State v. Herrera ( 2016 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Daniel Martinez Herrera, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2014-001299
    Appeal From Laurens County
    Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-424
    Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed October 12, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    Appellate Defender John Harrison Strom, of Columbia,
    for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
    Attorney General Megan Harrigan Jameson, both of
    Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
    Greenwood, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Daniel Martinez Herrera appeals his conviction for trafficking
    marijuana and his sentence of five years' imprisonment with credit for time served.
    On appeal, Herrera argues the trial court erred by (1) refusing to grant a directed
    verdict when the State failed to present any evidence that the weight of the
    marijuana at issue was ten pounds or more and (2) allowing expert testimony
    regarding the weight of six vacuum-sealed bags of marijuana when the State failed
    to establish that the methodology used to weigh the marijuana was scientifically
    reliable. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
    authorities:
    As to Issue 1: State v. Hewins, 
    409 S.C. 93
    , 102, 
    760 S.E.2d 814
    , 819 (2014) ("In
    criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." (quoting State
    v. Wilson, 
    345 S.C. 1
    , 5-6, 
    545 S.E.2d 827
    , 829 (2001))); State v. Gracely, 
    399 S.C. 363
    , 371-72, 
    731 S.E.2d 880
    , 884 (2012) ("When reviewing the denial of a
    motion for a directed verdict, [appellate courts] employ[] the same standard as the
    trial court by viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
    favorable to the non-moving party."); State v. Weston, 
    367 S.C. 279
    , 292, 
    625 S.E.2d 641
    , 648 (2006) ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the
    [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); id. at 292-93, 625
    S.E.2d at 648 ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial
    evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate court]
    must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Bennett, 
    415 S.C. 232
    , 237, 
    781 S.E.2d 352
    , 354 (2016) ("Accordingly, in ruling on a directed
    verdict motion where the State relies on circumstantial evidence, the [trial court]
    must determine whether the evidence presented is sufficient to allow a reasonable
    juror to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370
    (e)(1)(a) (Supp. 2015) ("Any person who knowingly sells,
    manufactures, cultivates, delivers, purchases, or brings into this [s]tate, or who
    provides financial assistance or otherwise aids, abets, attempts, or conspires to sell,
    manufacture, cultivate, deliver, purchase, or bring into this [s]tate, or who is
    knowingly in actual or constructive possession or who knowingly attempts to
    become in actual or constructive possession of . . . ten pounds or more of
    marijuana is guilty of a felony which is known as 'trafficking in marijuana' and,
    upon conviction, must be punished as follows if the quantity involved is . . . ten
    pounds or more, but less than one hundred pounds . . . for a first offense, a term of
    imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten years, no part of which
    may be suspended nor probation granted, and a fine of ten thousand dollars . . . .");
    State v. Mollison, 
    319 S.C. 41
    , 45, 
    459 S.E.2d 88
    , 91 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The
    knowledge element may be proved circumstantially by evidence of acts,
    declarations, or conduct of the accused from which an inference may be drawn that
    the accused knew of the existence of the prohibited substance."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-110
    (27)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2015) (defining "Marijuana" as "all species or variety
    of the marijuana plant and all parts thereof whether growing or not" and "the seeds
    of the marijuana plant," but excluding "the mature stalks of the marijuana plant or
    fibers produced from these stalks . . . [and] the sterilized seed of the marijuana
    plant which is incapable of germination"); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-392
     (2002)
    ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the weight of any controlled
    substance referenced in this article is the weight of that substance in pure form or
    any compound or mixture thereof.").
    As to Issue 2: State v. Cope, 
    405 S.C. 317
    , 334-35, 
    748 S.E.2d 194
    , 203 (2013)
    ("The trial [court] has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence and [its] decision should not be disturbed absent prejudicial abuse of
    discretion." (quoting State v. Clasby, 
    385 S.C. 148
    , 154, 
    682 S.E.2d 892
    , 895
    (2009))); State v. White, 
    382 S.C. 265
    , 270, 
    676 S.E.2d 684
    , 686 (2009) ("All
    expert testimony must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria, and that includes the trial
    court's gatekeeping function in ensuring the proposed expert testimony meets a
    reliability threshold for the jury's ultimate consideration."); Rule 702, SCRE ("If
    scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
    understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
    expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
    in the form of an opinion or otherwise."); State v. Martin, 
    391 S.C. 508
    , 513, 
    706 S.E.2d 40
    , 42 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Before a witness is qualified as an expert, the trial
    court must find (1) the expert's testimony will assist the trier of fact, (2) the expert
    possesses the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and
    (3) . . . the expert's testimony is reliable."); White, 
    382 S.C. at 274
    , 
    676 S.E.2d at 688
     ("The foundational reliability requirement for expert testimony does not lend
    itself to a one-size-fits-all approach, for the Council[1] factors for scientific
    evidence serve no useful analytical purpose when evaluating nonscientific expert
    testimony.").
    AFFIRMED.2
    WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
    1
    State v. Council, 
    335 S.C. 1
    , 20, 
    515 S.E.2d 508
    , 518 (1999).
    2
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-UP-424

Filed Date: 10/12/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024