Ward v. ArcelorMittal Georgetown, Inc. ( 2018 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Rodney Ward, Appellant,
v.
ArcelorMittal Georgetown, Inc., Employer, and New
Hampshire Insurance Company, Carrier, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2016-000510
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-021
Submitted November 1, 2017 – Filed January 10, 2018
AFFIRMED
Raymond Carl Fischer and William Stuart Duncan, both
of Georgetown, for Appellant.
Francis Drake Rogers, III, Stephen Lynwood Brown, and
Catherine Holland Chase, all of Young Clement Rivers,
of Charleston, for Respondent ArcelorMittal
Georgetown, Inc.
Francis Drake Rogers, III, of Young Clement Rivers, of
Charleston, for Respondent New Hampshire Insurance
Company.
PER CURIAM: Rodney Ward appeals the decision of the Appellate Panel of the
Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel). He argues the
Appellate Panel erred in finding (1) Ward failed to give ArcelorMittal
Georgetown, Inc. (ArcelorMittal) timely notice of his repetitive trauma injury; (2)
Ward failed to timely file his claim; (3) the equitable doctrine of laches barred
Ward's claim; and (4) Ward failed to establish his work with ArcelorMittal caused
his repetitive trauma injury. We affirm. 1
We find the Appellate Panel did not err in finding Ward failed to provide
ArcelorMittal with timely notice of his repetitive trauma injury. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 42-15-20(C) (2015) ("In the case of repetitive trauma, notice must be given
by the employee within ninety days of the date the employee discovered, or could
have discovered by exercising reasonable diligence, that his condition is
compensable, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the
commission for not giving timely notice, and the commission is satisfied that the
employer has not been unduly prejudiced thereby."); King v. Int'l Knife &
Saw-Florence, 395 S.C. 437, 444, 718 S.E.2d 227, 230 (Ct. App. 2011) ("An
employee's obligation to report a work-related repetitive trauma injury is not
triggered by the onset of pain but, rather, by the employee's diligent discovery that
his condition is compensable."); id. at 444, 718 S.E.2d at 230-31 ("[A]
work-related repetitive trauma injury does not become compensable, and the
ninety-day reporting clock does not start, until the injured employee discovers or
should discover he qualifies to receive benefits for medical care, treatment, or
disability due to his condition."); Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 475, 617 S.E.2d
369, 380 (Ct. App. 2005) (providing in a repetitive trauma case, a claimant's
ninety-day period to notify his employer of his injury is separate from the two-year
statute of limitations period to file his claim); id. at 476, 617 S.E.2d at 380
("Generally, the injury is not compensable if timely notice is not given.").
Because our decision on the issue of timely notice is dispositive, we need not
address Ward's remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of a prior issue
is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.