David Lee Meggett v. State of SC ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    David Lee Meggett, Petitioner,
    v.
    State of South Carolina, Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2018-000065
    Appeal From Charleston County
    G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-315
    Submitted June 1, 2022 – Filed July 27, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    Tricia    A.    Blanchette,    of   Law       Office     of
    Tricia A. Blanchette, LLC, of Leesville, for Petitioner.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney
    General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General W. Edgar Salter, III, and Senior Assistant Deputy
    Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of Columbia,
    for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
    authorities: Mack v. State, 
    433 S.C. 267
    , 272, 
    858 S.E.2d 160
    , 162 (2021) (holding
    that this court must uphold the PCR court's factual findings "if there is any evidence
    of probative value in the record to support them" (quoting Thompson v. State, 
    423 S.C. 235
    , 239, 
    814 S.E.2d 487
    , 489 (2018))); Mose v. State, 
    420 S.C. 500
    , 505, 
    803 S.E.2d 718
    , 720 (2017) ("In PCR actions, the burden of proof is on the applicant.");
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687–88, 692 (1984) (holding that in
    pursuing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR applicant must
    demonstrate that (1) counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness" and (2) "any deficiencies in counsel's performance [was] prejudicial
    to the defense."); id. at 690 ("[T]he court should recognize that counsel is strongly
    presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in
    the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."); id. at 694 ("The defendant must
    show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
    errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."); id. ("A reasonable
    probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.");
    Rivera v. Illinois, 
    556 U.S. 148
    , 153 (2009) ("Under Batson v. Kentucky . . . and later
    decisions building upon Batson, parties are constitutionally prohibited from
    exercising peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
    sex."); cf. Juniper v. Zook, 
    117 F. Supp. 3d 780
    , 792 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding that
    the proponent of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim "must show that, but for
    his trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to make certain arguments . . . the trial
    court would have found the prosecutor in violation of Batson").
    AFFIRMED.1
    GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-315

Filed Date: 7/27/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024