Jada Garris v. Lexington School District One ( 2022 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Jada Garris, Respondent,
    v.
    Lexington School District One, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2020-000770
    Appeal From Lexington County
    William A. McKinnon, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-297
    Submitted June 1, 2022 – Filed July 13, 2022
    AFFIRMED
    David T. Duff and David Nelson Lyon, both of Duff
    Freeman Lyon, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.
    Andrew Sims Radeker and Taylor Meriwether Smith, IV,
    both of Harrison, Radeker & Smith, P.A., of Columbia,
    for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Lexington School District One (the District) appeals the trial
    court's order awarding Jada Garris attorneys' fees and costs. On appeal, the
    District argues the trial court (1) abused its discretion in awarding Garris the full
    amount of attorneys' fees when she prevailed only in part, (2) abused its discretion
    in awarding attorneys' fees for claims Garris dismissed or abandoned prior to trial,
    and (3) erred in finding that the District did not contest certain factors enumerated
    in Burton v. York Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't.1 We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
    SCACR.
    We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Garris the full
    amount of attorneys' fees. See Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 
    382 S.C. 8
    , 20, 
    675 S.E.2d 439
    , 445 (2009) ("The decision to award or deny attorneys'
    fees under a state statute will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
    discretion."). Garris prevailed as to a claim at trial and as to the claims she
    removed from her complaint, which related to information the District produced
    prior to trial, but after the commencement of litigation. Further, the trial court
    thoroughly considered the Burton factors and although the District argues the trial
    court erred in determining it did not contest factors one or two, as the trial court
    determined in its amended decision, the District did not provide anything in
    support of its contentions as to these factors. See Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc.,
    
    393 S.C. 152
    , 156, 
    711 S.E.2d 895
    , 897 (2011) ("An abuse of discretion occurs
    when the conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an error of law or
    are based on unsupported factual conclusions." (quoting Kiriakides, 
    382 S.C. at 20
    ,
    
    675 S.E.2d at 445
    )); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-100
    (B) (Supp. 2021) ("If a person or
    entity seeking relief under [the Freedom of Information Act2] prevails, [s]he may
    be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and other costs of litigation specific to the
    request. If the person or entity prevails in part, the court may in its discretion
    award [her] reasonable attorney's fees or an appropriate portion of those attorney's
    fees."); Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia, 
    414 S.C. 213
    , 224, 
    777 S.E.2d 835
    , 841
    (Ct. App. 2015) ("Under this section, the only prerequisite to an award of attorney's
    fees and costs is that the party seeking relief must prevail, in whole or in part."
    (quoting Campbell v. Marion Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 
    354 S.C. 274
    , 288-89, 
    580 S.E.2d 163
    , 170 (Ct. App. 2003)); Sloan, 
    393 S.C. at 156
    , 
    711 S.E.2d at 897
     ("[A]
    prevailing party is 'one who successfully prosecutes an action or successfully
    defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not to the extent of
    the original contention [and] is the one in whose favor the decision or verdict is
    rendered and judgment entered." (alteration in original) (quoting Heath v. County
    1
    
    358 S.C. 339
    , 358, 
    594 S.E.2d 888
    , 898 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating the factors a trial
    court must consider when determining an award of attorneys' fees: (1) the nature,
    extent, and difficulty of the case, (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case, (3)
    professional standing of counsel, (4) contingency of compensation, (5) customary
    legal fees for similar services, and (6) beneficial results obtained).
    2
    
    S.C. Code Ann. §§ 30-4-10
     to -165 (2007 & Supp. 2021).
    of Aiken, 
    302 S.C. 178
    , 182-83, 
    394 S.E.2d 709
    , 711 (1990))); id. at 157, 
    711 S.E.2d at 897
     ("When a public body frustrates a citizen's FOIA request to the
    extent that the citizen must seek relief in the courts and incur litigation costs, the
    public body should not be able to preclude prevailing party status to the citizen by
    producing the documents after litigation is filed."); Burton, 358 S.C. at 358, 594
    S.E.2d at 898 (stating that a trial court considers the following six factors when
    determining whether to award attorneys' fees: (1) the nature, extent, and difficulty
    of the case, (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case, (3) professional standing
    of counsel, (4) contingency of compensation, (5) customary legal fees for similar
    services, and (6) beneficial results obtained).
    Because the resolution of the prior issues is dispositive, we need not address
    the portion of issue three regarding section 30-4-100(A) of the South Carolina
    Code (Supp. 2021). See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 
    335 S.C. 598
    , 613, 
    518 S.E.2d 591
    , 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address
    remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
    AFFIRMED. 3
    THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.
    3
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-UP-297

Filed Date: 7/13/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024