State v. Sanders ( 2016 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Fred Jack Sanders, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2014-001326
    Appeal From Richland County
    Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-514
    Heard September 22, 2016 – Filed December 14, 2016
    AFFIRMED
    Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
    Columbia, for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant
    Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr.; and Solicitor
    Daniel Edward Johnson, all of Columbia, for
    Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Fred J. Sanders appeals his convictions for manufacturing
    methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, possession of crack cocaine,
    possession with intent to distribute (PWID) heroin, and possession of a controlled
    substance (diazepam), arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to
    recharge the jury on the language of section 44–53–375(D)1 of the South Carolina
    Code2 and (2) denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm pursuant to Rule
    220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
    1. As to issue 1, we find the trial court did not err in denying Sanders's motion to
    recharge the jury on the language of section 44–53–375(D). See State v. Mattison,
    
    388 S.C. 469
    , 479, 
    697 S.E.2d 578
    , 584 (2010) ("An appellate court will not
    reverse the trial judge's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of
    discretion."); State v. Smith, 
    315 S.C. 547
    , 554, 
    446 S.E.2d 411
    , 415 (1994) ("The
    substance of the law is what must be instructed to the jury, not any particular
    verbiage."); State v. Austin, 
    299 S.C. 456
    , 458, 
    385 S.E.2d 830
    , 831 (1989) ("A
    request to charge a correct statement of the law on an issue raised by the
    indictment and the evidence presented at trial should not be refused."); 
    id.
    ("However, if the trial judge refuses to give a specific charge, there is no error if
    the charge actually given sufficiently covers the substance of the request."); State
    v. Adkins, 
    353 S.C. 312
    , 318, 
    577 S.E.2d 460
    , 464 (Ct. App. 2003) ("A jury charge
    is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition
    and adequately covers the law."). Here, the charge provided a correct statement of
    the law, and to the extent there was any error, such error was either harmless or
    inured to Sanders's benefit. See State v. Middleton, 
    407 S.C. 312
    , 317, 
    755 S.E.2d 432
    , 435 (2014) ("When considering whether an error with respect to a jury
    instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.'" (quoting State v. Kerr, 
    330 S.C. 132
    , 144–45, 
    498 S.E.2d 212
    , 218 (Ct. App. 1998))); 
    id.
     ("In making a
    harmless error analysis, our inquiry is not what the verdict would have been had
    the jury been given the correct charge, but whether the erroneous charge
    contributed to the verdict rendered." (quoting Kerr, 330 S.C. at 144–45, 498 S.E.2d
    at 218)); State v. Black, 
    400 S.C. 10
    , 27, 
    732 S.E.2d 880
    , 890 (2012) ("An
    1
    The most recent version of the statute is section 44–53–375(D) of the South
    Carolina Code (Supp. 2015), but we note its language is identical to the version in
    effect at the time of trial.
    2
    "Possession of equipment or paraphernalia used in the manufacture of cocaine,
    cocaine base, or methamphetamine is prima facie evidence of intent to
    manufacture." S.C. Code Ann. § 44–53–375(D) (Supp. 2015).
    appellate court generally will decline to set aside a conviction due to insubstantial
    errors not affecting the result.").
    2. As to issue 2, we find this issue is unpreserved. See State v. Benton, 
    338 S.C. 151
    , 157, 
    526 S.E.2d 228
    , 231 (2000) (explaining that an issue is unpreserved if a
    defendant argues one ground at trial and a different ground on appeal); State v.
    George, 
    323 S.C. 496
    , 510, 
    476 S.E.2d 903
    , 912 (1996) ("No issue is preserved for
    appellate review if the objecting party accepts the judge's ruling and does not
    contemporaneously make an additional objection to the sufficiency of the curative
    charge or move for a mistrial."); State v. Brown, 
    274 S.C. 48
    , 51, 
    260 S.E.2d 719
    ,
    721 (1979) ("[B]y this additional [jury] instruction the trial judge readily granted
    the only relief which appellant sought at trial."). Even on the merits, we find the
    trial court did not err in denying Sanders's motion for a mistrial. See State v.
    Stanley, 
    365 S.C. 24
    , 33, 
    615 S.E.2d 455
    , 460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The decision to
    grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge."); State v.
    Adams, 
    354 S.C. 361
    , 377, 
    580 S.E.2d 785
    , 793 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The less than
    lucid test is therefore declared to be whether the mistrial was dictated by manifest
    necessity or the ends of public justice." (quoting State v. Prince, 
    279 S.C. 30
    , 33,
    
    301 S.E.2d 471
    , 472 (1983))); State v. Walker, 
    366 S.C. 643
    , 658, 
    623 S.E.2d 122
    ,
    129 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Generally, a curative instruction is deemed to have cured
    any alleged error."); id. at 658, 623 S.E.2d at 130 ("A curative instruction to
    disregard incompetent evidence and not to consider it during deliberation is
    deemed to have cured any alleged error in its admission."). Further, as the non-
    prior bad acts evidence of Sanders's guilt is overwhelming, had there been any
    evidentiary error, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v.
    Brooks, 
    341 S.C. 57
    , 62–63, 
    533 S.E.2d 325
    , 328 (2000) (holding whether the
    improper introduction of prior bad acts is harmless requires the appellate court to
    review "the other evidence admitted at trial to determine whether the defendant's
    'guilt is conclusively proven by competent evidence, such that no other rational
    conclusion could be reached'" (quoting State v. Parker, 
    315 S.C. 230
    , 234, 
    433 S.E.2d 831
    , 833 (1993))); Adams, 354 S.C. at 381, 580 S.E.2d at 795 ("[A]n
    insubstantial error not affecting the result of the trial is harmless where 'guilt has
    been conclusively proven by competent evidence such that no other rational
    conclusion can be reached.'" (quoting State v. Bailey, 
    298 S.C. 1
    , 5, 
    377 S.E.2d 581
    , 584 (1989))).
    AFFIRMED.
    LOCKEMY, C.J., and GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-UP-514

Filed Date: 12/14/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024