Emiah Anderson v. SCDPPPS ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Emiah Anderson, Appellant,
    v.
    South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
    Pardon Services, Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-001853
    Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
    Milton G. Kimpson, Administrative Law Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-194
    Submitted March 1, 2022 – Filed May 11, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    Emiah Anderson, pro se.
    Matthew C. Buchanan, of the South Carolina Department
    of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia,
    for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Emiah Anderson, pro se, appeals an order of the administrative
    law court (ALC) affirming an order of the parole board of the South Carolina
    Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services denying his request for
    parole. On appeal, Anderson argues the ALC erred by affirming the parole board's
    order because (1) its denial of his request for parole was made upon an unlawful
    procedure and (2) its consideration of the "Criteria for Parole Consideration" listed
    on Department Form 1212 violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States
    and South Carolina Constitutions. We affirm.
    1. We find substantial evidence supports the ALC's finding that the procedure
    implemented by the parole board in denying Anderson's request for parole was not
    unlawful. See Risher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 
    393 S.C. 198
    , 204,
    
    712 S.E.2d 428
    , 431 (2011) ("A decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is
    supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.,
    
    379 S.C. 411
    , 417, 
    665 S.E.2d 231
    , 234 (Ct. App. 2008) (defining "substantial
    evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same
    conclusion" as the ALC); Cooper v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs.,
    
    377 S.C. 489
    , 500, 
    661 S.E.2d 106
    , 112 (2008) (stating the parole board's
    procedure for reviewing parole requests is lawful if the parole board "clearly states
    in its order denying parole that it considered the factors outlined in section
    24-21-640 and the . . . factors published in [Department Form 1212]").
    Additionally, we find Anderson's arguments concerning his parole eligibility, "The
    Rehabilitation Initiative," and his liberty interests are not preserved for review by
    this court. See Al-Shabazz v. State, 
    338 S.C. 354
    , 379, 
    527 S.E.2d 742
    ,755 (2000)
    ("[I]ssues or arguments that were not raised to and ruled on by the [ALC]
    ordinarily are not preserved for review."); State v. Franks, 
    432 S.C. 58
    , 79, 
    849 S.E.2d 580
    , 591 (Ct. App. 2020) ("Generally, this [c]ourt will not consider issues
    not raised to or ruled upon by the trial [court]." (alterations in original) (quoting
    State v. Williams, 
    303 S.C. 410
    , 411, 
    401 S.E.2d 168
    , 169 (1991))).
    2. We find substantial evidence supports the ALC's finding that the parole board's
    consideration of the "Criteria for Parole Consideration" listed on Department Form
    1212 did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States or South
    Carolina Constitutions. See Risher, 393 S.C. at 204, 712 S.E.2d at 431 ("A
    decision of the ALC should be upheld . . . if it is supported by substantial evidence
    in the record."); Sanders, 379 S.C. at 417, 665 S.E.2d at 234 (defining "substantial
    evidence" as "evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same
    conclusion" as the ALC); Jernigan v. State, 
    340 S.C. 256
    , 261, 
    531 S.E.2d 507
    ,
    509 (2000) ("An ex post facto violation occurs when a change in the law
    retroactively . . . increases the punishment for a crime."); Cooper, 
    377 S.C. at 501
    ,
    
    661 S.E.2d at 112-13
     (holding the parole board's consideration of factors it
    established pursuant to section 24-21-640 was not an ex post facto violation);
    
    id.
     (indicating the parole board established its "Criteria for Parole Consideration"
    listed on Department Form 1212 pursuant to section 24-21-640).
    Additionally, we find Anderson's argument concerning the parole board's
    consideration of the factors listed in section 24-21-10(F)(1) of the South Carolina
    Code (Supp. 2021) is not preserved for review by this court. See Al-Shabazz, 338
    S.C. at 379, 527 S.E.2d at 755 ("[I]ssues or arguments that were not raised to and
    ruled on by the [ALC] ordinarily are not preserved for review."); Franks, 432 S.C.
    at 79, 849 S.E.2d at 591 ("Generally, this [c]ourt will not consider issues not raised
    to or ruled upon by the trial [court]." (alterations in original) (quoting Williams,
    
    303 S.C. at 411
    , 
    401 S.E.2d at 169
    )).
    AFFIRMED.1
    GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-194

Filed Date: 5/11/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024