State v. Hayes ( 2018 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Favian Alphonso Hayes, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2009-129706
    Appeal From Sumter County
    Howard P. King, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-025
    Submitted November 6, 2017 – Filed January 17, 2018
    AFFIRMED
    Appellate Defenders Lara Mary Caudy and John
    Harrison Strom, both of Columbia, for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
    Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
    Columbia, and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of
    Sumter, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Appellant Favian Alphonso Hayes appeals his guilty plea to
    armed robbery, conspiracy, and drug possession. Hayes argues he did not freely,
    voluntarily, and intelligently plead guilty because the plea court improperly denied
    his motion to relieve counsel based on an alleged conflict of interest.
    We find Hayes's appellate argument unpreserved because he makes a different
    argument on appeal than he made during the plea hearing.1 See Wilder Corp. v.
    Wilke, 
    330 S.C. 71
    , 76, 
    497 S.E.2d 731
    , 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue
    cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
    upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for appellate review."); State v. Carlson,
    
    363 S.C. 586
    , 597, 
    611 S.E.2d 283
    , 288 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining a party "may
    not argue one ground below and another on appeal" (quoting State v. Adams, 
    354 S.C. 361
    , 380, 
    580 S.E.2d 785
    , 795 (Ct. App. 2003))); 
    id.
     at 595–96, 611 S.E.2d at
    288 (noting "constitutional arguments are no exception to the error preservation
    rule").
    During the plea hearing, Hayes's argument focused on plea counsel's carelessness
    in allowing a third party to temporarily obtain possession of photographs from
    Hayes's discovery materials. Hayes also made vague assertions that plea counsel
    lacked interest in his case. However, on appeal, Hayes's argument that plea
    counsel had a conflict of interest focuses on plea counsel's former representation of
    that third party who was a potential witness for the State against Hayes. At no time
    during the plea hearing did Hayes argue plea counsel had a conflict of interest due
    to his former representation of the third party. Thus, because Hayes makes a
    different argument on appeal than he made during the plea hearing, his appellate
    argument is unpreserved.
    Additionally, to the extent the plea court noted plea counsel's former representation
    of the third party, the short colloquy between the plea court and plea counsel was
    1
    This case has an extensive procedural history. Initially, this Court dismissed
    Hayes's direct appeal due to plea counsel's failure to file a guilty plea explanation
    as required by Rule 203(d)(1)(B)(iv), SCACR. Hayes then pursued an
    unsuccessful post-conviction relief (PCR) action. Following the conclusion of his
    PCR action, Hayes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the federal
    district court. The district court adopted the magistrate court's report and
    recommendation to grant the writ of habeas corpus. The district court found Hayes
    was entitled to a direct appeal and ordered our supreme court to restore his direct
    appeal rights. Importantly, the district court did not make any findings regarding
    the merits of Hayes's direct appeal issues. Thus, the posture of this appeal is as if
    Hayes had successfully perfected his direct appeal following his guilty plea, and all
    of our procedural rules, including issue preservation, are applicable.
    inadequate to preserve Appellant's argument on appeal. When the plea court sua
    sponte inquired whether there was a conflict of interest due to plea counsel's
    former representation of the third party, plea counsel conceded there was no
    conflict. Appellant did not object to plea counsel's concession. Thus, to the
    limited extent this issue was discussed with the plea court, we find Appellant
    conceded the issue. See State v. Gilmore, 
    396 S.C. 72
    , 84, 
    719 S.E.2d 688
    , 694
    (Ct. App. 2011) (explaining an issue conceded in the circuit court cannot be argued
    on appeal). Furthermore, a trial court's sua sponte recognition of a potential issue
    and subsequent conclusion, without objection, that no problem existed is not
    enough to preserve an issue for appellate review. See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt.
    Pleasant, 
    338 S.C. 406
    , 422, 
    526 S.E.2d 716
    , 724 (2000) (noting "the long-
    established preservation requirement that the losing party generally must both
    present his issues and arguments to the [circuit] court and obtain a ruling before an
    appellate court will review those issues and arguments"). Accordingly, we affirm
    Appellant's guilty plea because his appellate argument is unpreserved.
    AFFIRMED. 2
    WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    2
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-UP-025

Filed Date: 1/17/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024