SCDSS v. Freeman ( 2017 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,
v.
Laura Freeman and David Freeman, Defendants,
Of whom David Freeman is the Appellant.
In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2016-001672
Appeal From Greenville County
Rochelle Y. Conits, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-251
Submitted June 12, 2017 – Filed June 19, 2017
AFFIRMED
Matthew P. Head, of Head Law Firm, LLC, of
Greenville, for Appellant.
Rebecca Rush Wray, of South Carolina Department of
Social Services, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Robert A. Clark, of Greenville, for the Guardian ad
Litem.
PER CURIAM: David Freeman (Father) appeals the family court's order
terminating his parental rights to his minor son and daughter (Children). On
appeal, Father argues the family court erred in finding clear and convincing
evidence showed termination of parental rights (TPR) was in Children's best
interest. We affirm.
On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011); Lewis
v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). Although this court
reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the fact
that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to
evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Lewis,
392 S.C. at 385, 709 S.E.2d at 651-52. Further, de novo review does not relieve
the appellant of the burden of convincing this court that the preponderance of the
evidence is against the findings of the family court. Id. at 392, 709 S.E.2d at 655.
"A primary objective of the TPR statutes is to free children for the stability
adoption can provide." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Janice C., 383 S.C. 221, 230,
678 S.E.2d 463, 468 (Ct. App. 2009); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010)
(providing the purpose of the TPR statute is "to establish procedures for the
reasonable and compassionate [TPR] where children are abused, neglected, or
abandoned in order to protect the health and welfare of these children and make
them eligible for adoption by persons who will provide a suitable home
environment and the love and care necessary for a happy, healthful, and productive
life").
The family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of twelve statutory
grounds is satisfied and also finding TPR is in the best interest of the child. S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2016). The TPR statute "must be liberally
construed in order to ensure prompt judicial procedures for freeing minor children
from the custody and control of their parents by terminating the parent-child
relationship." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010).
In a TPR case, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. S.C.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App.
2000). "The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the
parental rights conflict." § 63-7-2620. "Appellate courts must consider the child's
perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when determining whether
TPR is appropriate." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741
S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013). "Parents have a fundamental interest in the care,
custody, and management of their children. . . . However, a child has a
fundamental interest in terminating parental rights if the parent-child relationship
inhibits establishing secure, stable, and continuous relationships found in a home
with proper parental care." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 364 S.C. 621,
626, 614 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2005).
We find TPR is in Children's best interest. Both the Department of Social Services
(DSS) and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) believed TPR was in Children's best
interest. Father tested positive for cocaine shortly after law enforcement removed
Children from the home in March 2015. Father admitted he neglected to take a
requested drug screen in December 2015 and tested positive for cocaine in March
2016—approximately three months before the TPR hearing. Richard Sevilla, a
DSS caseworker, testified Father failed to complete drug treatment. Therefore,
Father's ongoing issues regarding cocaine and his failure to obtain treatment makes
it unlikely he will be able to provide a suitable home for Children in the
foreseeable future. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cummings, 345 S.C. 288, 298,
547 S.E.2d 506, 511 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding the mother's history of drug relapse
was a significant factor in determining TPR was in the child's best interest).
We acknowledge DSS did not present direct testimony stating an adoptive
placement had been identified for Children. However, we are not aware of—and
Father does not cite to—any authority that requires DSS to identify an adoptive
placement for children before the family court can order TPR. Further, we
acknowledge evidence suggested Children had a meaningful bond with Father.
Under these facts, however, we find the risk to Children's safety due to Father's
failure to complete drug treatment and Children's need for stability and
permanency outweigh any bond Children may have with Father. See S.C. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Cameron N.F.L., 403 S.C. 323, 331, 742 S.E.2d 697, 701 (Ct. App.
2013) ("We do not believe the existence of a bond alone is significant enough to
preserve parental rights."). Father has had sufficient opportunities to remedy his
drug habit and obtain treatment, and Children should not have to continue to wait
to see if he will remedy the situation. Therefore, we find TPR is in Children's best
interest.
AFFIRMED.1
GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.