State v. Danny J. Plumley ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
State of South Carolina, Appellant,
v.
Danny Jame Plumley, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2019-000882
Appeal From Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 2022-UP-292
Heard March 10, 2022 – Filed July 13, 2022
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and, Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III,
Solicitor, of Greenville, all for Appellant.
David Alan Wilson, of Wilson & Englebardt, LLC, of
Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The State appeals the circuit court's order affirming the
magistrate court's suppression of David Jame Plumley's blood-alcohol-
concentration (BAC) test.1 The State argues law enforcement was not required to
give Plumley the implied-consent warning provided by section 56-1-2130 of the
South Carolina Code (2018) because even though Plumley held a commercial
driver's license (CDL), he was not driving a commercial vehicle when he was
stopped for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI). Additionally, the
State contends that even if Plumley was entitled to the advisement provided in
section 56-1-2130, law enforcement's failure to give it did not prejudice him.
We reverse and remand.
Section 56-l-2130(A) incorporates by reference section 56-5-2950 of the South
Carolina Code (2018)—the implied-consent statute applicable to all drivers.
Section 56-5-2950(J) provides BAC test results may be excluded if proper
policies and procedures are not followed and "if the trial judge or hearing officer
finds this failure materially affected the accuracy or reliability of the test results or
the fairness of the testing procedure." (emphasis added). The State maintains
unless the failure to give the CDL implied-consent warning prejudiced Plumley in
some way, the fairness of the testing procedure was not affected and his BAC test
result should not have been suppressed. We agree.
In Taylor v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, the court examined
whether the failure to give a driver his implied consent warnings in writing was
prejudicial when the driver had been given the warning verbally and claimed to
have understood it. 368 S.C. 33, 38-39, 627 S.E.2d 751, 753-54 (Ct. App. 2006),
aff'd, 382 S.C. 567, 677 S.E.2d 588 (2009). The court reasoned "Taylor does not
argue . . . he would have provided a blood test[2] [instead of refusing it] if he had
received the implied[-]consent rights in writing. Therefore, Taylor was not
prejudiced by the fact that [the arresting officer] read the implied[-]consent rights
out loud." Id. at 38, 627 S.E.2d at 754.
1
See State v. Looper, 421 S.C. 384, 387, 807 S.E.2d 203, 204 (2017) (explaining
"the State may immediately appeal an interlocutory order 'granting the
suppression of evidence which significantly impairs the prosecution of a
criminal case.'" (quoting State v. McKnight, 287 S.C. 167, 168, 337 S.E.2d 208,
209 (1985))).
2
The officer determined Taylor could not perform a BAC test due to mouth
injuries sustained in the subject automobile accident. See id. at 35, 627 S.E.2d at
752.
In Carroll v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Carroll testified he
likely would have refused the BAC test, instead of submitting to it, if he had
received the proper warnings. 388 S.C. 39, 44, 693 S.E.2d 430, 433 (Ct. App.
2010). In spite of his assertions the written warning would have changed his
decision, the court still "defer[red] to the [administrative law court]'s factual
findings regarding whether Carroll verbally received and understood his
implied[-]consent rights prior to testing." Id.Taylor and Carroll indicate the effect an implied-consent warning deficiency has
on the driver's conduct is an important factor to consider.3 In this case, Plumley
was properly given a general implied-consent warning and elected, based on that
information, to submit to the BAC test. He consented to the BAC test when
knowingly facing a six-month suspension of his driver's license for refusing to do
so. To presume he would have altered course and refused the test if he had been
informed of a lengthier, one-year suspension of his CDL, requires too great a leap
in logic. 4
Plumley maintains the failure to give the CDL implied-consent warning renders the
testing procedure unfair per se because he could not have knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights without the CDL warning. See State v. Reed, 332
S.C. 35, 45, 503 S.E.2d 747, 752 (1998) ("[W]aiver of a constitutional or statutory
right requires a showing on the record that the defendant made the waiver
knowingly and intelligently."). However, the right Plumley waived was the right
to refuse the BAC test. He was aware he had the right to refuse testing based on
the warning that was given. See Town of Mount Pleasant v. Shaw, 315 S.C. 111,
113-14, 432 S.E.2d 450, 451 (1993) (indicating if the defendant "is neither tricked
nor misled into thinking he has no right to refuse the test to determine the alcohol
content in his blood, urine[,] or breath, the test will generally be held admissible")
(emphasis added by court) (quoting Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 113 (Wyo.
1985))); id. at 113, 432 S.E.2d at 451 ("[A]n [implied-consent] advisory is
sufficient if, construed as a whole, it provides the driver adequate notice that he
may, if he so elects . . . refuse the test."). Because the failure to give the CDL
warning did not affect the fairness of the testing procedure, Plumley suffered no
3
Taylor and Carroll are both cases arising out of Administrative Law Court
proceedings, but they address the existence of prejudice in the context of a failure
to receive implied-consent warnings as prescribed by law.
4
The record and briefs do not indicate Plumley was employed as a CDL driver at
the time of his traffic stop.
prejudice from the warning's omission. 5 Accordingly, we find the circuit court
erred in affirming the magistrate court's suppression of the BAC test, and we
reverse the circuit court's order and remand to the magistrate court for trial.
The circuit court's order is
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.
5
We decline to address the State's argument Plumley was not entitled to the
advisement set forth in section 56-1-2130, because even if he was entitled to
such advisement, the failure to give it did not materially affect the fairness of
the testing procedure. See Whiteside v. Cherokee Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 311
S.C. 335, 340, 428 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1993) (declining to address the remaining
issues on appeal based on the disposition of an issue that finally determined the
case).