Woodruff Road SC v. SC Greenville Hwy 146 ( 2017 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Woodruff Road SC, LLC, Appellant,
v.
SC Greenville Hwy 146, LLC, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000107
Appeal From Greenville County
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-002
Heard November 17, 2016 – Filed January 4, 2017
AFFIRMED
Robert L. Widener, of McNair Law Firm, PA, of
Columbia; and Bernie W. Ellis, of McNair Law Firm,
PA, of Greenville, for Appellant.
James H. Cassidy and Joseph Owen Smith, both of Roe
Cassidy Coates & Price, PA, of Greenville, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Woodruff Road SC, LLC (Appellant), owner of commercial
property identified as Tract B, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine
the scope of an easement granted to the owners of property identified as Tract A.
The current owner of Tract A is SC Greenville Hwy 146, LLC (Respondent). The
circuit court determined Respondent could utilize the easement as part of a drive-
thru for one of its tenants. We affirm.
1. We find the language of the easement permits Respondent to operate a
portion of a drive-thru window within the easement that indicates Tracts A and B
shall have a right of way in common for ingress and egress. See Clemson Univ. v.
First Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 650, 197 S.E.2d 914, 919 (1973) ("[T]he
owner of the easement cannot materially increase the burden of the servient estate
or impose thereon a new and additional burden." (quoting 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements
and Licenses § 72)); Ingress, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining
ingress as "the act of entering" or "the right or ability to enter; access"); Egress,
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining egress as "the act of going out of
leaving" or the right or ability to leave; a way of exit"); Ballington v. Paxton, 327
S.C. 372, 379, 488 S.E.2d 882, 886 (Ct. App. 1997) ("A 'right of way' means what
those words imply; it does not mean a way always open; it does not mean a way
without any obstruction. . . . The right reserved, is to pass and repass; and in the
absence of express language, that means to pass and repass in a reasonable
manner." (quoting Watson v. Hoke, 73 S.C. 361, 362, 535 S.E. 537, 537, (1906)).
Because the record demonstrates invitees to Tract A enter the easement, pause to
place their order, and then exit the easement, their activity falls within the meaning
of ingress and egress and does not create a new burden on Appellant.
Additionally, the record reflects Tract B invitees are currently able to enter and exit
the easement in a reasonable manner, and therefore, Appellant's right to a common
right of way for ingress and egress, as reserved by the language in the grant of the
easement, is not impaired.1
AFFIRMED.
LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
1
Based on our determination above, we need not address the remaining issues on
appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613,
518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding the appellate court need not address
remaining issue when disposition of prior issue is dispositive).