Guardian ad Litem, James Seeger v. Richland School District Two ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
K.S., a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem,
James Seeger, Appellants,
v.
Richland School District Two, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2019-000951
Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-312
Heard April 5, 2022 – Filed July 27, 2022
AFFIRMED
Jacob John Modla, of The Law Offices of Jason E.
Taylor, P.C., of Rock Hill, for Appellant.
Sheneka Shante Lodenquai, of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard
& Smith, of Atlanta, GA, and Thomas Kennedy Barlow,
of Halligan Mahoney & Williams, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: James Seeger, acting as Guardian ad Litem for his son, K.S.,
appeals a circuit court order directing a verdict in favor of Richland School District
Two (Richland Two). The lawsuit alleged Richland Two was grossly negligent in
failing to promptly investigate and admonish K.S.'s first grade teacher (Teacher).
There does not appear to be any dispute that Teacher directed inappropriate language
at K.S. and that K.S. was psychologically harmed. The circuit court directed a
verdict based on the reasoning that K.S.'s mental injuries were not recoverable absent
a physical injury. We affirm, but for slightly different reasons.
FACTS
North Springs Elementary, located in Richland Two, assigned K.S. to Teacher's first
grade class in 2011. K.S. stopped wanting to go to school shortly after the school
year began. K.S. got upset at home in the mornings and cried at school throughout
the day. K.S. said the crying was because he missed Seeger, but an incident in the
school cafeteria some months after school began revealed K.S. was continually upset
over interactions with Teacher.
A worker in the cafeteria witnessed Teacher "approach[ing K.S.] very harshly" after
K.S. dropped his food tray. Teacher then grabbed K.S. "very forcefully by his arm"
and walked him to a table after he got a new tray. This made K.S. cry. The cafeteria
worker reported hearing Teacher say "I will give you something to cry for." Teacher
left K.S. to eat alone at the table.
K.S. testified Teacher clawed him with her fingernails when she grabbed him, which
hurt. Seeger testified he could not remember whether there were scratches on K.S.'s
arm; did not remember including anything about fingernails, scratches, or cuts in
emails he sent the school principal following the incident; and did not take any
pictures. A forensic psychologist who provided expert testimony stated he assumed
he would know if Teacher physically injured K.S. but had no knowledge of her doing
so, nobody told him she did, and K.S.'s medical records did not indicate she did.
Richland Two's Director of Human Resources testified nobody reported a physical
injury to her.
When the Seegers learned what happened, they asked the principal to move K.S. to
a new class. The principal did so immediately. K.S. cried on the walk to his new
class because he saw Teacher in the hallway, but he stopped crying after he met his
new teacher.
After changing classes, K.S. eventually shared Teacher had mistreated him before
the cafeteria incident, including by confiscating encouraging notes from Seeger and
allowing the other students in the class to form a "no crying club" that excluded K.S.
Richland Two opened an investigation into Teacher after the incident in the
cafeteria. The investigation revealed two faculty members in the school's media
center had previously reported Teacher to the principal after witnessing her treat
students in a concerning manner. These reports occurred before the cafeteria
incident described above.
The first report involved Teacher yelling at a child in front of all of the students in
her class to pick a different book to read. Teacher exclaimed "there [was] no way"
the child could read "one word" of the book, which made the child "sob."
The second report involved K.S. Teacher apparently told those in the media center
to not give K.S. any special treatment or praise because he did not deserve anything
for crying all day in her class. Then, when Teacher picked up her class from the
media center and learned K.S. had behaved well, she reportedly said, "of course he
was good for you, he has cried all day in my class." K.S. heard both sets of
comments and was upset by them.
The principal apparently did not take any action after either of these reports. Seeger
asserts this inaction was a violation of Richland Two's antibullying policy.
The parties tried the case for three days. During trial, Seeger proffered expert
testimony from Dr. Alan McEvoy, an academic specializing in teacher bullying and
school district responses. Dr. McEvoy's testimony described the national standard
of care and his professional opinion that Richland Two breached the national
standard as well as its own policy, which was consistent with the national standard.
The circuit court excluded the testimony, deeming it cumulative with other
testimony about the school's antibullying policy.
Richland Two moved for a directed verdict at the close of trial. There was ample
testimony throughout trial about the negative impact K.S.'s experience in Teacher's
class had on his mental health. K.S. suffers from anxiety, depression, angry
outbursts, and trouble sleeping to this day (he is now in high school). He has seen a
number of therapists and a psychologist, takes prescription medication, and had to
go to tutoring because the experience affected his performance at school.
As we mentioned at the beginning, the circuit court granted Richland Two's motion
for a directed verdict because it found the damages were "purely emotional
damages" that were not brought about by bodily injury and did not result in bodily
injury.
ISSUES
1. Did the circuit court err in directing a verdict in favor of Richland Two
because K.S. suffered purely emotional injuries?
2. Does the Safe School Climate Act waive the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act?
3. Did the circuit court err in excluding the testimony of Seeger's expert?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In an appeal from the grant of a directed verdict, [an appellate court] must, like the
trial court . . . , view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-movant . . . ." Miller v. FerrellGas, L.P., Inc., 392 S.C. 295, 297, 709 S.E.2d
616, 617 (2011). "When viewed in that light, if there is any evidence that may be
reasonably construed as creating a question of fact, the motion must be denied and
the matter submitted to the jury." Id. "[T]his rule does not authorize submission of
speculative, theoretical and hypothetical views to the jury. We have repeatedly
recognized that when only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the
evidence, the question becomes one of law for the court." Hanahan v. Simpson, 326
S.C. 140, 149, 485 S.E.2d 903, 908 (1997), superseded on other grounds by statute,
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-10(C)(1) (Supp. 2012), as recognized in Holmes v. E.
Cooper Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 408 S.C. 138, 758 S.E.2d 483 (2014).
ANALYSIS
The core dispute in this case is whether Seeger's claim satisfies the standard to prove
a claim for damages that are purely emotional (put differently, purely mental) in
nature. Seeger argues all that is required to survive a directed verdict in a case for
mental health damages is some evidence of a physical manifestation of those
damages. To that end, he contends K.S.'s anxiety, depression, angry outbursts, and
trouble sleeping are sufficient physical manifestations.
Richland Two argues directing a verdict was proper because Seeger's claim is a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, that plaintiffs in South Carolina
can only recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in two situations, and
that neither situation applies.
As far as we have been able to discover, South Carolina currently recognizes
negligent infliction of emotional distress in three contexts. First, South Carolina
recognizes negligent infliction of emotional distress in the "bystander" context—
when a plaintiff observes a defendant's negligence cause the death or serious injury
of a relative. See Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 582-83, 336
S.E.2d 465, 467 (1985) (finding a mother who witnessed the severe injury of her
daughter could recover damages for emotional distress). Because K.S. did not
observe the death or serious injury of a relative, "bystander" recovery is irrelevant.
Second, South Carolina recognizes actions for negligent infliction of emotional
distress when a plaintiff suffers emotional distress in addition to physical injuries.
See Boan v. Blackwell, 343 S.C. 498, 502, 541 S.E.2d 242, 244 (2001) (stating a
plaintiff may recover for mental anguish that accompanies a physical injury).
Teacher's grabbing K.S.'s arm in the cafeteria is undoubtedly evidence of physical
contact. Still, the evidence does not demonstrate the grab physically harmed K.S.
K.S. testified that it hurt when Teacher grabbed him, but Seeger testified he could
not remember whether there were scratches on K.S.'s arm; did not remember
including anything about fingernails, scratches, or cuts in emails he sent the school
principal; and did not take any pictures. A forensic psychologist testified he assumed
he would know if Teacher physically injured K.S. but had no knowledge of her doing
so and that K.S.'s medical records did not indicate physical injury. Richland Two's
Director of Human Resources testified nobody reported a physical injury to her. We
therefore agree that there is no evidence K.S.'s mental anguish accompanied a
physical injury.
The third species of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims applies when
emotional trauma proximately causes bodily injury. See Padgett v. Colonial
Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 608, 103 S.E.2d 265, 272 (1958) ("If the
respondent's bodily injury was proximately caused by the shock, fright and
emotional upset as a result of the negligence and willfulness of the appellant, he was
entitled to recover such damages as would compensate him for the injury so
sustained."); Strickland v. Madden, 323 S.C. 63, 67, 448 S.E.2d 581, 584 (Ct. App.
1994) ("[T]o the extent [the plaintiff] can prove her bodily injury was proximately
caused by her emotional trauma she may recover for such trauma . . . ."). These
authorities appear to be Seeger's chief support for why he believes the circuit court's
decision to direct a verdict was incorrect.
We do not wish to diminish—in any way—the negative effects K.S. undoubtedly
experienced. Even so, we respectfully disagree with the argument that the evidence
in this case meets the standard set by these precedents. Some cases suggest suffering
from a nervous breakdown as a result of negligence would support a verdict, even if
no other injury was sustained. See, e.g., Spaugh v. A. Coast Line R. Co., 158 S.C.
25, 30, 155 S.E. 145, 147 (1930) ("Suffering from a nervous breakdown, as a result
of defendant's negligence, would support a verdict for the plaintiff, independent of
any other injury she sustained."); see also Turner v. A B C Jalousie Co. of N.C., 251
S.C. 92, 96, 160 S.E.2d 528, 530 (1968) ("[Respondent] specifically alleges that as
a result of the conduct of the appellant 'her nervous system collapsed'. Such is an
allegation of physical or bodily injury."). But one of those same cases counsels that
if a plaintiff whose sole damage is a nervous breakdown is going to prevail, the
defendant's conduct must be exceedingly bad such that severe emotional distress
would be expected to follow in a reasonable person. See. e.g., Turner, 251 S.C. at
97-98, 160 S.E.2d at 530 (Lewis, J. concurring) ("I construe the opinion of the Chief
Justice to hold that the complaint states a cause of action for severe emotional
distress resulting in physical or bodily injury, recklessly, willfully and wantonly
caused by the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct of the agent of defendant in
using, under the circumstances, vile, profane and abusive language towards
plaintiff."). Our cases on this type of claim are dated, but this view aligns with more
modern authority in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d
437, 446 (Tenn. 1996) (abandoning the physical manifestation rule and applying the
general negligence approach but only for emotional injuries so serious or severe a
reasonable person would not be able to cope with the stress the circumstances
caused). We think these formulations of the rule are correct. Nobody questions that
Teacher's conduct was inappropriate and improper. It nevertheless does not reach
the extreme level required, even if we view that conduct in the light most favorable
to Seeger.
This conclusion controls the case and makes it unnecessary to address Seeger's other
issues. Seeger argues he only had to prove negligence by a preponderance of the
evidence rather than gross negligence because the Safe School Climate Act waives
Richland Two's sovereign immunity under the Tort Claims Act. However, and as
we have described, Seeger cannot meet the bar of proving a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim. Seeger also argues the circuit court should not have
excluded the testimony of his expert about the standard of care, but because Seeger
cannot prove damages for the reasons given above, the expert's testimony would not
have made a difference. On both points, the fact Seeger lacks a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress is dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating
an appellate court does not need to review remaining issues when its determination
of a prior issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.
THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.