Lani and Amanda Johnson v. Shianne Leigh Jarrett ( 2022 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Lani and Amanda Johnson, Respondents/Appellants,
v.
Shianne Leigh Jarrett and Derek Deas, Defendants,
Of whom Shianne Leigh Jarrett is the
Appellant/Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2021-000966
Appeal From Greenville County
Thomas T. Hodges, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-324
Submitted July 26, 2022 – Filed August 3, 2022
AFFIRMED
Heather Vry Scalzo, of Offit Kurman, of Spartanburg, for
Appellant/Respondent Shianne Leigh Jarrett.
David Alan Wilson, of Wilson & Englebardt, LLC, of
Greenville, for Respondents/Appellants Lani and
Amanda Johnson.
Jonathan Drew Hammond, of Greenville, as the Guardian
ad Litem.
PER CURIAM: Shianne Leigh Jarrett (Mother) and Lani and Amanda Johnson
(the Johnsons) cross appeal a family court order terminating Mother's parental
rights to her minor child (Child). Mother argues the family court erred in finding
(1) she willfully failed to support Child and (2) termination of parental rights
(TPR) was in Child's best interest. The Johnsons argue the family court erred in
finding they did not show Mother (1) willfully failed to visit Child or (2) failed to
remedy the conditions that caused Child's removal. We affirm.
On appeal from the family court, "this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de
novo." Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).
Although this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, it is not required to
ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a
better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony. See Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385-86, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651-52
(2011).
The family court may order TPR upon finding a statutory ground for TPR is met
and TPR is in the children's best interests. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp.
2021). The grounds "must be proved by clear and convincing evidence." S.C.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 254, 519 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App.
1999).
We find clear and convincing evidence showed Mother willfully failed to support
Child. See § 63-7-2570(4) (providing a statutory ground for TPR is met when a
"child has lived outside the home of either parent for a period of six months, and
during that time the parent has wil[l]fully failed to support the child"); id.
(explaining "[f]ailure to support means that the parent has failed to make a material
contribution to the child's care"); id. ("A material contribution consists of either
financial contributions according to the parent's means or contributions of food,
clothing, shelter, or other necessities for the care of the child according to the
parent's means."). Mother admitted that from November 2017 to March 2019, she
provided no monetary support for Child, and she gave no testimony indicating she
was unable to work during that time. Mother also agreed with testimony by Lani
Johnson, Child's custodian, that within six months of Child's removal, Mother gave
Child clothing on one occasion and provided some baby food, "a toy or two," and
"a pack of diapers here and there." We find these items did not constitute a
material contribution. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. M.R.C.L., 393 S.C. 387, 394,
712 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2011) ("Although mother had no independent source of
income, occasionally providing child with food, drinks, medicine, diapers, wipes,
and toys would not be considered a material contribution."). Thus, we find clear
and convincing evidence supports this TPR ground.
We also find TPR is in Child's best interest. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith,
343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case, the best
interests of the children are the paramount consideration."); S.C. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate
courts must consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary
concern when determining whether TPR is appropriate."). Child was removed
from Mother's care in November 2017, when she was six months old, and placed
with the Johnsons; by the time of the July 2021 TPR hearing, Child had lived with
the Johnsons for almost four years. By Mother's own admission, she was not ready
to care for Child until approximately two months before the TPR hearing—three
and a half years after Child was removed from her care. Moreover, the guardian ad
litem testified that although Mother had recently made significant improvements,
he believed TPR was in Child's best interest due to the length of time Child had
been living with the Johnsons and Child's deep bond with them. Thus, we find
TPR is in Child's best interest.1
AFFIRMED. 2
GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
1
Although the Johnsons argue the family court erred in finding they failed to prove
two other statutory grounds for TPR, because we find clear and convincing
evidence showed Mother willfully failed to support Child and TPR was in Child's
best interest, we decline to address the these grounds. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 613, 582 S.E.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address a
statutory ground for TPR after concluding clear and convincing evidence
supported another ground).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.