Barry Adickes v. Philips Healthcare ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Barry Adickes, Claimant, Respondent,
    v.
    Philips Healthcare, Employer, and Fidelity & Guarantee
    Insurance Company, Carrier, Appellants.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-001141
    Appeal From The Worker's Compensation Commission
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-316
    Submitted May 2, 2022 – Filed July 27, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    Brooke Ann Payne, of Payne Law Group, LLC, of Mt.
    Pleasant, for Appellants.
    William L. Smith, II and James David George, Jr., both
    of Chappell Smith & Arden, of Columbia, for
    Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: This case comes back to the Court of Appeals after remand to
    the Appellate Panel of the Worker's Compensation Commission ("the Appellate
    Panel") for calculation of Barry Adickes' (Respondent's) wage loss claim. Philips
    Healthcare and Fidelity Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, Appellants)
    appeal the recalculation and the Appellate Panel's issuance of sanctions/penalties
    against them for prematurely stopping lost wage payments and for failing to
    provide Adickes' prescription benefit. We affirm.
    1. Regarding Appellants' contention the Court of Appeals ruled the start date for
    the calculation was not January 17, 2014—the date of Adickes' termination—we
    conclude nothing in the opinion suggests a different start date for calculation and
    the opinion states the purpose of the statute is to replace wages the employee does
    not earn due to the injury. See Barry Adickes v. Philips Healthcare, Op. No. 2018-
    UP-027 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 17, 2018) ("PPD benefits are intended to
    compensate an injured claimant for the loss of earning capacity over the designated
    340 weeks from the date of injury, rather than compensate an injured claimant with
    a 340–week 'award' of PPD benefits for specific injuries."). The issue of maximum
    medical improvement (MMI) was raised, but the opinion does not address in any
    way how MMI impacts the calculation of lost wages pursuant to section 42-9-20 of
    the South Carolina Code (2015). Therefore, we affirm the single commissioner's
    calculation start date for the award.
    2. Regarding Appellants' argument the single commissioner erred in finding they
    prematurely terminated Adickes' payments, we find the final sentence of section
    42-9-20 indicates the seven weeks and five days Adickes was out of work
    following the accident does not count against the 340-week period prescribed in
    the statute. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-20
     ("In case the partial disability begins
    after a period of total disability, the latter period shall not be deducted from a
    maximum period allowed in this section for partial disability."); State v. Sweat, 
    379 S.C. 367
    , 377, 
    665 S.E.2d 645
    , 651 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A statute should be so
    construed that no word, clause, sentence, provision[,] or part shall be rendered
    surplusage . . . or superfluous[.]"); 
    id. at 382
    , 665 S.E.2d at 654 ("The General
    Assembly obviously intended [the statute' language] to have some efficacy, or the
    legislature would not have enacted it into law."); Bass v. Kenco Group., 
    366 S.C. 450
    , 466, 
    622 S.E.2d 577
    , 585 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding "the commissioner
    correctly applied section 42-9-20 and declined to give [the employer] a credit for
    temporary [total] benefits paid" in making a permanent, partial award).
    3. Regarding Appellants' contention the Appellate Panel erred in fining them for
    delays in providing Adickes' prescription benefit because any issues with the delay
    were not willful, we conclude substantial evidence in the record supports the fine.
    See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 42-3-175
    (A)(1) (2015) ("The commission may impose
    sanctions for willful disobedience of an order, including, but not limited to, a fine
    of up to five hundred dollars for each day of the violation."); Browder v. Browder,
    
    382 S.C. 512
    , 521, 
    675 S.E.2d 820
    , 825 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Willful disobedience
    requires an act to be 'done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to
    do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the
    law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or
    disregard the law.'" (quoting Spartanburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Padgett, 
    296 S.C. 79
    , 82-83, 
    370 S.E.2d 872
    , 874 (1988))); Thompson v. S.C. Steel Erectors,
    
    369 S.C. 606
    , 612, 
    632 S.E.2d 874
    , 877 (Ct. App. 2006) (explaining this court
    "review[s] facts based on the substantial evidence standard.").
    AFFIRMED.1
    WILLIAMS, C.J., AND KONDUROS AND VINSON, JJ., concur.
    1
    This case is decided without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-316

Filed Date: 7/27/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024