Bradberry v. Bradberry ( 2016 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Brenda Faye Bradberry, Appellant,
    v.
    William David Bradberry, Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2014-000612
    Appeal From Anderson County
    Henry T. Woods, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-425
    Heard September 21, 2016 – Filed October 12, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    William E. Phillips, of Anderson, for Appellant.
    David James Brousseau, of McIntosh, Sherard, Sullivan
    & Brousseau, of Anderson, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: In this divorce action, Brenda Bradberry (Wife) appeals the
    family court's order, arguing (1) the family court erred by failing to award alimony
    to Wife based on the duration of the marriage, the incomes of the parties, and other
    relevant factors and (2) the family court erred by failing to grant Wife a divorce
    based upon the ground of adultery. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR
    and the following authorities:
    1. As to issue 1: King v. King, 
    384 S.C. 134
    , 142, 
    681 S.E.2d 609
    , 614 (Ct. App.
    2009) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have
    been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court."); Miller v. Miller, 
    375 S.C. 443
    ,
    460, 
    652 S.E.2d 754
    , 763 (Ct. App. 2007) ("A party must make a post-trial motion
    where there are inaccuracies in the order or inconsistencies between an oral ruling
    and a written order."); I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 
    338 S.C. 406
    , 422, 
    526 S.E.2d 716
    , 724 (2000) ("[A] losing party must first try to convince the lower court
    is has ruled wrongly and then, if that effort fails, convince the appellate court that
    the lower court erred."); Mick-Skaggs v. Skaggs, 
    411 S.C. 94
    , 101-02, 
    766 S.E.2d 870
    , 873-74 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding the family court acted within its discretion in
    awarding the parties a divorce on the ground of one year's continuous separation
    rather than adultery); id. at 102, 766 S.E.2d at 874 (holding "because the granting
    of a divorce to Wife on the ground of adultery would not have dissolved the
    marriage any more completely, we need not alter the family court's decision on this
    issue"); id. at 102, 766 S.E.2d at 874 (noting "the family court was in the best
    position to assess the parties' and witnesses' testimony as well as the evidence
    presented in determining which ground for divorce was most appropriate under the
    circumstances"); Lucas v. Lucas, 
    279 S.C. 121
    , 123, 
    302 S.E.2d 863
    , 864 (1983)
    (finding it was within the family court's discretion to deny a divorce on one ground
    and grant it on another ground).
    2. As to issue 2: 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130
    (C) (2014) (detailing the fifteen factors
    family courts should consider when determining whether to award alimony); King,
    384 S.C. at 142, 681 S.E.2d at 613 ("The family court is only required to consider
    relevant [alimony] factors."); Davis v. Davis, 
    372 S.C. 64
    , 79, 
    641 S.E.2d 446
    ,
    453-54 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An award of alimony rests within the sound discretion of
    the family court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."); Bodkin
    v. Bodkin, 
    388 S.C. 203
    , 215, 
    694 S.E.2d 230
    , 237 (Ct. App. 2010) ("An abuse of
    discretion occurs when the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on
    factual findings without evidentiary support."); Allen v. Allen, 
    347 S.C. 177
    , 186,
    
    554 S.E.2d 421
    , 425 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Our inquiry on appeal is not whether the
    family court gave the same weight to particular factors as this court would have;
    rather, our inquiry extends only to whether the family court abused its considerable
    discretion in assigning weight to the applicable factors."); Reiss v. Reiss, 
    392 S.C. 198
    , 208, 
    708 S.E.2d 799
    , 804 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Alimony is a substitute for the
    support normally incident to the marital relationship and should put the supported
    spouse in the same position, or as near as is practicable to the same position,
    enjoyed during the marriage."); Smith v. Smith, 
    327 S.C. 448
    , 463, 
    486 S.E.2d 516
    ,
    523-24 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting fault is an appropriate factor for consideration in
    determining alimony in cases in which the misconduct affected the economic
    circumstances of the parties or contributed to the breakup of the marriage); Bodkin,
    388 S.C. at 217, 694 S.E.2d at 238 (noting the appellate court's role is not to
    reweigh the alimony factors).
    AFFIRMED.
    LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-UP-425

Filed Date: 10/12/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024