SCDSS v. Mattie Walls ( 2016 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,
v.
Mattie Walls, Carley Jason Walls, Dwayne Anderson,
and Barbara Anderson, Defendants,
Of whom Mattie Walls is the Appellant.
In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2016-000030
Appeal From Laurens County
Joseph C. Smithdeal, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-483
Submitted October 13, 2016 – Filed November 16, 2016
AFFIRMED
Edward S. McCallum, III, of Law Offices of Edward S.
McCallum, III, of Greenwood; and Julius Holman Hines,
of K&L Gates LLP, of Charleston, for Appellant.
Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Marcus Wesley Meetze, of the Law Office of Marcus W.
Meetze, LLC, of Greenville, for the Guardian ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Mattie Walls (Mother) appeals the family court's order
terminating her parental rights to her eight month old daughter (Child) and entering
her name on the South Carolina Central Registry of Child Abuse and Neglect
(Central Registry). On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred by (1) finding
clear and convincing evidence supported termination of parental rights (TPR)
based upon the ground Child was harmed and due to the severity or repetition of
the abuse or neglect, Mother's home could not be made safe within twelve months;
(2) ordering Mother's name be added to the Central Registry; (3) refusing to reopen
the record to consider testimony from a new expert medical witness; (4) failing to
dismiss the South Carolina Department of Social Services' (DSS's) case against
Mother when DSS failed to provide her with treatment services; and (5) failing to
dismiss DSS's case against Mother when DSS failed to provide proper statutory
notice in its petition for TPR. We affirm.
On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); see
also Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). Although this
court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the
fact that the family court, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position
to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony.
Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385, 709 S.E.2d at 652. The burden is upon the appellant to
convince this court the family court erred in its findings. Id.
1. We find the family court properly ordered TPR. Clear and convincing evidence
supports TPR on the ground Child was harmed and due to the severity or repetition
of the abuse or neglect, Mother's home could not be made safe within twelve
months. The family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of twelve
statutory grounds is satisfied and also finding TPR is in the best interest of the
child. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2015). The statutory grounds for TPR
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Mrs. H,
346 S.C. 329, 333, 550 S.E.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 2001). "Clear and convincing
evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts
a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established. . . . [I]t does not mean
clear and unequivocal." Loe v. Mother, 382 S.C. 457, 465, 675 S.E.2d 807, 811
(Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Anonymous (M-156-90) v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs,
329 S.C. 371, 375, 496 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1998)). A statutory ground for TPR exists
when "[t]he child . . . while residing in the parent's domicile has been
harmed . . . and because of the severity or repetition of the abuse or neglect, it is
not reasonably likely that the home can be made safe within twelve months." S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2570(1). "'[H]arm' occurs when the parent . . . inflicts or allows
to be inflicted upon the child physical or mental injury or engages in acts or
omissions which present a substantial risk of physical or mental injury to the
child . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(4)(a) (2010) (emphasis added). "'Physical
injury' means death or permanent or temporary disfigurement or impairment of any
bodily organ or function." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(18) (2010).
At trial, DSS presented considerable testimony demonstrating Child was harmed
when, at just twenty-three days old, she suffered multiple physical injuries.
Specifically, a pediatric neurosurgeon who was qualified as an expert in trauma
causation testified Child presented with a proximal left femur fracture, a healing
classic metaphyseal lesion, bilateral skull fractures, a subdural hematoma, a
fracture of the lumbar spine on the L2 vertebra, and blood in her back and
abdomen. He opined Child's injuries were not consistent with birth trauma and,
significantly, while Child's parents' explanation of Child's father (Father) catching
her when she fell from her changing table could be a plausible explanation for
Child's broken femur, Child's pattern of widespread injuries indicated nothing
other than child abuse. Additionally, a board certified pediatrician specializing in
child abuse pediatrics testified she believed the constellation of Child's injuries
indicated they were caused by nonaccidental trauma and not by osteogenesis
imperfecta (OI) or some other underlying genetic condition. Further, a clinical
geneticist testified he believed no evidence existed to support a claim that Child
suffered from OI, and he ruled out 95% of OI through genetic testing.1
1
In addition to the lack of indicators or markers suggesting that Child suffered
from OI, Child did not suffer any fractures during the several months preceding the
TPR hearing. The genetics expert explained that if Child had one of the rarer
forms of OI, one would expect to see continuing fractures, bone thinning, and other
bone abnormalities. Child's x-rays did not reflect any such bone issues. This is so
despite the fact that while Father was changing Child's diaper during a supervised
visit with Mother and Father, Child fell from a sofa onto a tile-covered concrete
floor.
Additionally, we find TPR is in Child's best interest.2 "In a TPR case, the best
interest of the child is the paramount consideration." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Williams, 412 S.C. 458, 469, 772 S.E.2d 279, 285 (Ct. App. 2015). "The interests
of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict." S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010).
Child's DSS foster care worker (Foster Care Worker) and guardian ad litem (GAL)
testified Mother had a bond with Child and Child enjoyed visits with her parents.
Foster Care Worker stated Mother was in the top 10% of parents as far as the effort
she expended to try and maintain a relationship with Child while she was in DSS
custody. Specifically, Foster Care Worker explained Mother offered to pay child
support on multiple occasions; Mother brought clothing, toys, shoes, and other
items for Child; and Mother regularly visited Child. However, Foster Care Worker
and GAL expressed concerns that reunification would not be possible without a
plausible explanation to account for Child's injuries. Foster Care Worker further
stated that in the case of nonaccidental trauma, she was not sure what could be
done to make Mother's home safe. Foster Care Worker averred that while Child
was not in preadoptive placement at the time of the hearing, DSS actively sought
an adoptive resource for her. While we acknowledge Mother's considerable efforts
to try and remain an active part of Child's life while Child remained in DSS
custody, given the severity of Child's injuries and Mother's inability to offer a
plausible explanation for those injuries, we find TPR is in Child's best interest and
will allow her to establish permanency outside of the foster care system. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010) ("The purpose of this article is to establish
procedures for the reasonable and compassionate [TPR] where children are abused,
neglected, or abandoned in order to protect the health and welfare of these children
and make them eligible for adoption by persons who will provide a suitable home
environment and the love and care necessary for a happy, healthful, and productive
life.").
2. We find the family court did not err in placing Mother's name on the Central
Registry. "At a hearing pursuant to [s]ection . . . 63-7-1660, at which the [family]
2
Though Mother failed to address Child's best interest in her brief, we address it
because this matter affects the rights of a minor child. See Galloway v. Galloway,
249 S.C. 157, 160, 153 S.E.2d 326, 327 (1967) ("The duty to protect the rights of
minors has precedence over procedural rules otherwise limiting the scope of
review[,] and matters affecting the rights of minors can be considered by [appellate
courts] [e]x mero motu.").
court orders that a child be taken or retained in custody or finds that the child was
abused or neglected, the [family] court . . . shall order, without the possibility of
waiver by the department, that a person's name be entered in the [Central Registry]
if the [family] court finds that there is a preponderance of the evidence that the
person . . . physically abused the child . . . [or] wilfully or recklessly neglected the
child . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1940(A)(1)(a), (c) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis
added). "'Preponderance of the evidence' means evidence which, when fairly
considered, is more convincing as to its truth than the evidence in opposition."
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(19) (2010). The family court found by clear and
convincing evidence Child was harmed by one or both her parents during the first
twenty-three days of her life. Given the family court's determination Child was
harmed, we find the family court was statutorily required to order Mother's name
be added to the Central Registry.
3. We find the family court did not err when it declined to reopen the record
pursuant to Rule 59(a)(2), SCRCP, to consider additional expert testimony because
the evidence Mother sought to introduce could have been discovered before trial.
By Mother's own admission, she had secured another expert witness prior to trial
who was prepared to testify regarding the possibility Child suffered from metabolic
bone disorder. Therefore, we find Mother had notice evidence of metabolic bone
disorder might exist and she could have secured that evidence prior to trial or
sought a continuance of proceedings until that evidence could have been presented
at trial. See Spreeuw v. Baker, 385 S.C. 45, 62-63, 682 S.E.2d 843, 852 (Ct. App.
2009) (stating in order to obtain relief based upon newly discovered evidence the
moving party must show the evidence "has been discovered since the trial" and
"could not have been discovered before the trial").
4. We find the family court did not err in denying Mother's motion to dismiss
DSS's case on the basis that DSS failed to offer Mother treatment services. "It is
the purpose of this chapter to . . . establish an effective system of services
throughout the [s]tate to safeguard the well-being and development of endangered
children and to preserve and stabilize family life, whenever appropriate . . . ." S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-10(B)(2) (2010) (emphasis added). Here, we find DSS was
statutorily required to pursue TPR. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1660(B)(2) (Supp.
2015) (providing the removal petition "must include a petition for [TPR]
if . . . evidence indicate[s] the existence of one or more of the conditions set forth
in [s]ection 63-7-1640(C)(1) through (8) [of the South Carolina Code (Supp.
2015)], unless there are compelling reasons for believing [TPR]" would not be in
the child's best interest); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1640(C)(1)(a), (b) (providing the
family court can authorize DSS to forego reasonable efforts at reunification when
"the parent has subjected the child" to aggravated severe or repeated abuse or
neglect). However, had the family court determined clear and convincing evidence
did not support TPR based upon severe or repetitious harm, it would have been
statutorily required to order DSS to provide Mother with treatment services. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1670(A) (2010) ("At the close of a hearing pursuant to
[s]ection 63-7-1650 or 63-7-1660 and upon a finding that the child shall remain in
the home and that protective service shall continue, the family court shall review
and approve a treatment plan designed to alleviate any danger to child and to aid
the parents so that the child will not be endangered in the future."). Thus, under
these facts, we find DSS's failure to offer treatment services did not warrant
dismissal.
5. We find the family court did not err in denying Mother's motion to dismiss this
case based upon DSS's failure to include a statutorily-required notice provision in
the TPR complaint. Pursuant to section 63-7-1660(C)(2) of the South Carolina
Code (2010), a TPR complaint "shall state: 'As a result of this hearing, you could
lose your rights as a parent.'" However, the TPR complaint here included the
statutorily-required notice provision for a removal complaint, which requires a
removal complaint to "state: 'At this hearing the court may order a treatment plan.
If you fail to comply with the plan, you could lose your rights as a parent.'" S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-1660(C)(3) (2010). Although the TPR complaint did not
include the correct notice provision, it put Mother on notice she "could lose [her]
rights as a parent." Further, the TPR complaint complied with the requirements for
a TPR complaint as set forth in section 63-7-2540 of the South Carolina Code
(2010), included the grounds on which DSS sought TPR, and contained an
explanation of the facts that supported TPR. Accordingly, we find Mother was on
notice that DSS sought TPR and was therefore not prejudiced by DSS's failure to
include the correct notice provision.
Because Mother was not prejudiced by DSS's failure to include the statutorily-
required notice provision, we disagree with Mother's contention that DSS's failure
to strictly comply with section 63-7-1660(C)(2) warrants dismissal of DSS's
amended complaint. Although DSS should make all efforts to comply with the
statutory requirements for a TPR petition, including the notice requirement
codified in section 63-7-1660(C)(2), the General Assembly prescribed no remedy
for DSS's failure to include the notice mandated by section 63-7-1660(C)(2) in its
petition. Our finding that DSS's failure to include the proper notice provision does
not warrant dismissal in this case comports with the statutory policy of "liberally
constru[ing] [TPR statutes] in order to ensure prompt judicial procedures for
freeing minor children from the custody and control of their parents." S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010).
AFFIRMED.3
LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.