Holliday v. Holliday ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Debra L. Holliday, Respondent,
    v.
    Bobby R. Holliday, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-001283
    Appeal From Clarendon County
    Gordon B. Jenkinson, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-240
    Submitted April 1, 2022 – Filed June 8, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    John Stephen Keffer, of Young, Keffer & Donnald, PA,
    of Sumter, and William H. Johnson, of Johnson, DuRant
    & Nester, LLC, of Manning, both for Appellant.
    William Ceth Land, of Land Parker Welch LLC, of
    Manning, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Bobby R. Holliday (Husband) appeals the family court's order,
    arguing the family court erred in awarding Debra L. Holliday (Wife) a greater
    percentage of proceeds from a personal injury action settlement and in failing to
    award him attorney's fees and costs. Based on our de novo review, we affirm
    pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
    1. The family court did not err in awarding Husband thirty-three percent of the
    personal injury action settlement. See Marsh v. Marsh, 
    313 S.C. 42
    , 46, 
    437 S.E.2d 34
    , 36 (1993) ("[P]roceeds of a personal injury settlement acquired during
    the marriage are marital property subject to the family court's jurisdiction."); 
    id. at 45
    , 
    437 S.E.2d at 36
     ("[R]ecognition of the award or settlement as marital property
    does not mean the proceeds of the award must be divided and a portion awarded to
    the non-injured spouse. To the contrary; the family court may, and in many cases
    probably should, award the proceeds entirely to the injured spouse."); Tomlinson v.
    Melton, 
    428 S.C. 607
    , 611, 
    837 S.E.2d 230
    , 232 (Ct. App. 2019) ("[T]he appellate
    court has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its own view of the
    preponderance of the evidence."); 
    id.
     ("However, this broad scope of review does
    not require the appellate court to disregard the fact that the family court, which saw
    and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and
    assign comparative weight to their testimony."); id. at 611-12, 837 S.E.2d at 232
    ("[T]he appellant bears the burden of convincing the appellate court that the family
    court committed error or that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
    court's findings.").
    2. The family court did not err in failing to award Husband attorney's fees and
    costs. Husband's argument that he was entitled to an award of fees and costs
    because he incurred extra attorney's fees and costs due to Wife's incorrect
    valuations of the marital property is not preserved for appellate review because this
    argument was not raised to and ruled upon by the family court. See Doe v. Doe,
    
    370 S.C. 206
    , 212, 
    634 S.E.2d 51
    , 55 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]hen an appellant
    neither raises an issue at trial nor through a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, the issue
    is not preserved for appellate review."). Further, considering the evidence in the
    record, we hold Husband failed to meet his burden in proving the family court
    erred in ordering the parties to pay their own fees and costs. See Stone v.
    
    Thompson, 428
     S.C. 79, 92, 
    833 S.E.2d 266
    , 272 (2019) (stating the appellate court
    "reviews a family court's award of attorney's fees de novo"); Tomlinson, 428 at
    611-12, 837 S.E.2d at 232 ("[T]he appellant bears the burden of convincing the
    appellate court that the family court committed error or that the preponderance of
    the evidence is against the court's findings."); E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 
    307 S.C. 471
    , 476-
    77, 
    415 S.E.2d 812
    , 816 (1992) (stating that when deciding whether to award
    attorney's fees, the family court considers the following factors: "(1) the party's
    ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the
    attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) [the] effect of the
    attorney's fee on each party's standard of living").
    AFFIRMED.1
    THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-240

Filed Date: 6/8/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024