Mathes Auto Sales, Inc. v. Morris ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Mathes Auto Sales, Inc., Respondent/Appellant,
    v.
    Otis Morris, Jr., Pro Bowl Motors, Inc., Travelers
    Casualty & Surety Co. of America, Inc., Gerald Scott
    Dixon, Michael Tyrone Moore, and Dixon's Automotive,
    LLC, Defendants,
    Of Whom Otis Morris, Jr., Pro Bowl Motors, Inc., Gerald
    Scott Dixon, Michael Tyrone Moore, and Dixon's
    Automotive, LLC, are the Appellants/Respondents.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-000297
    Appeal From Richland County
    Joseph M. Strickland, Master-in-Equity
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-253
    Submitted May 2, 2022 – Filed June 8, 2022
    Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled July 20, 2022
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
    Leland B. Greeley, of Leland B. Greeley, P.A., of Rock
    Hill, for Appellants/Respondents Dixon Automotive,
    LLC, Gerald S. Dixon, and Michael T. Moore.
    H. Ronald Stanley, of the Stanley Law Group, of
    Columbia, for Appellants/Respondents Otis Morris, Jr.,
    and Pro Bowl Motors.
    J. Gregory Studemeyer, of Irmo, for
    Respondent/Appellant Mathes Auto Sales, Inc.
    PER CURIAM: Mathes Auto Sales, Inc. (MAS) filed this action against Otis
    Morris, Jr., Pro Bowl Motors, Inc. (Pro Bowl), Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of
    America, Inc. (Travelers), Gerald Scott Dixon, Michael Tyrone Moore, and
    Dixon's Automotive, LLC, alleging conversion, negligence, and violations of the
    South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) and the Regulation of
    Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act (Dealers Act). After a bench trial,
    the master-in-equity awarded MAS $70,736 in actual damages, $212,208 in
    punitive damages, and $102,489 in attorney's fees and costs. Morris and Pro Bowl
    appeal, arguing the master failed to set off the award with the amount MAS
    received in settlements and in calculating the punitive damages award. Dixon,
    Moore, and Dixon's Automotive appeal, arguing the master erred in denying their
    motion for nonsuit and in adding Dixon and Moore as individual defendants. MAS
    appeals, arguing the master erred in failing to award lost profits. We affirm as
    modified pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.1
    1.    We hold the master did not err in failing to set off the award with the amount
    MAS received in settlements. See Bardsley v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 
    405 S.C. 68
    ,
    78, 
    747 S.E.2d 436
    , 441 (2013) ("The collateral source rule provides that
    compensation which an injured party receives from a source wholly independent of
    a wrongdoer will not reduce the damages for which the wrongdoer is liable."); 
    id.
    (explaining the collateral source rule exists because "reducing recovery by the
    amount of the benefits received by the plaintiff would grant a windfall to the
    defendant . . . . If there is a windfall, it is considered more just that the injured
    person profit rather than grant the wrongdoer relief." (quoting 22 Am. Jur.
    2d Damages § 392)).
    2.   We modify the master's order regarding the award of punitive damages.
    Under the Dealers Act, the master awarded actual damages of $35,368, doubled the
    award to $70,736, and awarded punitive damages of three times the $70,736, or
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    $212,208. MAS conceded the punitive damages award should have been three
    times the actual damages rather than three times the doubled damages. We modify
    the award of punitive damages to $106,104, which is three times the actual
    damages of $35,368. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-110
    (3) (2018) (providing for
    three times actual damages in an award of punitive damages under the Dealers
    Act).
    3.      We find no error by the master in denying the motion for a nonsuit. See
    Rule 41(b), SCRCP (stating the defendant in a non-jury action may move for an
    involuntary nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff's case on the ground that "upon the
    facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief"); Shepard v. S.C. Dep't
    of Corr., 
    299 S.C. 370
    , 372, 
    385 S.E.2d 35
    , 36 (Ct. App. 1989) ("In an action at
    law tried before a judge sitting without a jury, the trial judge's findings of fact have
    the same force and effect as a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal when
    supported by competent evidence."); 
    id.
     ("If there is any evidence which
    reasonably tends to support the judge's findings, the judgment must be affirmed.");
    
    S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-40
    (B) (Supp. 2021) (providing that it is a violation of the
    Dealers Act for a dealer "to engage in any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or
    unconscionable and which causes damage to any of the parties or to the public");
    Taylor v. Nix, 
    307 S.C. 551
    , 555, 
    416 S.E.2d 619
    , 621 (1992) ("Arbitrary conduct
    is readily definable and includes acts which are unreasonable, capricious or
    nonrational; not done according to reason or judgment; depending on will alone.").
    4.     We affirm the master's order adding Dixon and Moore as individual
    defendants. Collins Ent. Inc. v. White, 
    363 S.C. 546
    , 562, 
    611 S.E.2d 262
    , 270 (Ct.
    App. 2005) ("It is well established that a motion to amend is addressed to the
    discretion of the trial judge, and the party opposing the motion has the burden of
    establishing prejudice."); 
    id.
     ("Amendments to conform to the proof should be
    liberally allowed when no prejudice to the opposing party will result.").
    5.     We find no error in the master's failure to award lost profits. See Taylor,
    
    307 S.C. at 556
    , 
    416 S.E.2d at 622
     ("[O]nly damages incurred as a result of the
    conduct in violation of [the Dealers Act] are recoverable and subject to doubling
    and punitive damages."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-110
    (1) (2018) (providing "any
    person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
    forbidden in this chapter may sue therefor in the court of common pleas and shall
    recover double the actual damages by him sustained"); Austin v. Specialty Transp.
    Servs., Inc., 
    358 S.C. 298
    , 311, 
    594 S.E.2d 867
    , 873 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Our task
    in reviewing a damages award is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine if
    there is any evidence to support the damages award.").
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
    THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-253

Filed Date: 7/20/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024