State v. Moran ( 2016 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Darryl Wayne Moran, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2014-002331
    Appeal From Marion County
    D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-406
    Heard June 8, 2016 – Filed August 24, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson &
    Delgado, LLC, of Columbia for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
    Attorney General Susannah Rawl Cole, both of
    Columbia, and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of
    Florence, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Darryl Wayne Moran appeals his conviction of conspiracy for
    solicitation to commit murder, arguing (1) the trial court erred in denying his
    motion for a directed verdict and motion for a new trial based on lack of evidence,
    and (2) Wharton's Rule1 precludes the conspiracy conviction. We affirm.
    In 2011, Moran was indicted for conspiracy for solicitation to commit murder and
    solicitation to commit the murder of Randy Parrott, the boyfriend of his ex-wife.
    In August 2014, Moran was tried with codefendant James Earl Herring Jr., who
    was also indicted for solicitation to commit the murder of Parrott. The jury found
    Moran and Herring not guilty on the charge of solicitation but found Moran guilty
    of conspiracy for solicitation to commit murder. The trial court sentenced Moran
    to five years' imprisonment suspended upon two years' imprisonment and three
    years' probation.
    As to Moran's argument the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
    verdict and subsequent motion for a new trial on the ground the State presented no
    evidence Moran had conspired with another person to solicit someone to murder
    Parrott, we find the trial court did not err in finding the State presented substantial
    circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove Moran's guilt. See State v.
    Lollis, 
    343 S.C. 580
    , 583, 
    541 S.E.2d 254
    , 256 (2001) ("On appeal from the denial
    of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt must view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the State."); State v. Odems, 
    395 S.C. 582
    , 586, 
    720 S.E.2d 48
    , 50 (2011) ("[I]f
    there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to
    prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly
    submitted to the jury." (emphasis in original)); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-410
     (2015)
    ("The common law crime known as 'conspiracy' is defined as a combination
    between two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful object
    or lawful object by unlawful means."). At trial, James Carlyle Rabon Jr. testified
    to conversations he overheard or to which he was a party while living in Moran's
    home with his younger brother and Herring. Specifically, James stated he
    1
    Under Wharton's Rule,
    Where co-operation or concert between two or more
    persons is essential to the commission of a substantive
    crime, and there is no ingredient of an alleged conspiracy
    that is not present in the substantive crime, the persons
    necessarily involved cannot be charged with conspiracy
    to commit the substantive offense and also with the
    substantive crime itself.
    16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 6 (2009).
    overheard a conversation between Moran and Herring in which Moran asked
    questions such as: "Will he do it? How much would it cost? Will he do it for
    $2,000?" James also testified Moran asked him if he knew where he could get a
    silencer and if he knew anyone who "would f*** [Parrott] up?" James recalled
    Moran discussed the plot to murder Parrott, stating:
    [t]he plan was somebody was going to hide at the end of
    [Parrott's] driveway, throw a large object in the driveway.
    Somebody would be hiding in the woods. When
    [Parrott] stopped and exited his vehicle to get to whatever
    was blocking the driveway, somebody was going to jump
    out and shoot him dead.
    Moreover, Keith Douglas Caulder, a friend of Herring's, testified Herring
    approached him with an offer to split $3,000 for killing a man who lived in
    Florence—where Parrott lived.2 Caulder recalled Herring "went into detail about
    somebody had offered him money to kill somebody" and explained he and Herring
    were supposed to meet the guy [who had offered money
    to have someone killed] the next morning[,] and the guy
    was going to give [Herring] the money[,] and we were
    supposed to go to the house and kill someone and then
    break in[to] the house and make it look like a robbery, if
    I'm not mistaken.
    Considering James's recollection of the discussion between Moran and Herring
    regarding whether an individual would "do it for $2,000," Moran's need for a
    silencer, Moran's description of the plan to murder Parrott, Moran's knowledge and
    surveillance of Parrott's property, with Caulder's testimony for added context, we
    find the State presented sufficient substantial circumstantial evidence such that the
    trial court did not err in denying Moran's motion for a directed verdict.
    As to Moran's argument Wharton's Rule precluded his conspiracy conviction, we
    find this issue was not preserved because Moran first raised this issue in his post
    trial motion and it was not ruled on by the trial court. See State v. Wise, 
    359 S.C. 14
    , 21, 
    596 S.E.2d 475
    , 478 (2004) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits only
    2
    James testified Moran knew where Parrott lived because he had surveilled
    Parrott's home.
    to review errors of law which have been properly preserved, i.e., the issue has been
    raised to and ruled on by the trial court.").
    AFFIRMED.
    HUFF, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-UP-406

Filed Date: 8/24/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024