McMasters v. Charpia ( 2016 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Rene McMasters now known as Rene McMasters
Ronaghan, Respondent,
v.
H. Wayne Charpia a/k/a Howard W. Charpia and Jody E.
Charpia, Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002311
Appeal From Dorchester County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-423
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed October 5, 2016
AFFIRMED
Howard W. Charpia and Jody E. Charpia, of
Summerville, pro se.
Frank M. Cisa, of The Law Firm of Cisa & Dodds, LLP,
of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Howard W. Charpia and Jody E. Charpia (the Charpias) appeal
the denial of their motions to reconsider the granting of a foreclosure of a judgment
lien and to vacate or void the compulsory order of reference. The Charpias argue
(1) the judgment underlying the foreclosure is void because ten years has expired
without execution of the judgment and (2) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and
violated the Due Process Clause because the Charpias were not properly notified of
the hearings. We affirm.1
1. We find the judgment underlying the foreclosure was not void because Rene
McMasters Ronaghan sought to enforce it within the ten-year statutory period. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39-30 (2005) ("Executions may issue upon final judgments or
decrees at any time within ten years from the date of the original entry thereof and
shall have active energy during such period, without any renewal or renewals
thereof . . . ."); Linda Mc Co., Inc. v. Shore, 390 S.C. 543, 554, 703 S.E.2d 499,
505 (2010) ("[W]hen a party has complied with the applicable statutes . . . and is
merely waiting on a court's order regarding execution and levy, the ten[-]year
limitation found in section 15-39-30 is extended to when the court finally issues an
order."); id. at 555, 703 S.E.2d at 505 ("[I]f a party takes action to enforce a
judgment within the ten-year statutory period of active energy, the resulting order
will be effective even if issued after the ten-year period has expired.").
2. We find the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction. See Milgroom v.
McDaniel, 308 S.C. 5, 8-9, 416 S.E.2d 626, 627-28 (1992) (finding the master-in-
equity properly returned the matter to the circuit court because of a potential
conflict and the circuit court "reached [its] own findings only after conducting an
independent hearing and review of the record"). Additionally, the circuit court did
not violate the Charpias' due process rights. Although the Charpias were not
properly notified of the January 9, 2013 hearing, the circuit court had already held
a July 30, 2012 hearing on the foreclosure action that the Charpias attended, and it
issued a thorough order granting foreclosure. See Murdock v. Murdock, 338 S.C.
322, 334, 526 S.E.2d 241, 248 (Ct. App. 1999) ("It is a fundamental doctrine of the
law that a party whose personal rights are to be affected by a personal judgment
must have a day in court, or opportunity to be heard, and that without due notice
and opportunity to be heard a court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such personal
rights." (emphasis added) (quoting Webster v. Clanton, 259 S.C. 387, 391, 192
S.E.2d 214, 216 (1972))). Further, the January 9, 2013 hearing consisted primarily
of discussion about whether the Charpias received notice, and the circuit court's
order did not indicate it considered anything presented at the hearing. Thus, we
find the circuit court did not err in denying the Charpias' motion to reconsider. See
Rule 59(f), SCRCP ("The motion [to alter or amend the judgment] may in the
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
discretion of the court be determined on briefs filed by the parties without oral
argument.").
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.