Estate of Richard Ladson, Jr. v. THI of South Carolina at Charleston ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Estate of Richard Ladson, Jr., by and through Personal
Representative Richard Miles Ladson, Sr., POA,
Respondent,
v.
THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC d/b/a
Riverside Health and Rehab, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2019-001413
Appeal From Charleston County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-169
Submitted March 1, 2022 – Filed April 6, 2022
AFFIRMED
Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines, and
Donald Jay Davis, Jr., all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of
Charleston, for Appellant.
Carl Everette Pierce, II, Benjamin Catlett Smoot, II, and
Carl Everette Pierce, III, all of Pierce, Sloan, Wilson,
Kennedy & Early, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: THI of South Carolina at Charleston, LLC, d/b/a Riverside
Health and Rehab (THI) appeals the circuit court's order denying its motion to
compel arbitration. On appeal, THI argues the circuit court erred in denying its
motion because the merger of the at-issue arbitration agreement (Arbitration
Agreement) with the admission agreement (Admission Agreement) equitably
estopped Richard Ladson, Jr.'s estate from denying the validity of the arbitration
agreement. We affirm.
The circuit court did not err in denying THI's motion to compel arbitration because
the admission agreement and the arbitration agreement did not merge. See Berry v.
Spang, 433 S.C. 1, 9, 855 S.E.2d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 2021) ("Appeal from the
denial of a motion to compel arbitration is subject to de novo review." (quoting
New Hope Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667
S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2008))), petition for cert. filed (S.C. Apr. 23, 2021); Wilson v.
Willis, 426 S.C. 326, 335, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019) ("Whether an arbitration
agreement may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a matter
subject to de novo review by an appellate court."); Berry, 433 S.C. at 9, 855 S.E.2d
at 314 ("[A] circuit court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any
evidence reasonably supports the findings." (quoting Gissel v. Hart, 382 S.C. 235,
240, 676 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009))); Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 407
S.C. 346, 355, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (concluding that by their own terms,
language in the admission agreement that "recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of the
two documents[, i.e. the arbitration agreement and the admission agreement]" and
a clause allowing the arbitration agreement to "be disclaimed within thirty days of
signing while the admission agreement could not" indicated the parties' intention
"that the common law doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge v. UniHealth
Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, LLC, 422 S.C. 544, 562-63, 813 S.E.2d 292, 302 (Ct.
App. 2018) (determining an admission agreement and arbitration agreement did
not merge because the fact "the Admissions Agreement indicated it was governed
by South Carolina law, whereas the Arbitration Agreement stated it was governed
by federal law," "each document was separately paginated and had its own
signature page," and "the Arbitration Agreement stated signing it was not a
precondition to admission" evidenced the parties' intention the documents be
construed as separate instruments). Because the documents did not merge, we
need not address THI's equitable estoppel argument. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of
a prior issue is dispositive); Coleman, 407 S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since
there was no merger here, appellants' equitable estoppel argument was properly
denied by the circuit court."); Hodge, 422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302
(concluding "equitable estoppel would only apply if documents were merged").
AFFIRMED.1
WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.