Chamblee v. Anderson County Fire Department ( 2017 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Sandy Chamblee, Appellant,
v.
Anderson County Fire Department, Employer, and State
Accident Fund, Carrier, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001862
Appeal From The Workers Compensation Commission
Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-215
Submitted March 1, 2017 – Filed May 24, 2017
AFFIRMED
Richard E. Thompson, Jr., of Thompson & King, of
Anderson, for Appellant.
Ian Charles Gohean, of Willson Jones Carter & Baxley,
P.A., of Greenville, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Sandy Chamblee filed a workers' compensation claim asserting
she suffered a permanent aggravation of a preexisting asthma and lung condition
on May 26, 2011, when she inhaled smoke while responding to a fire. The single
commissioner of the workers compensation commission (the Commission) issued a
decision and order denying Chamblee's claim in its entirety. The appellate panel of
the Commission affirmed the single commissioner's order. Chamblee appeals,
arguing the Commission erred in (1) finding she failed to carry her burden of
proving a compensable injury by accident or aggravation of her preexisting
condition and (2) allowing testimony related to the issue of when the employer was
notified of her alleged accident. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and
the following authorities:
1. As to whether the Commission erred in finding Chamblee failed to carry her
burden of proving a compensable injury: Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second
Injury Fund, 363 S.C. 612, 619, 611 S.E.2d 297, 300 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The South
Carolina Administrative Procedures Act establishes the standard for judicial review
of decisions of the workers' compensation commission."); Bursey v. S.C. Dep't of
Health & Envtl. Control, 360 S.C. 135, 141, 600 S.E.2d 80, 84 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A
court can reverse an agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions only if
they are . . . 'clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record . . . .'" (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e)
(Supp. 1994))); Ervin v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 386 S.C. 245, 249, 687 S.E.2d
337, 339 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding a claimant must show she suffered an injury by
accident which arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment to
receive compensation for an injury); id. (holding the claimant bears the burden of
proving the incident is compensable); Mullinax v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 318
S.C. 431, 435, 458 S.E.2d 76, 78 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Where the medical evidence
conflicts, the findings of fact of the [Appellate Panel] are conclusive."); Hargrove
v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 295, 599 S.E.2d 604, 613-14 (Ct. App. 2004)
("A work-related accident which aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing condition,
infirmity, or disease is compensable . . . unless it is due solely to the natural
progression of a pre-existing condition."); id. at 295, 599 S.E.2d at 614 ("The
right of a claimant to compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing condition
arises only where there is a dormant condition which has produced no disability
but which becomes disabling by reason of the aggravating injury."); id. ("A
determination of whether a claimant's condition was accelerated or aggravated by
an accidental injury is a factual matter for the Appellate Panel."); id. ("Where there
is a conflict in the evidence from the same or different witnesses, the [Appellate]
Panel's findings of fact may not be set aside.").
2. As to whether the Commission erred in allowing testimony related to the issue
of when her employer was notified of her alleged accident: S.C. Dep't of Transp. v.
First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301-02, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007)
(stating an issue must have been "(1) raised to and ruled upon by the trial court, (2)
raised by the appellant, (3) raised in a timely manner, and (4) raised to the trial
court with sufficient specificity[,]" to be preserved for appellate review").
AFFIRMED.1
LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.