SCDSS v. Rudemyer ( 2016 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,
v.
Jennifer Rudemyer and Sebastian Renaud, Defendants,
Of whom Jennifer Rudemyer is the Appellant.
In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2015-002118
Appeal From Beaufort County
Deborah A. Malphrus, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-438
Submitted September 19, 2016 – Filed October 18, 2016
AFFIRMED
Marshall L. Horton and Lindsay Yoas Goodman, both of
Horton & Goodman, LLC, of Bluffton, for Appellant.
Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Gregory Michael Galvin, of the Galvin Law Group, of
Bluffton, for the Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Jennifer Rudemyer (Mother) appeals the family court's order
granting custody of her minor child (Child) to Sebastian Renaud (Father). On
appeal, Mother argues the family court was bound to the plan of reunification and
the family court improperly disregarded section 63-7-1670 of the South Carolina
Code (2010). We affirm.1
On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); see
also Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). Although this
court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the
fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better
position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony. Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385, 709 S.E.2d at 651-52.
We find the family court was not bound to the plan of reunification, and although a
previous permanency planning order indicated a plan of reunification, reunification
was not the law of the case. At a judicial review hearing, which the family court is
authorized to conduct pursuant to the permanency planning statute, the family
court is required to review the status of the child and the progress being made
towards the child's return home. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1700(A) (Supp. 2015)
("At the initial permanency planning hearing, the court shall review the status of
the child and the progress being made toward the child's return home or toward any
other permanent plan approved at the removal hearing."). Additionally, we find
section 63-7-1700 permits the family court to make changes to the permanent plan
to accommodate changing circumstances. See § 63-7-1700(D) (giving the family
court the power to determine whether a child should be returned to the home); 63-
7-1700(I) (providing future permanency planning hearings must be held as
specified by the statute). Thus, although the family court initially approved a plan
of reunification, it had the authority to adjust that plan based on the circumstances.
Here, Mother relapsed in November 2014 and was unable to complete her
treatment plan by December 2014. Accordingly, we find the family court had the
authority to reevaluate Child's permanent plan at the subsequent judicial review
hearing.
Next, we find Mother's contention that the family court disregarded section 63-7-
1670 is misplaced. Section 63-7-1670 is only applicable to instances in which the
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
Department of Social Services intervenes and the child remains in the home. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1670(A) ("At the close of a hearing pursuant to Section 63-
7-1650 or 63-7-1660 and upon a finding that the child shall remain in the home
and that protective services shall continue . . . ." (emphasis added)). Here, the
family court's order reflects Child was removed from Mother's home pursuant to
section 63-7-1660 and placed with Father. Because Child was removed from
Mother's home, we find section 63-7-1670 does not apply and Mother's argument
that the family court no longer had jurisdiction following her completion of the
treatment plan is without merit.
Finally, we find it was in Child's best interests for the family court to grant Father
primary custody. See Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 140, 245 S.E.2d 612, 614
(1978) ("The welfare of the child and what is in his/her best interest is the primary,
paramount and controlling consideration of the court in all child custody
controversies."). As a result of Mother's relapse, Child spent more than thirteen
months in Father's custody. During that time Father provided a stable home for
Child. Furthermore, the GAL believed it was in Child's best interest to remain in
Father's custody. Accordingly, we find primary custody with Father was in Child's
best interest.
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.