee Jackson, Appellant.

---

Appeal From Beaufort County
Judge Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

---

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-038
Heard November 15, 2011 – Filed January 25, 2012   

---

AFFIRMED

---

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Alphonso Simon, Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Harold Lee Jackson appeals his convictions of murder and two counts of assault and battery with intent to kill arguing the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury charge on self-defense.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Bryant, 372 S.C. 305, 312, 642 S.E.2d 582, 586 (2007) ("In criminal cases, an appellate court reviews errors of law only and is bound by the factual findings of the trial court unless clearly erroneous."); State v. Burkhart, 350 S.C. 252, 260, 565 S.E.2d 298, 302-03 (2002) (stating if there is any evidence in the record to support self-defense, the issue should be submitted to the jury); id. (finding the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction must be both erroneous and prejudicial to warrant reversal); State v. Goodson, 312 S.C. 278, 280, 440 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1994) (concluding a self-defense charge is not required unless it is supported by the evidence); State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984) (listing the four elements to establish self-defense: (1) the defendant must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) the defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger; (3) if the defense is based on belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief, and if the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness, and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or losing his own life; and (4) the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury); State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 166, 634 S.E.2d 23, 30 (Ct. App. 2006) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (noting if the defendant provokes or initiates the assault, he cannot invoke self-defense). 

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.